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Zusammenfassung 
Die vorliegende Dissertation beschäftigt sich hauptsächlich mit zwei Fragen: Erstens, welche Faktoren beein-
flussen den Prozess, durch den sich neue Technologien unter Firmen verbreiten? Zweitens, welche Konsequen-
zen ergeben sich aus der Verbreitung neuer Technologien? Beide Fragen beschäftigen sich mit der Dynamik des 
technologischen Wandels. Die Analyse wird am konkreten Beispiel von e-Business Technologien durchgeführt. 
Dabei werden insbesondere die Konsequenzen von interdependenten Technologien untersucht. Es wird ge-
zeigt, dass es zu steigenden Erträgen der Adoption kommen kann, wenn verwandte Technologien sich nicht in 
ihren Funktionalitäten substituieren. Dies kann zu einer endogenen Beschleunigung der technologischen Ent-
wicklung führen. Dies bedeutet, dass die Wahrscheinlichkeit der Adoption einer Technologie mit der Anzahl der 
zuvor adoptierten, verwandten Technologien ansteigt. Diese Theorie wird empirisch getestet und in vier ver-
schiedenen Untersuchungen mit zwei verschiedenen, großen Datensätzen bestätigt. Die Existenz einer wachsen-
den digitalen Kluft in der e-Business Technologie-Ausstattung der Unternehmen wird für den Zeitraum von 
1994-2002 nachgewiesen.  
Außerdem wird argumentiert, dass die Adoption neuer Technologien in Firmen strategische Bedeutung hat da 
sich daraus Möglichkeiten zur Durchführung von Innovationen ergeben. Diese können sich entweder durch re-
duzierte Produktionkosten für bestehende Produkte, neue Produkte und Dienstleistungen, oder neue Distributi-
onskanäle manifestieren. Empirische Evidenz zeigt, dass e-Business Technologien derzeit wichtige Enabler von 
Innovationen sind und dass innovative Firmen mit höherer Wahrscheinlichkeit wachsen. Außerdem wird ge-
zeigt, dass durch e-Business Technologien induzierte Innovationen gegenüber anderen Innovationsarten nicht 
inferior sind in Bezug auf deren gleichzeitiges Auftreten mit finanziellen Leistungsindikatoren.  
Die Arbeit diskutiert die Implikationen dieser Ergebnisse aus volks- und betriebswirtschaftlicher Perspektive. 
 
Schlagworte: Technologischer Wandel, Innovation, Diffusion, Adoption, verwandte Technologien, endo-
gene Beschleunigung, e-business, IKT, Wettbewerbsfähigkeit, Performanz 
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Abstract 
 
This dissertation primarily deals with two questions: First, what determines the process by which new tech-
nologies spread among enterprises over time? Second, what are the consequences of the spread of new tech-
nologies? Both questions concern the dynamics of technological change. They are analyzed considering the 
diffusion and implications of e-business technologies as a concrete example. 
Particular attention is given to technological interdependencies. It is shown that increasing returns to adoption 
can arise if related technologies do not substitute each other in their functionalities. This can lead to an endoge-
nous acceleration of technological development. Hence, the probability to adopt any technology is an increasing 
function of previously adopted, related technologies. The theory is empirically tested and supported in four in-
dependent inquiries, using two different exceptionally large datasets and different econometric methods. The 
existence of a growing digital divide among companies is demonstrated for the period between 1994 and 2002. 
In addition, it is argued that the adoption of new e-business technologies by firms has strategic relevance be-
cause this creates opportunities to conduct innovation, either to reduce production costs for a given output, to 
create a new product or service, or to deliver products to customers in a way that is new to the enterprise. Em-
pirical evidence is presented showing that e-business technologies are currently an important enabler of innova-
tions. It is found that innovative firms are more likely to grow. Also, e-business related innovations are not 
found to be inferior to traditional kinds of innovations in terms of simultaneous occurrence with superior finan-
cial performance of enterprises.  
Implications of these findings are discussed both for economists and management researchers. 
 
Keywords: Technological change, innovation, diffusion, adoption, related technologies, endogenous ac-
celeration, e-business, ICT, firm performance, competitive advantage 
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 PART  I 
1. Introduction 
1.1. Purpose 
Formel-Kapitel 1 Abschnitt 1 
The research results presented here primarily deal with two questions. The first question is the fundamental 
question in diffusion research: What determines the process by which new technologies spread among enter-
prises over time? The second question arises directly from the first: What are the consequences of the spread of 
new technologies? 
Both questions essentially concern the topic of technological change and progress. Understanding the diffu-
sion of new technologies and their consequences means understanding an essential part of technological change. 
This topic has intrigued economists and business scientists likewise for a long time. It hardly seems necessary to 
point out its importance. We look to technological progress to rescue us from the consequences of exhausting 
natural resources, to cure lethal diseases, to outsmart our competitors by exploiting new opportunities, to in-
crease our wealth by making better use of the resources we have, to improve quality of life by saving time from 
things we do not like to do, to provide us with new forms of entertainment, and many other things. Technologi-
cal progress has brought to us a wealth of tools and utilities that have effectively changed the way we live and 
work, among them engines, machinery, electricity, airplanes, telephones, computers, and the Internet. 
However, the invention of a new technology is only a necessary, not a sufficient condition yet for technical 
advance. Many new methods and products often find no immediate commercial application. Also, even poten-
tially beneficial technologies are usually not adopted by everyone instantaneously. Instead, diffusion of new 
technologies is a dynamic process that features pioneer users, followers, and typically also a number of non-
adopters. To understand these processes, one needs to concern issues that are among the more challenging to 
analyze: Diffusion is dynamic and hence time-dependent, uncertainty is inherent, heterogeneity of enterprises 
and markets plays a role, specific technological characteristics have to be considered, and imperfections are om-
nipresent. It is an important and exciting research field, both for economists and business scientists. Because of 
this, one of the purposes of this text is to look at technological change from both perspectives, trying to bridge 
the gap between the economics and the management literature on various occasions and drawing conclusions for 
both audiences. 
Certainly, the scope of technological change can vary substantially for different kinds of technologies. Some 
new technologies may only have minor impact on production processes and competition, or have limited areas 
of applications. Other technologies may be applicable in many areas and may have considerable influence. Such 
general purpose technologies include steam power, electricity, computers, or the Internet. The focus in this text 
is on e-business technologies, which constitute a number of related information and communication technologies 
(ICT) that are jointly based on the Internet. The purpose of these technologies is to support business processes, 
both within a company or between a company and its environment. Related technologies rarely stand alone. This 
makes the analysis of the diffusion of e-business technologies particularly interesting, because some of these 
technologies might be complements or constitute a pre-requisite for the adoption of another application. Also, 
firms that have already collected experience with one or more of these technologies might have learning effects 
that make the adoption of another related technology more attractive. If such effects prevail, what will be the 
consequences for technological development? Which diffusion patterns can we expect to find? 
Ever since the end of the “dot.com bubble”, there has been a very lively debate about the relevance and the 
impact of ICT and e-business technologies among economists, business scientists, managers, and in the public 
media. Therefore, another relevant question in this context is: Does IT matter, and if so, how?  
The aim of this work is to make a contribution towards our understanding of these issues. 
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1.2. Contributions 
This thesis contributes to the existing literature in a number of aspects. On the theoretical side, an underpin-
ning of the effects of related technologies is offered. Specifically, it is argued that various factors, such as tech-
nological complementarities, learning effects, absorptive capacity and imperfections of financial markets, can 
lead to increasing returns to adoption. Hence, the probability to adopt any e-business technology is hypothesized 
to be a strictly increasing function of the number of other e-business technologies that a firm has already in-
stalled. As a result, a growing “digital divide” can be expected up to the point where the most advanced firms 
find no more additional related technologies that promise positive returns on investment. A mathematical 
framework is offered that makes these thoughts explicit and empirically testable.  
On the empirical side, various innovative approaches are employed. To analyze the adoption and diffusion of 
e-business, a parametric model is always used in the first step to test the mathematically derived hypothesis ex-
plicitly. In addition, chapter 5 complements the parametric results with a non-parametric analysis that allows to 
gain additional insights about the data and provides an indirect robustness check for the parametric model. This 
non-parametric techniques in chapter 5 is used for the first time to analyze technology diffusion data. The para-
metric models in chapter 6 and 7 also feature some innovative elements. The discrete time hazard-rate model 
which is used in chapter 6 allows to control for unobserved heterogeneity of firms. In addition, the model has a 
semi-parametric specification of the baseline hazard which allows estimation without making the assumption 
that eventually all firms will adopt each technology as time goes to infinity – a weakness of standard continuous 
time hazard-rate models for analyzing technology diffusion data. Chapter 7 uses a fixed-effects error component 
model to estimate firm performance conditional on the market that a firm operates in, thus controlling for unob-
served market specific effects. All analyses are based on large-scale survey data that were collected for the e-
Business Market W@tch, a research project sponsored by the European Commission that had the objective to 
monitor the uptake and impact of e-business in various sectors of the enlarged European union. The datasets 
contain very detailed information at the individual firm level and represent population samples from numerous 
sectors and countries, covering a large part of economic activity in Europe in the years 2002 and 2003. 
The results of these studies are also novel and important in their own right. The empirical results support the 
hypothesis of increasing momentum of development upon a given technological trajectory. Also, the existence 
of a growing digital divide is shown and its extent is quantified. In addition, in chapter 7 we learn that a substan-
tial amount of innovation is currently related to Internet-based technologies. Also, it is shown that innovations 
based on ICT are at the very least not inferior to other kinds of innovations. The results suggest that innovative 
firms and firms that are more advanced in technology usage are more likely to grow. Also, it is found that not all 
types of innovation are related to profitability. Reasons for this are discussed. Finally, implications of all results 
are discussed both from an economic and a management perspective. 
The original research presented in chapters 5 to 7 is accompanied by two chapters that give an up-to-date 
overview of the existing literature. All together, I hope that these chapters will be accessible, interesting, and 
convincing to the reader and possibly contribute to the debate and further research on the nature and the conse-
quences of technological change. 
1.3. Outline 
The text is organized in three main parts. The first part describes the research topic in detail and provides an 
overview of what we currently know about technological change by means of an extensive literature review. 
This first part of the text comprises of chapters 1, 2 and 3. Part two contains chapters 4 through 7. These chap-
ters present the novel research that was conducted for this thesis. Part three concludes the text by summarizing 
the most important new insights and by providing directions for further research. 
The remainder of this first chapter continues with the discussion of the most relevant terminology that will be 
used throughout the rest of the book. This is necessary to pin down an understanding about the terms innovation, 
adoption, diffusion, technological progress, and e-business that is appropriate for the purpose of this study. 
Chapter 2 gives a literature overview about the consequences of technological diffusion. Starting from a very 
general perspective, it discusses how technology determines the operating range of an enterprise and possible 
problems to appropriate returns from investments into new technologies. Then, the interplay between market 
structure and technology investment is considered. The potential of technology to spur productivity and eco-
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nomic growth is discussed. Closely related but not identical to the concept of productivity is firm performance, 
which might be measured on various criteria such as profitability, growth, market share, or stock value. Conse-
quently, the relationship between technology investments and firm performance is also treated. Furthermore, the 
consequences of technological change for labor demand are surveyed. The chapter concludes with a number of 
implications and hypothesis regarding e-business diffusion. 
Chapter 3 gives an overview of various streams of literatures that explain the nature of the diffusion process 
of technologies, considering findings from micro-economic theory, empirical IO, corporate finance and the man-
agement literature. Although technology diffusion is a topic of inquiry in all these fields, we find surprisingly lit-
tle spill-over of insights between the disciplines. The chapter tries to identify main contributions and overlapping 
themes of the different streams. It specifies some hypothesis about which factors influence the decision of firms 
to adopt e-business technologies. In addition, the relationships between technology diffusion and the impact of 
new technologies are emphasized by showing numerous parallels and connections between the theories dis-
cussed in chapters 3 and 4. It is argued that both the diffusion and the impact of new technologies are closely re-
lated and that they together comprise an elementary part of technological progress and change. This concludes 
Part I. 
Part II, which presents the original research, starts with Chapter 4 which describes the e-Business Market 
W@tch datasets that were used for the empirical analysis in the following chapters. 
Chapter 5 presents a static analyses of e-business adoption. Particular attention is paid to the presence and 
consequences of related technologies. A theoretical model based on investment-theoretic considerations is intro-
duced which leads to the hypothesis that, under specific circumstances, firms are more likely to adopt if they are 
already advanced users of e-business technologies. The hypothesis is tested with logistic regressions and in a 
simultaneous equation model. In addition, classification and regression trees are used to explore technological 
complementarities and usage patterns in more detail. The three empirical methods that are used in this chapter 
each provide unique insights into the adoption patterns of related technologies.  
Chapter 6 extends the analysis to a dynamic scenario using pseudo-panel data. It tests the same hypothesis as 
chapter 5 but within a dynamic hazard-rate modeling framework. The results of chapter 5 are supported through-
out although the analysis is based on a different dataset collected with other enterprises more than one year later. 
A formal definition of the growing digital divide is presented and empirical evidence for it is presented. 
Chapter 7 tackles the question about the relevance of e-business technologies as a source of sustainable com-
petitive advantage for firms. It is argued that e-business tools enable both product and process innovations. A 
model of firm performance is developed that controls for unobserved market-specific effects and estimates for 
the effect of e-business enabled innovations on turnover development, profitability, and employment develop-
ment are presented and discussed.  
Finally, Part III concludes the text with chapters 8 and 9. Chapter 8 summarizes the main findings and contri-
butions. Chapter 9 discusses economic and managerial implications of the findings and suggests directions for 
future research. 
1.4. Terminology 
1.4.1. Innovation 
The term innovation is widely used in various contexts. However, there is no unique and universally applica-
ble definition for it. Practically, this means that instead of a universally “correct” definition, we must suffice 
with an understanding of the term that fits the purpose of the analysis. Here, we will need a definition that is 
broad enough to point out the link between innovation and technological progress, but also explicit enough to 
distinguish between innovation and related terms, as for example newness.  
In common speech, innovation means “the introduction of something new” or “a new idea, method, or de-
vice” (Merriam-Webster Dictionary 2003). The precise meaning is usually clarified in the specific context it is 
used in. For instance, a quite different meaning can be attached to the term in a sociological or a legal context. 
Compare, for example, the understanding of the sociologist Hagen (1971, pp. 351-361) who views innovation as 
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a factor that allows elites to build up power potentials, or the understanding of the German patent office 
(Deutsches Patentamt, 2004) about what constitutes an innovative activity.  
For the purpose of this study, it is an obvious choice to use a well-known definition from the economics or 
business science literature. For an extensive discussion of the term innovation from the managerial perspective, 
see Hauschildt (1997, pp. 1-25). A popular example from the business literature is Rogers (2003) who defines 
innovation as an “idea, practice, or object perceived as new by the individual or other unit of adoption”. The 
emphasis of this definition is clearly on the demand side of the market. In Rogers view, it is the perception of the 
customer that decides whether something is an innovation or not. This definition is especially popular for mar-
keting purposes.  
Another popular definition often cited in the managerial literature is by Tushman and Moore (1982, p. 132), 
who define innovation “as the synthesis of a market need with the means to achieve and produce a product that 
meet that need”. This definition is broader than the one suggested by Rogers in the sense that it includes the sup-
ply side of the market. However, the focus is entirely on the commercial transaction – the purchase of a new 
product. The definition does not account for the possibility that an innovation may also occur on the users side 
as a consequence or a prerequisite of the usage of the new product.1   
In contrast to many definitions of innovation that focus primarily on the perspective of the seller of a new 
product, idea, or practice, a more comprehensive definition is needed for the context of this work that allows to 
identify the relevance of innovations beyond the immediate sales interest of the inventor. An obvious candidate 
is the broad and popular definition by Schumpeter (1934, p. 66). He describes innovation as the “carrying out of 
new combinations”. Schumpeter restricts this definition to those “new combinations” which are discontinuous, 
and not simply a small, continuous enhancement of an old combination. He identifies five possible cases: 
1. “The introduction of a new good… 
2. The introduction of a new method of production… 
3. The opening of a new market… 
4. The opening of a new source of supply… 
5. The carrying out of the new organization of any industry, like the creation or breach of a monopoly posi-
tion.” 
Schumpeter’s definition is especially valuable because it outlines different dimensions of innovation in the 
economic and managerial sense. First of all, he does not restrict innovation to one specific functional dimension 
(e.g. marketing) but recognizes that innovations can occur in practically all spheres of the firm. In fact, his defi-
nition of innovation as “carrying out new combinations” is not even limited to the firm environment. They may 
also occur among individuals or non-profit institutions, although Schumpeter’s interest was primarily on produc-
tion.  
Second, his definition includes the subjective dimension of innovation. The judgment of how and in which 
way the new and the old combinations of means and ends are different, is essentially tied to a subject and her 
perspective. This is implied in the “five possible cases”, which could all relate to one and the same innovation 
(e.g. the gasoline-operated engine), but depending on the perspective of different subjects, this innovation could 
be a new good (e.g. the engine from the perspective of Carl Benz), a new market (e.g. from the perspective of all 
those who see the commercial potential of Benz’ innovation), a new source of supply (e.g. for the established 
manufacturers of coaches), the introduction of a new method of production (e.g. for carters who switch from 
horse coaches to automobiles as a means of transporting their loads), or the carrying out of the new organization 
of an industry (e.g. from the ex-post perspective of an outside observer of the coach industry). Consequently, 
this definition of innovation implies that the question if something is an innovation cannot be answered without 
asking “new for who”. In this way, Schumpeter’s definition of innovation generalizes Rogers definition.   
Third, Schumpeter raises the issue of different degrees of innovativeness. By limiting his definition to discon-
tinuous new combinations, he clarifies that not everything which is somehow new already qualifies to be an in-
novation. For example, the invention of the gasoline engine and the development of a new taste variety of a 
___________ 
1 Other definition from the managerial perspective can be found in Barnett (1953, p. 7), Becker and Whisler (1967, p. 
463), Damanpour (1991, p. 556), Knight (1967, p. 478), Rickards (1985, p. 10, 28), Roberts (1987, p. 3), or Schmookler 
(1966, p. 2). 
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candy bar can hardly be measured on one scale. It is the discontinuity that distinguishes the one from the other. 
The gasoline engine actually replaces the horse, the new taste variety only diversifies the spectrum of candy 
bars. This has led to numerous attempts in the literature to classify different degrees of innovativeness. We find 
characterizations like “major” versus “minor”, “radical” versus “incremental”, or “basic” versus “improvement”. 
See for example Green et. al . (1995), who constructed four factors and 17 items to measure the degree of inno-
vativeness.  
Fourth, Schumpeter clearly distinguishes between invention and innovation. Invention is a necessary, but not 
yet a sufficient condition for innovation. Innovation does include the process of invention, but also the introduc-
tion of the invention in a market or process. Schumpeter’s five examples of innovativeness all include the notion 
of a practical use of the invention. The “carrying out of new combinations” requires an actual utilization of a 
new mean or the achievement of a new end. Thus, what distinguishes innovation from invention is that the for-
mer requires a practical use of the latter – an invention must be adopted to become an innovation (instead of just 
an idea or a prototype). 
This broad definition of innovation by Schumpeter allows to take different perspectives on the subject. It 
seems suitable for our purposes and will be used henceforth. 
 
1.4.2. Adoption and diffusion 
Innovation can be viewed as a process (Becker and Whisler 1967, Hauschildt 1997, pp. 19-22) that typically 
involves stages like  
1. first idea 
2. discovery/observation 
3. research 
4. development 
5. invention 
6. introduction 
7. ongoing usage 
We can view stages one to five as a breakdown of the invention process, whereas innovation includes stages 
one to six. Stage seven – the ongoing usage - is a consequence of the innovation, but not part of the innovation 
itself. The terms adoption and diffusion of innovation refer to stage six of this process – the introduction of a 
new product or process among members of a social system (a firm, a market, a country etc.). Adoption refers to 
the individual decision to use a new product or process for the first time. This usually involves some kind of 
commercial transaction, contract or purchase.  
The adoption decisions of different members of a social system are usually distributed over time. Diffusion 
means the aggregated spread of an innovation in a social system, which is the result of the distribution of indi-
vidual adoption decisions (Litfin 2000, pp. 19-23). Adoption theory studies the determinants of individual adop-
tion decisions. Diffusion theory expands the analysis to an aggregated, time-dynamic perspective that does not 
necessarily model the individual decision of each member of a social system. Ideally, however, adoption theory 
should be the fundament of diffusion theory to have a micro-foundation of the aggregate analysis. It should be 
noted that the diffusion of a new product or process is an imitation of the behavior of other members of the so-
cial system. However, for each individual, the adoption of the new product or process could be an innovation in 
the sense that it changes her way of doing things or doing a new thing for the first time (subjective dimension of 
innovation – “new for who”). 
1.4.3. Technological progress 
For the purposes of this study, the comprehensive definition proposed by Stoneman (2002) is adopted: Tech-
nology means the goods and services produced and the means by which they are produced in a firm, industry, or 
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economy. Technological changes mean changes in the goods or services produced and the means by which 
they are produced. The terms technological change, technological advance, and technological progress are used 
interchangeably in this text, blinding out the slightly different ethical overtones of these terms. When speaking 
of technological progress or advance in this text, it is not necessarily implied that this progress or advance will 
be superior to the previous state in all regards – it simply means change in the economic sense specified above. 
Technological changes in the nature and types of goods and services produced are called product innovation. 
Technological changes in the techniques used in production are called process innovation (which includes e.g. 
changes in machinery, organizational changes, changes in the flow of goods or information, or managerial 
changes). However, as pointed out above, whether something is considered to be a product or a process innova-
tion is often a question of perspective.   
The attention to technology-related phenomena has spread in the last few decades to become an important 
concern for quite mainstream economic theories, e.g. “patent races”, “new trade theory”, “new growth theory” 
and even “real business cycle” macro models (Dosi 1997), but also in the managerial community with the emer-
gence of research and teaching fields like “technology management”, “innovation management”, and “R&D 
management”. The study of technological progress is making steps “inside the black box” (Rosenberg, 1982). 
We begin to understand technological progress not as an exogenous shock that randomly shifts the supply curve, 
but as an explicit part of economic dynamics and business management.  
The interest of economists to study technological progress was inspired by Schumpeter (1934) who viewed 
major technological innovations (“the carrying out of new combinations”) as the main source of long-term eco-
nomic development. He advocated the view that economic development must be driven by forces that exist 
within the economy itself, and not just by external influences that the economy reacts to (Schumpeter 1934, p. 
63): “Should it turn out that there are no such changes arising in the economic sphere itself, and that the phe-
nomenon that we call economic development is in practice simply founded upon the fact that the data change 
and that the economy continuously adapts itself to them, then we should say that there is no economic develop-
ment.” In other words, economic development in this sense does not mean history or culture or other influences 
that are exogenous to the economy. Neither does it simply mean the growth of population or income as a con-
tinuous process over time.  
“Development in our sense is a distinct phenomenon, entirely foreign to what may be observed in the circular 
flow or in the tendency towards equilibrium. It is spontaneous and discontinuous change in the channels of the 
flow, disturbance of equilibrium, which forever alters and displaces the equilibrium state previously existing (p. 
64)… These spontaneous and discontinuous changes in the channel of the circular flow and these disturbances 
of the centre of equilibrium appear in the sphere of industrial and commercial life, not in the sphere of the wants 
of the consumers of final products (p. 65)... The carrying out of new combinations means, therefore, simply the 
different employment of the economic system’s existing supplies of productive means – which might provide a 
second definition of development in our sense (p. 68)“.  
From this perspective, the emergence and diffusion of new technologies among firms – thus technological 
change - is seen as a motor of economic development. This concept of economic development has gained new 
popularity recently through the very influential endogenous growth literature (see for example Jones 1998 and 
Romer 1990). 
At the micro-economic level, the emergence of new technologies often bring about a myriad of changes that 
do not end with the adoption of one new technology, but include the adoption of various complementary tech-
nologies, accompanied by organizational changes, changes in products and services being offered, prices, qual-
ity levels, production processes and changing supplier relationships. The influential theoretical work by Mil-
grom and Roberts (1990) and Milgrom, Qian, and Roberts (1991) has demonstrated that it is no coincidence that 
these changes occur together. The key idea is that complementarities exist between technology variables and 
other key variables of the firm’s strategy, such as organizational design, production and order processes, inven-
tory management, quality and delay of delivery. The firm’s decision to adopt any or all of the possible changes 
is marked by important non-convexities. Thus, it may be unprofitable for a firm to purchase a technology with-
out adopting a changed marketing strategy or organizational structure, but it might be highly profitable to do all 
together. One key conclusion from these models is that under the presence of complementarities all sign-
adjusted decision variables rise over time within a firm. Another conclusion is that it is plausible to expect coor-
dinated and radical changes in various decision variables simultaneously. Once the adoption is well underway, it 
should proceed rapidly, with increasing momentum. It can also be shown that innovations in the manufacture of 
technological inputs both arise as a response to a growing market for those inputs and simultaneously encourage 
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that growth (Milgrom, Qian and Roberts 1991). Complementarities among a group of core activities and proc-
esses can lead to a persistent, path-dependent pattern of change. Once the system begins along a path of growth 
of core variables, it will continue forever along that path, or until external forces disturb the system. 
Another interesting and often cited stream of thought is the literature on technological paradigms and trajecto-
ries (Dosi 1982), which provide a concept for the direction of development. Dosi suggests that in broad analogy 
to the Kuhnian definition of a scientific paradigm (Kuhn 1962), technological paradigms can be defined. A tech-
nological paradigm is a model or a pattern of solution of selected technological problems, based on selected 
principles derived from natural science and on selected material technologies. A cluster of related concrete tech-
nological solutions can be associated with each technological paradigm, such as nuclear technologies, biotech-
nologies, or Internet technologies. Dosi calls the pattern and direction of progress based on a technological para-
digm a trajectory. Technology, in this view, includes a perception of a limited set of possible technological al-
ternatives and of notional future developments. We can think of the outer limits of a trajectory as the optimal 
combination of all relevant technological and economic variables, so to speak the production possibility frontier 
with respect to a given technological paradigm. The emergence of a new trajectory corresponds to the emer-
gence of a cluster of related technological innovations in the Schumpeterian sense. The movement of a firm or 
an entire economy upon a trajectory can be described by the diffusion of technologies from the cluster within a 
firm or economy. The economic and managerial relevance of a new trajectory will depend on the scope and the 
“disruptiveness” of the associated technologies. 
Numerous technological trajectories can exist in parallel. Also, trajectories can be more or less general and 
more or less powerful. In addition, there might be complementarities among trajectories because they require 
complementary forms of knowledge, experience, skills etc. When speaking of trajectories or technological para-
digms in this text, the above given definition of these terms  by Dosi (1982) is implied.  
 
1.4.4. E-business 
Before we proceed, it must be made clear what we mean by e-business and how it fits into the general frame-
work. 
The emergence of the Internet as a new mass medium in the late 1990’s combined with a lively public debate 
about its merits has created a variety of terms to describe Internet-related technologies and activities. Policymak-
ers, industry, and the media used different terms for the same concepts, and also often attached different mean-
ings to the same terms. As a consequence of the initial confusion, there were numerous efforts lead by various 
statistical authorities and international organizations (e.g. OECD, European Commission, U.S. Bureau of the 
Census, Statistics Canada) to come up with a clear and consistent definition of terms as a first step for develop-
ing useful statistics to measure the “digital economy” (Mesenbourg 2001, p. 3; OECD 1999, pp. 7-9; EITO 
1999, pp. 169-170; Atrostic et. al. 2001).  
The existing definitions can be seen as differing in three key elements that they usually cover (OECD 1999, 
p. 10):  
1. activities/transactions,  
2. applications,  
3. communication networks.  
These three key elements are identical to the different dimensions that e-business comprises: A technological 
communication infrastructure, one or more (software) applications that run on this infrastructure, and the actual 
usage of the applications. The earlier definitions of e-business and e-commerce varied for example with the ac-
tivity (e.g. retailing or delivery occurring electronically), the application (e.g. fully integrated online shop or an 
online catalogue with a simple email form), or the communication network they referred to (e.g. Internet or 
EDI). In addition, there has been a debate about the scope and the relationship of the terms e-business and e-
commerce.  
For the purposes of this text, it is useful to stick to the definition given by the European e-Business Market 
W@tch (2003), because the survey data for the empirical analysis in chapters 5 till 8 stems from this research 
project. The definition of the e-Business W@tch project is officially used by the European Commission (who 
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initiated the project) and closely relates to the definitions suggested by the OECD and the U.S. Bureau of the 
Census. This ensures a wide acceptance in countries that follow OECD standards. Also, with this back-up by of-
ficial authorities, the definition used here seems to become increasingly accepted in research and business prac-
tice as well. 
The e-Business Market W@tch defines e-business as any business process that an enterprise conducts over 
non-proprietary computer networks, which relates both to external and to company internal processes. The un-
derstanding of the term e-business is such that is does not only describe external communication and transaction 
functions, but also relates to the flow of information within the company, i.e., between employees, departments, 
subsidiaries and branches. As distinct from this, e-commerce is taken to cover external transactions only, and it 
therefore might be conceived as a subgroup of e-business activities (see Figure 1). 
 
 
 
Figure 1 - Basic concept of “e-business” and “e-commerce”   
 
The definition given above limits the scope of the terms e-business and e-commerce to the usage of non-
proprietary networks (i.e. the Internet) for conducting transactions. The distinction was maintained by the e-
Business W@tch team to be able to investigate the specific consequences of non-proprietary networks, which 
can be very different from using proprietary networks such as EDI (Cohen et. al. 2001).  
The related term “information and communication technology” (ICT) refers in this context to the technologi-
cal infrastructure or the tools of e-business, rather than to the processes associated with their usage. ICT can also 
be proprietary technologies (e.g. networks, computers, software, or proprietary CAD technologies). The use of 
ICT in business processes leads to e-business, if non-proprietary networks are used.  
Other than the restriction to non-proprietary network technologies, the e-business definition used here is very 
broad by including any kind of business process that occurs within an enterprise or between an enterprise and 
external parties. The meaning of the term is explicitly not restricted to commercial transactions in the legal 
sense, but also includes other means of exchanging information in a commercially relevant way, for example for 
the purpose of optimizing logistics, sharing knowledge, or employee training. This broad definition has the ad-
vantage that for the purpose of analyzing the impacts of e-business, the attention of the investigator is not hastily 
restricted to a limited set of Internet-supported activities or applications that might ex post not turn out to be the 
most relevant. 
How does e-business fit into the framework outlined above? Is it an innovation? If so, how “major” or “dis-
ruptive” is it? Is it part of technological progress in the sense of Schumpeter, Milgrom and Roberts, or Dosi? 
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An innovation in the Schumpeterian sense as “carrying out of new combinations” requires the utilization of 
a new mean, the achievement of a new end, or both. When a firm adopts an e-business solution it usually trans-
fers parts of an existing process into a new process that is supported by the new Internet-technology. It changes 
the way of doing things. For example, when a firm adopts an e-learning solution, a part of the training activities 
could be shifted from the seminar room to the computer desktop of the employees. In our terminology this is the 
utilization of a new mean – a process innovation. Such a process innovation naturally requires more than simply 
the purchase of a particular software. In practice, the purchase of a specific e-business tool is only the first step 
in a longer implementation process that usually comprises  
• customization of the software,  
• implementation into the existing communication network,  
• definition and implementation of interfaces of the new software with legacy software systems and data,  
• development and integration of suitable content, 
• re-engineering of business processes,  
• and various training measures for employees to familiarize them with the new tools and routines. 
A process innovation only occurs if the implementation succeeds, the routines are changed, and the new sys-
tem is actually utilized. 
The adoption of an e-business solution may also lead to the achievement of a new end, for example if the us-
age of the technology is the prerequisite for a new product or service offer that can be successfully introduced to 
the market (e.g. Internet auction platforms like Ebay – in this case the service innovation occurred simultane-
ously with the emergence of a new enterprise and a new market). Online banking is an example where the utili-
zation of a new mean and a new end happened simultaneously. It is a product or service innovation to the cus-
tomer that allows her to access her banking account and conduct financial transaction 24 hours a day from any 
Internet-terminal in the world, independent from bank branches and opening hours. To the bank, it is a process 
innovation because it automates the processing of customer transactions.  
From these examples it becomes clear that e-business fits into the definition of innovation as the “carrying out 
of new combinations”, given that the implementation and utilization of the technology-supported new processes 
or the introduction of the technology-supported new product or service to the market actually succeed.  
Further considering the functional dimension, one can find e-business solutions for practically all spheres of 
the firm (see Table 1). This illustrates that e-business offers a wide range of innovation potentials, again corre-
sponding with the broad Schumpeterian definition that did not restrict the innovation term to a specific function 
of the firm. 
Table 1 - Examples of e-business solutions for various functions of the firm2 
E-business solution Typically corresponding function of the 
firm 
Online sales Marketing / sales 
E-procurement Purchasing 
Supply chain management (SCM) Purchasing / logistic / production 
E-marketplaces Purchasing / sales 
Customer relationship management 
(CRM) 
Marketing / customer service 
Knowledge management (KM) Human resource management / R&D 
Enterprise resource planning (ERP) Accounting / controlling / logistics / pur-
chasing / sales 
E-learning Human resource management 
Group ware General management / R&D  
 
___________ 
2 The examples listed in the table only refer to those solutions which run on the Internet, i.e. fulfill our definition of e-
business that is restricted to non-proprietary network technologies. 
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For the sake of completeness, different subjective dimensions of e-business innovation can be identified. 
Let’s consider the example of e-learning, which is the usage of online, Internet-based technologies to support 
employee training (E-business W@tch 2003, Köllinger 2002, pp. 15-19).  
E-learning can be a new good for the producer of a learning software platform (e.g. Saba, Docent) or a new 
service for an education content provider, who switches to this new distribution channel (e.g. globaleng-
lisch.com, University of Phoenix). It can be a new market for all those who see the commercial potential of e-
learning (e.g. SAP – a late mover into the market for e-learning software platforms, or NETg – an e-learning 
firm with origin in the United States who expanded into Europe as a new market). E-Learning can also be 
viewed as a new source of supply by those companies that add e-learning modules to their employee training 
curricula (e.g. Daimler-Chrysler corporate university). It may also be considered as a new method of knowledge 
generation, both from the perspective of the individual learner and the perspective of the firm that organises and 
conducts trainings. Finally, it may also be seen as a source for the new organization of an industry – the market 
for professional training services has seen quite a restructuring since the emergence of e-learning. Market shares 
have shifted from traditional training methods to e-learning and to new industry players, while incumbents re-
acted with different strategies to the new possibilities and threats (Köllinger 2001, pp. 63-72; IDC 2000). 
One could easily formulate similar cases for other e-business technologies. It becomes obvious again that the 
question if something is an innovation cannot be answered without asking “new for who”. In addition, it also 
shows that whether one views e-business as a product or a process innovation is essentially a matter of perspec-
tive.  
The previous discussion leads to the following understanding of e-business: 
An e-business technology may be viewed as 
• a product innovation or a new market from the perspective of the suppliers, if their technological inven-
tions are successfully introduced to the market; 
• an enabler of process innovation from the perspective of the adopter, if the implementation of the e-
business technology succeeds, the routines are changed, and the new system is actually utilized; or 
• an enabler of product or service innovation from the perspective of the adopter, if the e-business technol-
ogy is successfully used to offer a new service or deliver products to customers in a way that is new to 
the enterprise. 
Note that in all three cases the definition of e-business as an innovation is conditional on certain restrictions. 
This is especially important for the perspective of the adopter. For the adopting firm, the technological solution 
is only a tool to enable innovation, the purchase of the tool itself does not constitute an innovation yet. Thus, the 
question if and to what extent e-business technologies are actually used to conduct innovations on the side of the 
adopters is already an empirical one.  
This leads to the question how “disruptive” or “major” e-business-enabled innovations might be. From the 
previous discussion we know that e-business offers a wide range of innovation potentials, spanning over many 
functional areas of each firm. In addition, many of these e-business solutions can be applied in various sectors of 
the economy, so the scope of the innovation potentials for the economy is also very broad. However, whether we 
observe major changes occurring due to the adoption of e-business technologies essentially depends on how 
each individual firm deals with the available technologies. The e-business induced changes that are possible in 
each firm can be quite radical, but they may also be incremental. In the worst case, an e-business investment 
may also turn out to lead to no changes or to no desired changes (i.e. a writing off).  In practice, we find that 
some firms rely very heavily on Internet-supported processes (e.g. Dell, E-bay), whereas others don’t. Thus, the 
question whether e-business is a “disruptive” innovation in the Schumpeterian sense that acts as a driver of eco-
nomic development is actually also an empirical one. Chapter 7 will discuss this issue in more detail, based on 
empirical results. 
Interestingly, many aspects of e-business seem to comply with the assumptions in the model of Milgrom and 
Roberts (1990). We are faced with a number of new technologies that can serve different purposes within firms, 
but are all members of the group of ICT’s that use the Internet as a communication platform. We may expect 
that some of these technologies will be complementary to each other and to other decision variables of the firm, 
such as flexible production schemes, automated supply chain management, quicker engineering and production 
times or customized marketing activities. This would mean that it is plausible to expect path-dependent devel-
opments and increasing momentum once the adoption of some core variables is under way.  
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Finally, how does e-business relate to Dosi’s concept of technological paradigms and trajectories? Recall 
that Dosi (1982) defines a technological paradigm as a model or pattern of a solution of selected technological 
problems, based on selected principles derived from the natural sciences and on selected material technologies. 
Following this conceptual framework, we could define e-business as a cluster of related technological innova-
tions that are jointly based on the Internet. The technological problem that all e-business solutions try to solve is 
to optimize the exchange of commercially relevant information, which is essential for running and controlling 
any business. They do so by providing specific software solutions that run on non-proprietary computer com-
munication networks with a universally standardized protocol (TCP/IP). In this sense, e-business is a techno-
logical paradigm with a very general scope, because it’s “normal problem solving tools” are applicable in vari-
ous regions, sectors, firms, and functional areas. The normal course of development along the e-business trajec-
tory starts with the non-availability of any technology from the e-business cluster within a firm or country, pro-
gresses with the adoption of various technologies, and possibly ends with adopting all available e-business tools. 
Note that this is not a deterministic process. Not all firms need necessarily adopt all technologies that are associ-
ated with a given paradigm. However, the rate of progress upon a trajectory can be related to the position of a 
firm upon the trajectory because of complementarities, learning effects, rebates and financial consequences of 
earlier investments. Chapters 5 and 6 will discuss this in detail. 
2. Consequences of technological diffusion 
Formel-Kapitel 2 Abschnitt 1 
An extensive amount of research has been conducted on the consequences of the emergence of new technolo-
gies (for an overview, see for example Stoneman 1995). The purpose of this chapter is not to give a complete 
treatment of all relevant contributions to this topic, such an endeavor would be clearly beyond the scope of this 
text. Instead, the purpose is to point out some important topics that have been demonstrated to be directly related 
to technological change in general in order to identify possible consequences of e-business technologies. Some 
of the emerging issues can be addressed in later chapters, while most will necessarily remain subject to further 
research.  
2.1. Technology and the supply function 
The technological environment is fundamental to each firm and the entire economy because it determines the 
available operating range of each individual enterprise. In micro-economic theory, firms are endowed with pro-
duction-possibility sets, which are determined by the available technology. Producers maximize their profits 
over these technological possibilities, giving rise to supply functions (Arrow and Debreu 1954, Mas-Colell et. al. 
1995, ch. 5, Tirole 1988, Varian 1992, ch. 1). From this general starting point, it is obvious that the technologi-
cal environment influences all areas of economic activity. Technology determines the types of products and ser-
vices being produced in an economy and the optimal combination of machinery and labor to produce these out-
puts. It also influences market structures. For example, whether a technology is convex or not will have an influ-
ence on the expected market structure and competitive dynamics of an industry. Technology also influences the 
equilibrium conditions in each market, and thereby market prices, aggregate output and the distribution of social 
welfare. This implies that not only the profits of the firms operating in a given market depend on the technology 
used, but also consumer welfare. Hence, technology is a crucial element for the living standards in an economy. 
The largest part of economic theory takes technology as exogenous and derives equilibrium conditions given 
a particular technology (i.e. cost function). It is implicitly understood by economists that technology is a funda-
mental aspect of economic activity, but it is mostly treated as a “black box”. However, there is also a substantial 
part of the literature that considers the incentives and consequences of technological change explicitly. Exam-
ples are the research on R&D incentives, patents, licensing, technology diffusion, new growth theory and real 
business cycle theory (Geroski 1995, Beath et. al. 1995, Romer 1996, ch. 3 & 4, Stoneman 2002). 
Technological change always comprises of several parts. The first part is the emergence of a new technology, 
which is a product innovation from the point of view of the firm producing the technology. A new technology 
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can either emerge as a consequence of a deliberate research and development effort, but it can also emerge as 
a by-product of some other activity or by pure chance. The second part is the introduction of the new technology 
among other firms. By adopting and implementing the new technology, user firms try to change their way of 
production, which constitutes a process innovation. Alternatively, user firms can also adopt the new technology 
to create a new product or service for their customers, which constitutes a product innovation. Finally, both 
product and process innovations can occur simultaneously on the side of the technology-adopting firm if the im-
plementation succeeds.  
In micro-economic terms, a product innovation corresponds to the generation of a new production function 
(Kamien and Schwartz 1982, p.2), or alternatively leads to product differentiation (Beath et. al. 1987, Shaked 
and Sutton 1986, Vickers 1986), depending on how new the product is. 
A process innovation, on the other hand, can be viewed as an outward shift of an existing supply function, 
which is normally modeled by assuming that the new technology will lead to lower variable costs in the produc-
tion of an existing good or service (Beath et. al. 1995, Dasgupta and Stiglitz 1980, Reinganum 1981 a,b).  
The possible consequences of a successful product or process innovation that are induced by a successful im-
plementation of new technologies create market adjustments that can yield competitive advantages for the inno-
vative firm. The prospect of these advantages triggers the investment into new technologies and the associated 
diffusion process. The nature of these closely interdependent incentives, decisions and market adjustments is 
further discussed in chapters 2.3, 2.4, 2.5 and 3. 
2.2. Appropriability problems 
A relevant and non-trivial question is who will benefit most from an innovation. Apart from the literature that 
emphasizes the actual products and processes used in an economy when talking about innovation and techno-
logical change, it is also not uncommon to think of technology as generic knowledge or information that is gen-
erated by investing into R&D (Stoneman 2002, 4-6, Geroski 1995). Typically, the terms knowledge, informa-
tion, invention, innovation and technology are inexactly treated as synonyms in such contexts. Although this is 
not the approach that is followed throughout this text, it does have some merits because it points out potential 
problems for incentives to invest into technology and the ability of innovators to benefit from their investment.  
The main argument is that knowledge and information have to a large degree attributes of a public good. In-
formation may be non-rivalrous in the sense that its use by one firm does not automatically preclude the use by 
another. It may also be non-excludable if the producer of the new knowledge is unable to effectively prevent 
non-payers from using it. Patents are one way to assign property rights to knowledge. However, not all commer-
cially valuable knowledge complies to the legal standards required for getting patent protection. Thus, a success-
ful inventor may involuntarily create a positive externality for the market without being able to get a private 
benefit from the R&D investment. Hence, the production and dissemination of new knowledge or information 
might be subject to market failure and create problems for the inventors. 
If the use of information by one firm does not preclude the use of the same information by another firm, the 
sale or involuntary transfer of the new information by the inventor instantly destroys her monopoly (Geroski 
1995). Also, a potential buyer of the information will have difficulties in judging the value of the information 
before it is revealed. However, at the moment the information is revealed there is usually no additional value in 
purchasing it. Thus, the inventor is unlikely to recoup her investments into generating the new information, 
which creates a disincentive to invest. This constitutes a potential for market failure because everyone might be 
better off with the new information than without it, but the incentives to invest are small if social returns exceed 
private returns on investment. 
In addition, market failure might arise because the creation of knowledge often involves substantial fixed 
costs which lead to increasing returns to scale. Also, knowledge and information are inherently discrete, which 
usually prevents marginal pricing and also implies economies of scale even if the information can be perfectly 
codified and protected with a patent. Finally, investments into the generation of new knowledge is risky in two 
ways. First, the inventor has ‘technological’ uncertainty about how to make something work. Second, there is 
the additional uncertainty about how to sell the new idea on a market (i.e. how to turn the invention into an in-
novation). This double uncertainty might be another cause of market failure for the investment into new tech-
nology (Arrow 1963, Geroski 1995, p. 91) 
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Thus, there are numerous potential problems for an inventor to appropriate returns from her investment into 
new knowledge. On the other hand, according to Geroski (1995, p. 93) there are two reasons why these prob-
lems may not be so severe in practice: 
First, the appropriability problem depends on the extent that the transmission of knowledge is costless. As 
soon as the acquisition of knowledge becomes a cost factor for whatever reason, knowledge loses the non-
excludability attribute and increases the chance of the inventor to yield a private return. The second reason why 
information and knowledge are often not public goods is because many new ideas can be embodied in an output 
sold as a new product or service. Naturally, it is much easier to claim property rights over and charge for things 
or services than for ideas or concepts. 
The costs of transmitting a new technology (voluntarily or involuntarily) are rarely actually zero. It seems 
clear that the costs of transmission depend on the nature of the technology. They tend to increase with complex-
ity, the rate of change, and the degree to which the technology relates to other complementary or specialized as-
sets of firms and their degree of experience (Geroski 1995, p. 117). Also, the ease of transmitting knowledge 
tends to decrease if the nature of the knowledge is more tacit than explicit, and hence cannot be easily codified. 
However, even if the public goods characteristics of an invention can be effectively circumvented by what-
ever means, this does not yet guarantee that the inventor will be able to appropriate private returns. MacDonald 
and Ryall (2004) have shown in a formal analysis based on coalition games that even if a technology or innova-
tion takes the form of a valuable, rare, and imperfectly imitable firm-specific asset, this does not guarantee pri-
vate returns of the owner of the technology. They show that a non-imitable resource is neither a necessary nor a 
sufficient condition for profitability because the ability of a firm to appropriate private returns also depends on 
how consumers value the product of the firm and whether there is competition for the product on the consumers 
side. In other words, the firm must also be able to effectively restrict its supply such that some consumers who 
would value the product are not served. On the other extreme, even if the technology would be perfectly imi-
table, this does not rule out that firms might appropriate excess returns in case they have another scarce resource, 
such as production capacity (i.e. if all firms together cannot serve all customers although the technology is 
common knowledge). Only if there is perfect imitation and no scarcity of supply, no firm will be able to gain 
profits irrespective of their bargaining skills and customers will appropriate all value. The point is – even if a 
successful innovator is perfectly able to circumvent the public goods problem of his invention, this does not 
automatically solve his appropriability problem. 
In the case of e-business technologies, technology suppliers have found many ways to circumvent the public 
goods problem. The new “knowledge” about how to run certain business processes based on Internet technolo-
gies is usually embedded in products (hardware and software) and consulting services (customization, imple-
mentation, migration, training, and supervision), which can be sold. This does, however, not imply that all tech-
nology suppliers can be profitable, but at least they are not unprofitable because of a disability to exclude cus-
tomers from the usage of their innovations.  
Whether the users of the new technology are able to appropriate private returns from their investments into 
the new technologies and the corresponding process innovations is even less clear. Let’s assume some industry 
is characterized by all firms originally using the same (old) technology. Each of these firms might originally be 
profitable or not. Now a new technology arrives that makes production more efficient and could in principle be 
bought by any firm in the industry (hence it is non-exclusive and represents some generic new knowledge, such 
as a standardized enterprise software solution that contains a set of proven best practice business processes). The 
question is if adoption of the new technology will allow a firm to benefit from the investment, i.e. to yield pri-
vate returns exceeding the original returns. The answer to this question depends on the timing of adoption deci-
sions. For example, it can be shown that under monopolistic competition, firms that successfully introduced a 
new production process are only able to get private returns from their investment as long as their competitors 
have not also adopted the same process (Götz 1999). If all firms adopt immediately, no firm will get excess re-
turns and all benefits will be passed on to consumers. Firms that do not adopt, however, will lose market share 
and will eventually be driven out of business.  
The story changes, however, if firms are not completely homogeneous ex ante and if the new technology 
closely relates to complementary or specialized scarce assets, such as managerial competence, the presence of 
rare technical experts, or a high level of technological experience among employees. In such a case, only firms 
that posses the necessary complementary scarce resources will be able to benefit from the new technology. Or, 
in other words, the value of the new technology is not identical to each firm in the market. It could also be that 
the technology is not generic, but can be customized to suit individual needs of companies, thus making it more 
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difficult for rivals to imitate. This opens up the possibility to create a scarce resource that cannot be easily 
copied by rivals, thus increasing the chance to appropriate private excess returns, provided that there is some de-
gree of competition for the product on the consumers’ side.  
The bottom line for the users’ side thus is: adopting generic “best practice” e-business solutions will at best 
generate temporary excess returns, as long as competitors did not successfully copy the same practice. Sustain-
able advantages that are due to e-business technology can only be achieved in two ways: (1) if the technology 
can be customized, complementing some other scarce resource of the firm, thus limiting imitation; or (2) if the 
technology can be used to innovate a new product or service offer that is valuable to customers and cannot be 
perfectly copied by competitors.  
A number of empirical studies have dealt with different methods of appropriability and their effectiveness. 
Levin et. al. (1987) find that for new processes lead time (early adoption) and learning curve advantages were 
most effective in securing private returns, followed by secrecy about the new process and marketing related ad-
vantages. Patents were found to be least effective for appropriating returns from new processes. For new prod-
ucts, patents turned out to be more important, but still not as effective as lead time, learning curve and marketing 
advantages. Taylor and Silberstone (1973) found that the influence of various measures also varied from sector 
to sector. For example, patents seem to work better in the pharmaceutical industry and the manufacturing of 
other chemical products than in other sectors. 
Another relevant issue in this context is the imitation time that firms need to copy the action of the first inno-
vator. Mansfield (1985) found that rivals learned about decisions made to develop new products or processes 
some 12-18 months after the decision has been made. Considering the average development process, which 
takes about 2-3 years to complete, there is a very good chance that the news will leak out before the project is 
finished (Geroski 1995, p. 107). If, however, the innovation is readily codified and can be purchased as a tech-
nology from some provider (as in the case of many e-business technologies), the imitation time might be consid-
erably lower and thus the diffusion process of the technology faster than in the study by Mansfield (1985). 
Summing up, the research on appropriability problems has pointed out that investments into technology might 
be subject to market failure for various reasons. One important reason is that the inventor could be unable to ex-
clude non-payers from copying the invention. In this case, the social returns to the invention might exceed the 
private returns and hence create no incentive for the potential inventor to invest. This incentive problem wears 
off if the inventor is able to embed its new idea in a new product or service that is valuable and scarce for cus-
tomers, or in case of a new process ceases with the complexity of the technology and its relation to other com-
plementary and scare inputs, such as specialized labor. To profit, the innovating firm must at least gain a tempo-
rary monopoly position which will be destroyed once competitors are able to perfectly copy the innovation and 
serve all customers in the market. Hence, lead time, learning curve advantages, secrecy, patents, capacity con-
straints, marketing related advantages, and other scarce complementary resources of a firm can contribute to-
wards securing private returns on investment and overcoming the appropriability problem. 
2.3. Market structure 
The relationship between technology, innovative activities and market structure is complex and has been sub-
ject of extensive research in the industrial organizations literature. The results of these ongoing research activi-
ties are relevant both for policy makers (for defining competition policies that ensure dynamic efficiency) and 
business managers (for choosing optimal innovation strategies to gain profitability and to survive in the market).  
Technology influences cost structures and, thus, plays an important role for determining market structure. 
This is a one-directional relationship. However, the relationship between technology and innovation on the one 
hand, and market structure and innovation on the other is a two-directional relationship. While the present state 
of technology influences the range of possible future technological development by means of successful innova-
tion, the occurrence of successful innovation changes the technological environment. Furthermore, a given mar-
ket structure influences firms’ incentives to invest into innovative activities. Successful innovations, in turn, 
might initiate changes in market structure by stimulating the growth of the successful innovator at the expense of 
its rivals or changing the minimum efficient plant size for operation in a market, hence leading to a rise or fall in 
industry concentration. Thus, technology, market structure and innovative activity are all endogenous variables 
in dynamic models of market development (Scherer 1980, p. 5).  
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Market structure is determined by the size of the market, the number of firms in the market, and their size 
class distribution. The optimal size of firms in a market is given by the shape of their cost function, which de-
pends on the presence of economies of scale and scope. The size of the market is related to the position of the 
demand function, which might be subject to network externalities. The interaction of the aggregate supply and 
demand function pose limits on the feasible number and size distribution of firms in equilibrium. Thus, they 
shape the boundaries of the industry market structure.  
According to Panzar (1989), an industry configuration is a number of firms, m, and related output vectors 
 such that 1 2 my , y ,..., y ( )iy Q p=∑ , where p is the vector of market prices and  is the system of market de-
mand equations. Thus, supply equals demand. An industry structure which is sustainable in a long-run equilib-
rium must guarantee that firms in the industry make at least zero profits. Thus, if an industry structure is to be 
feasible, the market demand curve must not lie to the extreme left of the firm’s average costs curves. Formally, a 
market structure is feasible if p y , i.e. no firm in the market makes negative profits. 
Q(p)
i iC(y ) i× ≥ ∀
However, not all feasible industry structures will be sustainable. In fact, for  some markets, industry configu-
rations with one, two, or a thousand firms might all be feasible. In order to be sustainable, an industry structure 
also needs to be efficient. Efficiency of an industry can be defined as 
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3 Nepelski (2003) discusses some of the literature mentioned in sections 2.2.2. to 2.2.5 to analyze whether the diffusion of 
e-business technologies in the automotive industry relates to an increase in industry concentration.  
 
where  is the total industry output and  is the industry cost function. Therefore, according to 
Panzar (1989, pp. 34-35) an industry configuration is efficient and sustainable if and only if it is made up of a 
number of firms and a division of output that yield the lowest possible total industry costs of production. How-
ever, as the technological environment changes, the cost functions and / or the output vectors of firms begin to 
change and an industry structure that was feasible and efficient in the past might not be sustainable anymore. 
This could lead to exit of enterprises from the market and greater concentration or encouraging new entry and 
higher competition.  
Iy ≡ ∑ I IC (y )
To reiterate, the feasibility and efficiency of a market structure at any given point in time is given by the 
shape of the cost function of firms and the demand function of the market. The dynamic structure of a market, 
however, is influenced by the interplay of firms’ incentives to invest into innovation, their ability to appropriate 
returns from their investments, and possible shifts in the demand function of a market.  
To elaborate on these issues in more detail, the following two sections will look at economies of scale and 
scope as factors that influence the shape of the cost function. The section after that looks at network externalities 
as a factor that influences the shape of the demand function. Thereafter, the interplay of market structure and in-
novation are discussed in more detail in two sections.3 A special section is the one on technology competition, 
which takes a game-theoretic approach to analyze firms’ strategic incentives to invest in R&D and analyses the 
market outcomes of such games. The following section mentions additional factors that can influence the dy-
namic relationship of innovation, technology, and market structure. Finally, the last section summarizes the main 
results and relates them to the diffusion of e-business technologies. 
  
2.3.1. Economies of scale 
The limits of perfectly competitive market structures have frequently been attributed to technological con-
straints and cost structures resulting from them. It is argued that costs determine prices and, thus, influence in-
dustry structure (Hay and Morris 1991, p. 27). The notions of economies of scale and scope are important in this 
regard because they imply that the size and the product range of a firm influence their cost structure.  
According to the standard definition, economies of scale are present in a single product environment when an 
increase in all input levels is followed by a more than proportional increase in output (Panzar, 1989). Economies 
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of scale can be measured as the ratio of average costs to marginal costs. If total the cost of aggregate output Y 
at factor price w is represented by a simple cost function , then average costs are defined as 
 and marginal costs as 
C(Y, w)
AC C(Y, w) / Y= MC dC / dY= . The degree of economies of scale is given by 
. If S( is greater than, equal to or smaller than 1, the firm faces 
increasing, constant or decreasing returns to scale (Bailey and Friedlaender 1982).  
S(Y, w) AC / MC {C(Y, w) / dC / dY}≡ = Y, w)
Economies of scale might occur for various reasons. For example, product-specific economies occur if a 
higher production volume of a product leads to a better utilization of available resources, like facilities, manage-
rial staff, or R&D. They also occur if the marginal costs of an additional unit are close to zero, but the produc-
tion of the first unit involves substantial fixed costs. This is typically the case in all content industries (music, 
newspapers, magazines, radio, television) where the production of the content is very costly, but the distribution 
of the content to an additional customer has costs close to zero. Economies of scale might also be plant-specific, 
where the construction of a big plant might be less expensive relative to its output than the production of a small 
plant. Finally, economies of scale might also be present when multiple plants are operated by a single firm 
where some organizational elements (management, personnel, R&D or technology adoption) might be utilized 
by more than one plant, hence leading to a cost reduction in output size.  
Note that economies of scale depend on the available technology. Hence, a change of the technological envi-
ronment might lead to changes in the degree of scale economies.  
Economies of scale exist in many industries (Scherer 1980). Yet, in most production or distribution activities 
a firm reaches a point at which further cost reductions arising from size or production increase are exhausted. 
Any further expansion beyond this point would result in diseconomies of scale (Scherer and Ross 1990, p. 102). 
The point at which the average cost attains its minimum represents the industry minimum efficient scale (MES), 
which plays a key role in determining industry structure (Schmalensee 1988, p. 653). The MES determines the 
optimum firm size that, together with the total industry size, determines the optimum number of firms in a mar-
ket (Curry and George 1983, p. 217). 
The presence of strong economies of scale in an industry creates significant entry barriers (Bain 1956, p. 55) 
and leads to high market concentration or even monopoly outcome. However, as Panzar (1989, pp. 24-29) 
pointed out, economies of scale are neither necessary nor sufficient conditions for sustaining natural monopoly. 
The perquisite for a natural monopoly is a cost function that is strictly subadditive over the entire range of out-
puts. Formally, a cost function is said to be subadditive if iC( Y ) C(Y )< i∑ ∑ , where each proportion of  may 
range over all levels of output up to ∑ . An industry is a natural monopoly through the output level  if 
 is strictly subadditive at all Y ' , i.e. if up to output level Y it is cheapest if only one company pro-
duces everything.  
iY
iY
Y≤
Y
C(Y ')
The theoretical importance of economies of scale as a determinant of industry structure has been supported by 
empirical research. For example, in the meta-study by Curry and George (1983) it was found that all surveys 
confirmed a significant relationship between economies of scale and industry concentration. Technological fac-
tors also seem to explain the observed similarity across analyzed countries in the ranking of industries by con-
centration level.  
2.3.2. Economies of scope 
Cost savings cannot only arise from the size of an enterprise, but also from its scope of activity. Whenever the 
costs of providing the services of the sharable input to two or more product lines are subadditive, the multi-
product cost function exhibits economies of scope (Panzar and Willig 1981). For the two product case, this can 
be formally expressed by where  and Y  stand for the outputs of product 1 and 2 
respectively. The measure of the degree of scope economies is simply a proportion of the total production cost 
that is saved by joint production to total costs 
1 2 1 2C(Y , Y ) C(Y ,0) C(0, Y )< + 1Y 2
{ }c 1 1 2 1(Y ,0) (0,Y (Y ,Y ) / C(Y ,Y )−2 ) C 2S . Economies of scope 
are present if S  is greater than 0. If economies of scope exist, firms with a diversified product mix enjoy lower 
total costs than total costs of firms specializing in single products (Bailey and Friedlaender 1982). 
C C= +
c
There are various reasons why economies of scope might occur. First, it might be that some production fac-
tors are not scarce and hence can be used for the production of various goods or services. For example, a reputa-
ble brand name might give rise to economies of scope. Second, it could be that different products share the same 
scarce inputs, and cost advantages arise from producing more than one kind of product if spare capacities of the 
joint input exist. For example, this could be managerial competence or a good communication infrastructure of a 
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company. Third, it could be that there are cost complementarities between different outputs, i.e. when the mar-
ginal cost of producing one good falls as the production of the other good increases. Examples for this can be 
found in the chemical industries when one product is the byproduct of another. 
Again, the presence of economies of scope is influenced by the technological environment and changes in 
technology might change the level of economies of scope. Since most firms offer more than one product, the 
concept of economies of scope seems to be of great significance. However, in contrast to economies of scale, 
there is little empirical evidence for the presence of economies of scope. One reason for this are measurement 
problems. Baumol et. al. (1982) have pointed out conditions for correct measurement. But for a few exceptions, 
there have been little attempts to implement them in empirical research and the available evidence is inconclu-
sive (Hay and Morris 1991, p. 37). 
 
2.3.3. Network externalities 
The presence of network externalities is yet another factor that can influence market structures. It relates to 
the shape and the position of the demand function for a new network-based technology. Generally, an external-
ity is said to be present whenever the well-being of a consumer or the production possibilities of a firm are di-
rectly affected by the actions of another agent in the economy (Mas-Colell et. al. 1995, p. 352). Externalities can 
be positive or negative. Networks exhibit positive consumption and production externalities (Economides 
1996a). Network externalities are a concept that is directly related to technology, in particular technological in-
frastructures that are organized as networks, i.e. components which are physically or virtually linked like rail-
ways, telephone lines, or the Internet. A network externality occurs if the components of a network are compati-
ble, hence if linking the components gives rise to complementarities (Economides 1996a). The value of such a 
network depends on the number of components that are connected to it. For example, in a telephone network 
each owner of a telephone is a component in the network and the value of the network to each user is the greater 
the more other users have a telephone. If such a network has n users, then there are  potential compo-
nents, i.e. people one could call if the components are compatible. Thus, the value of the network is proportional 
to , hence it increases exponentially in the number of users. The willingness of each potential 
user to join the network and her willingness to pay for it consequently depend on the expected number of other 
users (Shapiro and Varian 1999, p. 184, Economides 1996a).  
n(n 1)−
2n(n 1) n n− = −
When a new network technology is introduced to the market, the eventual market outcome depends on cus-
tomers’ predictions about how the network will evolve. Consequently, there will be feedback loops and numer-
ous equilibria are possible, i.e. either a zero size network or a large network size might emerge (Katz and 
Shapiro 1985, 1992, Economides 1996b). If two or more alternative network technologies are introduced to a 
market, the market outcome might be characterized by a “winner takes all” scenario and a lock-in by historical 
events (Arthur 1989, Church and Gandal 1993, David 1985, Katz and Shapiro 1986). An interesting question in 
this regard is whether the producers of competing technologies should risk a standards war or opt for compati-
bility of their systems (Besen and Farrell 1994, Farrell and Saloner 1986, 1992, Katz and Shapiro 1985, 1994). 
The research on this topic has shown that although network externalities occur on the demand side of a market 
(sometimes they are also referred to as demand side economies of scale), the presence of these effects has far 
reaching implications for the market structure on the supply side, strategic behavior of technology suppliers, and 
the efficiency and desirability of the market outcome.  
Furthermore, positive externalities might not only occur among consumers, but also among firms in vertically 
or horizontally related industries. This could be a possible source of increasing returns to scale. To see this, con-
sider the following example by Mas-Colell et. al. (1995, pp. 374-375): 
Consider a bilateral externality situation involving two firms. Firm 1 may engage in an externality-generating 
activity that affects firm 2’s production. For example, this could be a specific output, knowledge, or the utiliza-
tion of a communication technology that firm 2 also uses (whereby firm 1 provides additional value to the com-
munication network). The level of the externality generated by firm 1 is denoted by h, and firm j’s profits condi-
tional on the production of the externality level h are j (h)π  for j 1,2= . It is standard to assume that 1( )π ⋅  is 
concave, hence that firm 1 is subject to decreasing returns to scale. However, this may not automatically be true 
for firm 2 also.  
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Suppose that firm 2 produces an output at price 1, using an input at price 1 also. Firm 2’s production func-
tion is , with q h zβ α= [ ], 0,∈
/(1 )) hβ −απ = γ
1α β . Thus, h is a positive externality. Given h, the maximized profits of firm 2 can 
be calculated as , where  is a constant. If 2 (h 0γ > 1β > − α , than firm 2’s profit function is not 
concave in h and firm 2 exhibits increasing returns to scale because 1α + β > . Thus, if firm 1 increases the pro-
duction of the positive externality h, it is profit maximizing for firm 2 to increase its scale rather than just substi-
tuting h for z.  
The above discussion allows to formulate some possible implications for the diffusion of e-business tech-
nologies. First of all, e-business technologies are likely to be subject to network externalities because they are 
communication tools that are jointly based on the Internet. The Internet itself clearly features network 
externalities: The more individuals and firms use the Internet, the more valuable it becomes. The same is true for 
each e-business technology that is installed in a firm. The value of these technologies usually increases the more 
individuals make use of them. For example, the value of a knowledge management system, an online 
marketplace, or an e-procurement system clearly increase with the number of users. Furthermore, as far as 
systems are compatible between firms, positive externalities generated by an additional user within a firm or a 
new firm joining the network spill over to other firms. This has three implications: First, the more firms jump on 
the “e-business wagon”, the more valuable it becomes for other firms to join in too. Second, large firms with 
many employees will benefit more from e-business technologies that are primarily used in-house than small 
firms can. This is because a large number of in-house users implies a higher value of the communication 
network. Third, as far as systems are compatible and linked across companies, they could possibly be a source of 
increasing returns to scale given the reasoning from above. This could shift up the minimum efficient scale of 
firms in an industry and hence increase concentration levels if demand remains constant. However, this last 
point might be counteracted by new business opportunities that open up in an industry due to the emergence of 
the new technologies, e.g. new possibilities to differentiate products. Hence, there might also be new firms 
entering the industry and exploiting these opportunities. In addition, the continuously falling prices of 
progressively more powerful computer equipment and software tools lower the investment barriers into ICT for 
small firms and give them access to resources that were formerly privilege of large enterprises. Thus, the net-
effect of ICT and e-business diffusion for market structures could be mixed. 
2.3.4. Market structure and innovation incentives 
Present industry structures might influence firm’s incentives and abilities to invest in innovation and new 
technologies. Research interest has focused on the question which market structure best promotes innovation 
and technological advance. The debate largely focuses on the two Schumpeterian (1942) hypothesis that (1) 
there is a positive relationship between innovation and monopoly power with the concomitant of above normal 
profits; and (2) that large firms are more than proportionately innovative than small firms. Both Schumpeterian 
hypotheses are related to the rank effects literature that explains differences among firms in their timing to invest 
into new technologies (chapter 3.2.2). It is argued that large firms and firms with some price-setting power are 
more likely to be early adopters of new technologies. 
The relationship between monopoly power and innovation has been subject to lively debates in the economic 
literature. There are two ways in which monopoly can affect innovative activities (Scherer 1980, p. 423). First, 
the anticipation of extraordinary profits is of course an incentive for developing an innovation. It is necessary to 
have some monopoly power for a while to realize an extraordinary profit. This monopoly power is the ability to 
prevent or at least to retard imitation (Kamien and Schwartz 1982, p. 27). Even in a competitive industry a firm 
might secure a monopoly position stemming from a successful innovation by means of patent protection or suf-
ficient lead time to build up capacity to realize economies of scale or strategic know-how. This line of reasoning 
is consensus. Second, the possession of monopoly power could precipitate firms’ innovative activities. However, 
this issue is subject to controversy.  
Arguments in favor of the first Schumpeterian hypothesis claim that monopolistic profits can serve as an in-
vestment pool for further research. Also, monopolists can have advantages in being able to finance an innovative 
activity internally, which includes advantages in controlling the flow of information about the innovative activ-
ity, thus making it more probable to appropriate returns from the investment (Kamien and Schwartz 1982, p. 
29). Contrariwise, a monopolist might be subject to lethargy and more bureaucracy, which could hinder the abil-
ity to innovate. Furthermore, a monopolist’s attention might focus more on protecting current profits rather than 
seeking new profit opportunities. Kenneth Arrow (1964) has formally shown the possibility that a newcomer to 
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an industry might have greater incentives to invest into a cost-reducing process-innovation than the monopo-
listic incumbent. He showed that both for drastic and non-drastic innovation, the newcomer’s incentive to invest 
exceed the incentive of the monopolist because the incumbent calculates the incentive as the difference between 
expected future profits and current profits, whereas the newcomer sees the profits from the innovation as a pure 
gain. Segerstrom and Zolnierek (1999) have shown that this assumption is not always true. According to their 
findings, whether industry leaders or industry followers are most innovative depends on the R&D cost advan-
tages with respect to market power. The incentives of the follower to innovate are the greater relative to the in-
cumbents incentives, the smaller the cost advantage of the incumbent to innovate. However, if the cost advan-
tage of the incumbent is substantial, then the incentives to innovate will be greater for the incumbent.  
The empirical investigation of the first Schumpeterian hypothesis is extremely challenging because of the dif-
ficulties to measure monopoly power in empirical studies. Still, there are numerous papers that address this issue 
empirically. One stylized fact that emerges from this work is an inverse U-shaped relation between concentra-
tion ratio and innovative activity (Scherer 1967, Mansfield  1977, Comanor 1967). A slight amount of concen-
tration seems to promote invention and innovation. But beyond a moderate amount of concentration, further in-
creases in concentration do not seem to be associated with more rapid rates of technological advance (Baldwin 
and Scott 1987, p. 90). In addition, Paul Geroski (1994) has pointed out an important source of biased estimation 
results: technological opportunities (the availability of potential investment projects) may not be evenly distrib-
uted across all industry sectors. Geroski (1994) showed that industries with high technological opportunity are 
characterized by high concentration ratios, considerable market share, and higher profitability. The technological 
opportunity variable explained about 60% of the innovativeness variance and thus turned out to be very impor-
tant. Hence, estimation results that do not control for technological opportunity might over-estimate the positive 
effect of monopoly power on innovation incentives.  
The second Schumpeterian hypothesis, that large firms are more than proportionately innovative than small 
firms, is also subject to debate. Arguments in favor of the hypothesis include economies of scale and scope. 
Positive scale and scope effects my be present on the input side as well as the output side of innovative projects 
(Kamien and Schwartz 1982, p. 32). Large firms have advantages in attracting highly specialized staff which is 
needed for innovative projects. Because of the indivisibility of labor it might only be viable for large firms to 
hire such personnel. Also, large firms might have large research laboratories with different specialists who can 
benefit from each others work. In addition, large firms have advantages to utilize specialized equipment and they 
may benefit from well-established marketing and distribution channels to exploit the benefits of innovative ac-
tivities (Nelson 1959, p. 303). Furthermore, innovative activities involve risks and large firms have advantages 
in managing these risk, given that innovative activities are usually not divisible: According to portfolio theory, 
the variance of a portfolio can be decreased by diversifying investments into various risky projects that are not 
perfectly correlated. Hence, large firms can diversify their portfolio of investment projects and thereby limit 
their overall risk whereas small firms often put their entire existence on stake if they undertake one big, risky 
project.  
On the other hand, bureaucracy and communication problems might limit the positive effects of large size on 
innovative activities. In a large organization, ideas and findings may be more likely to get lost than in a small 
firms. Also, researchers may also be less motivated in a large firm than in a small firm because in the latter, their 
compensation may be more directly related to their performance. Some evidence for this can be found in re-
searchers leaving large companies to found their own enterprise to exploit ideas that their former employer 
would not sponsor (Kamien and Schwartz, p. 33). 
The empirical evidence on the relationship between firm size and innovative activity is also subject to various 
measurement problems. For example, many studies of firm size and innovative behavior take R&D spending as 
the dependent variable to indicate innovative activity. However, R&D spending is a measure of input, and not a 
measure of output of innovative activity. The evidence on the relationship between firm size and innovation is 
mixed. Some studies examine a positive relationship (Comanor 1967, Acs and Audretsch 1987, Blundell et. al. 
1999), while others did not find a significant relationship (Mansfield 1964, Cohen et. al. 1987). Scherer (1967) 
found evidence for an inverse U-shaped interaction between size and firms’ R&D intensity. The results also vary 
with the industry that is being analyzed, for example whether the industry is capital intensive, mature or emerg-
ing seems to play a role for what type of innovations are being observed and what type of enterprises bring them 
to the market (Acs and Audretsch 1987, Cohen and Klepper 1996). 
Comprising, there is evidence for an inverse U-shaped relationships between innovative activity and monop-
oly power, as well as innovative activity and firm size. Even though small innovative enterprises exist, it appears 
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that small firms are less likely to be leaders in technological competition. Large firms and market leaders 
have, up to some boundary, advantages in carrying out risky and innovative projects. Nevertheless, it appears 
that neither a large size nor monopoly power are prerequisites for high performance in innovative activities. Fur-
thermore, no industry structure seems to be absolutely superior in terms of incentives for technological devel-
opment. The relationships are rather complex and tend to vary from industry to industry. 
 
2.3.5. Innovation and market structure 
As pointed out above, technology and changes in the technological environment that are induced by success-
ful innovation have a direct impact on market structures. First, technology determines economies of scale of 
production and thus the minimum efficient size of a firm in an industry. Thus, if the emergence of a new tech-
nology increases the minimum efficient plant size while demand remains constant, the industry is likely to be-
come more concentrated. Second, successful innovations create entry barriers and may give the innovator a sus-
tainable advantage. For example, the innovator may hold a patent, or use her lead time to build up capacities to 
realize economies of scale, gain advantages from learning and experience, build up reputation, or exploit possi-
ble network effects on the demand side of the market.  
The importance of technology as determining the cost structure of an industry and thus its concentration level 
is well recognized since the early works of Bain (1956) and Blair (1972). The faith in technological determinism 
of market structure has been reinforced by the evidence of cross-country similarities in industry concentration 
ratios (Caves 1989).  
Recently, this line of research has been refined by making a distinction between exogenous and endogenous 
sunk costs (Sutton 1991). Exogenous sunk costs are those that are given by the technology, for example the 
costs for setting up a single production unit of minimum efficient size. These exogenous sunk costs are equal for 
all entrants in an industry. Endogenous sunk costs, on the other hand, are those that are incurred by each firm to 
increase consumers’ willingness to pay for a company’s product. This includes R&D expenditures and advertis-
ing, which are obviously also sunk, but in contrast to the exogenous sunk costs, these variables are part of each 
firms’ choice set and thus endogenous.  
The industry concentration ratio is determined by the size of the market and entry costs. Thus, according to 
Sutton (1991), an increase in market demand or a decrease in exogenous sunk costs will result in a lower con-
centration level and a higher number of enterprises in the market, ceteris paribus. However, in Sutton’s (1991) 
model the analysis of industries with significant endogenous sunk costs is more complex because R&D and ad-
vertising influence market demand. However, an increase in market size alone does not result in the reduction of 
concentration ratios because the competitive reaction of other firm’s in the market will raise the equilibrium 
level of endogenous sunk costs in the industry. Thus, instead of more firms joining the industry, entry barriers 
will be raised and the incumbent firms will grow.  
According to Sutton (2001), the only plausible way to raise margins and recovering sunk costs in an industry 
with intensive innovations is through the change of market structure. This can be achieved by consolidation or 
via exit of firms. Thus, industries in which competition is centered on technological progress can be expected to 
be more concentrated than it would be implied given the minimum efficient size alone. 
The vulnerability of a given market structure depends on whether an aggressive newcomer who outspends all 
incumbent firms in R&D can cover his expenses on innovation. The question is whether such an escalation strat-
egy pays off. According to Sutton (2001), the answer to this question depends on the industry. In particular, it 
depends on two characteristics. First, if R&D is effective in raising consumers’ willingness to pay for products 
belonging to the relevant group of products on which R&D is spent, than escalation becomes more profitable. 
Ineffective R&D will consequently not benefit an escalation strategy. Second, if the scope of R&D activities is 
broad and benefits various product groups, and if these product groups are close substitutes, then the escalation 
strategy is more viable. Therefore, in industries in which products are close substitutes high concentration levels 
can be expected. In such an industry it is profitable to follow the escalation strategy because any technologically 
aggressive firm is able to capture sales from smaller rivals operating both its own product range and that of ri-
vals.  
Sutton’s theory predicts that in industries in which innovative efforts are insignificant, the lower bound to the 
concentration level is zero no matter how homogenous submarkets are. That is, if the escalation strategy is inef-
  21
fective the market can accommodate an undefined number of firms with a small market share each. On the 
other hand, in an industry in which R&D investments are both high and effective, the lower bound to the con-
centration level should increase together with the degree of product substitutability. Empirical support for this 
theory was found by Sutton (1991, 2001) and Robinson and Chiang (1996). 
Further empirical evidence on innovation as a determinant of market structure development has been col-
lected by numerous authors. Phillips (1966) found that successfully innovating firms tend to grow at the cost of 
others, leading to a rise of concentration level (Kamien and Schwartz 1982, p. 72). Mansfield (1983) investi-
gated whether the introduction of innovations has influenced the MES in the chemical, drug, and petroleum in-
dustries and concluded that most process innovations led to an increase in MES that resulted in an increase in 
industry concentration. He also found evidence that successful innovators grow faster than their competitors 
(Baldwin and Scott 1987, p. 99). Hannan and McDowell (1990) examine the process of technology adoption in 
the banking sector and its impact on concentration level. Their findings suggest that the adoption of new tech-
nology enabled innovative firms to enlarge their market shares, which resulted in either an increase or decrease 
in the market concentration ratio. If large firms were first to adopt the new technology, the concentration level 
rose. Otherwise, if small firms were first to adopt, concentration levels decreased.  
Thus, a complex relationship exists between market structure and innovation. While existing market struc-
tures influence firm’s incentives to invest in innovation, successful innovative activities will change the existing 
market structure to the disadvantage of the non-innovators. The evolution of industry structures is largely influ-
enced by technological change and firms’ incentives and ability to innovate. Hence, technology, innovative ac-
tivities, and market structure should all be viewed as endogenous variables in models of industry evolution. 
2.3.6. Technological competition 
A part of the theoretical literature that explicitly adheres to this view is the game-theoretic approach to ana-
lyze technological competition. This stream of research has improved our understanding of strategic aspects of 
technological competition and their immediate consequences for the development of industry structures. For an 
excellent overview, see Beath et. al. 1995. According to the game-theoretic approach, firms invest into innova-
tive activities for two reasons (Beath et. al. 1995): They seek profitable investment opportunities (profit incen-
tive) and they seek to give themselves a strategic advantage over their rivals (competitive threat). A strategic ad-
vantage may occur because a better process or a better product can enhance a firm’s market share. If a firm 
knows that its rivals are engaging in innovative activities, it will see its own competitive position as being under 
threat. This creates an incentive to also invest in innovation in order not to lose out to rivals. The incentive to in-
vest depends on the difference between the pay-off if the firms wins the technological competition and its pay-
off if it loses, in which case the successful rival takes over part or all of its market share.  
In general, the models found in this literature abstract from economies of scale effects and assume constant 
returns to scale. However, some of the models allow a heterogeneous starting position of firms in terms of dif-
ferences in their cost function, as a probable result of past technological competition.  
The literature can be divided into non-tournament models and tournament models. In non-tournament models, 
potentially many firms can obtain an equivalent improvement in their cost function by spending an equivalent 
amount on R&D. Usually Cournot competition is assumed in the product market, and products are assumed to 
be substitutes. There is only one stage to the game in which all firms simultaneously choose their output and 
R&D expenditure levels. The results depend on the elasticity of substitution between the product commodities 
and the effectiveness of R&D spending to reduce marginal costs of production (Dasgupta and Stiglitz 1980, 
Beath et. al. 1982). It can be shown that social optima only occur under very special circumstances, otherwise 
there will be market failures in the amount of R&D activity and in the number of firms in the market. While this 
type of models is well-suited to address questions of social optima, it does not explain the stylized fact of tech-
nological competition that “success breeds success” (Beath et. al. 1995, Dasgupta 1986). The “success breeds 
success” story implies that there are only a limited number of successful innovators (maybe only one) which are 
able to carry their advantage on over time. This issue is addressed in tournament models (also known as “patent 
races”).  
In these models, technological competition takes the form of a tournament in which there is only one winner 
and a race to be the first to make the discovery. Obviously, the central question in these models is whether in the 
process of dynamic competition persistent dominance of one firm emerges, or whether advantages of any tech-
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nological leader in the industry will be short-lived and competition will be characterized by a persistent pat-
tern of action/reaction, and a constant switch in who is leading the competition. 
The factors that influence the outcome of such games are very complex, and as noted by Beath et. al. (1995, 
p. 142), the results can be quite confusing because different models yield conflicting predictions about the ex-
pected outcome. The reason is that these models are typically built on different assumptions, and these assump-
tions are responsible for different predictions. One of the lessons that can be learnt is that results tend to vary 
dramatically between the static and the dynamic analysis. To illustrate, consider the following two examples. 
First, in models that concern the tournament of two firms for a single innovation, the outcome depends cru-
cially on the type of competition that is assumed. If Cournot competition is assumed, than depending on how 
drastic the innovation is, there are scenarios where action/reaction will be the outcome. However, if the assump-
tion of Cournot competition is replaced with the assumption of Bertrand competition, persistent dominance will 
be the outcome in all cases (Beath et. al. 1995, p. 146, Vickers 1986). Thus, while Bertrand usually leads to 
more competitive outcomes in the static case, it can give less competitive outcomes in the dynamic case.  
Second, there are almost reverse predictions for models that analyze a race for just one innovation, and mod-
els that analyze a continuous race for a sequence of innovations. Vickers (1986) has shown that only some of the 
strongest conditions for dominance or action/reaction carry over to sequences. Furthermore, conditions that are 
sufficient for dominance or action/reaction in single-innovation models can lead to exactly opposite outcomes in 
sequential models (Beath et. al., p. 148). 
In summary, the game-theoretic literature demonstrates that the market outcome of technological competition 
is highly sensitive to numerous factors: 
1. Certainty vs. uncertainty: whether the success of an R&D investment can be taken for granted or not 
2. Mode of competition: Whether firms are in a mode of price (Bertrand) or quantity competition 
(Cournot-Nash) 
3. Type of innovation: Whether firms compete for a new product or a new process innovation 
4. Drastic vs. non-drastic innovation: The extent to which the innovation enables cost savings or differ-
entiates product offers  
5. Rate of progress: How fast new technologies become available 
6. Leap-frogging vs. catch-up: Whether technology becomes common knowledge after a while and 
thus enables firms to leap-frog certain technological developments, or whether the technology can be 
effectively protected from imitation by the innovator, in which case rivals would have to spend more 
to catch-up. 
Variations in one or more of these parameters and assumptions can lead to drastically different market out-
comes and strategic incentives of firms to invest in new technologies. Empirical evidence with field data for 
these types of models is naturally hard to come by. However, the normative and positive predictions of these 
models point out important factors to guide empirical research on these issues and inform managers and policy 
makers about circumstances to look out for to guide their decisions. 
2.3.7. Other dynamic factors 
Other then the strategic incentives of firms to invest into technology that are identified in the game-theoretic 
literature, there are three additional dynamic factors that influence the sequence of technological competition 
and its market outcome. All three dynamic factors contribute to our understanding of the “success breeds suc-
cess” story.  
First, learning by doing may endogenously influence the ability and costs of making further technological 
progress. Kenneth Arrow (1962a) deserves credit for recognizing learning by doing as an important factor of 
economic activity. He pointed out two widely accepted generalizations about the process of learning. First, 
learning is a product of experience. And second, learning from repetition is subject to sharply decreasing re-
turns, hence the learning stimulus must be evolving to continuously increase knowledge. Based on these initial 
facts, Arrow (1962a) advanced the hypothesis that “technical change in general can be ascribed to experience, 
that it is the very activity of production which gives rise to problems for which favorable responses are selected 
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over time.” In his model, the cumulative production of capital goods acts as an index of experience. Further-
more, he assumes that all learning is incorporated in the new capital goods and that no additional learning takes 
place on the side of the user. Furthermore, he views learning as a pure by-product of production, ignoring fac-
tors such as schooling or research. The accumulation and continuous investment into knowledge is reflected in a 
downward drift in cost curves over time. As pointed out by Sheshinski (1967), such economies of scale are dy-
namic by nature and thus “irreversible”, which benefits those firms that have an early start in competition. Par-
ente (1994) and Chari and Hopenhayn (1991) have pointed out that learning by doing may cause constant long-
term growth paths. Lieberman (1984), Hatch and Mowery (1998) and others have demonstrated the empirical 
relevance of learning by doing effects, while Spence (1981) and Lieberman (1984) pointed out the importance 
of learning by doing for the evolution of market structures. Surprisingly though, the presence of strong learning 
by doing effects must not automatically lead to persistent dominance in a dynamic market. Jovanovich and 
Nyarko (1996) showed that an agent may be so skilled at some technology that he will never switch again to a 
newer, better technology, so he will experience no long-run growth from a certain point in time on. A less 
skilled agent might switch to a newer and better technology, however, and overtake the more skilled agent. 
Thus, action/reaction can also occur when learning from experience is important.    
Second, R&D has a dual role: It does not only create new technologies and knowledge, it also enables a firm 
to develop and maintain their broader capabilities to assimilate and exploit externally available innovation. 
Hence, conducting its own R&D helps a firm to learn and to benefit from R&D conducted elsewhere. This dual 
role of R&D has been pointed by Cohen and Levinthal (1989). Other scholars of technological change have also 
observed that firms invest in own R&D partially to be able to utilize information which is available externally 
(Allen 1977, Mowery 1983, Tilton 1971). Thus, learning through R&D helps a firm to absorb extramural knowl-
edge. This “absorptive capacity” of firms represents an important part of their ability to create new knowledge. 
Absorptive capacity is different from learning-by-doing in that the latter refers to the automatic process by 
which firms become more practiced, and, hence, more efficient at doing what they are already doing. In contrast, 
with absorptive capacity a firm may acquire outside knowledge that will permit it to do something quite different 
(Cohen and Levinthal 1989). This observations sheds a different light on R&D. For example, it implies that 
firms might conduct R&D even if they are not able to prevent the new knowledge to spill out into the public 
domain. Specifically, they might conduct R&D in order to gain first-mover advantages from technological 
knowledge generated in universities or governmental laboratories. Or they might invest in R&D to be able to act 
as fast second mover in the face of spillovers from a competitor’s innovation. Thus, firms that are active in R&D 
might have competitive advantages even if they are not able to perfectly appropriate returns from their invest-
ment (e.g. if they conduct pure basic research that is not readily embedded in some product, service, or process 
innovation).  
Third and finally, a “success-breeds-success” story might emerge because of imperfections in the capital mar-
ket. In the real world, information asymmetries exist between financial intermediaries and firms that seek exter-
nal funding for investment projects. This might lead to varying financing conditions for firms that intend to in-
vest into the same investment project, depending on their past financial performance. Because of information 
asymmetries, the creditor will not only look at the nature of the investment project but also at the past perform-
ance of an enterprise to evaluate the risk associated with the credit. Consider for example the influential role of 
credit ratings by Standard and Poor’s or others on firms’ ability to get external financing. If current access to 
capital depends on past performance, then firms that successfully innovated in the past might have an advantage 
today to finance investment projects that could yield them superior returns in the future. Or, in other words, 
when borrowers’ net worth improves, lenders become more willing to lend, and additional investment can be fi-
nanced. Thus, imperfections in the capital market might lead to a “success-breeds-success” story because they 
over-proportionately benefit the winner of a technological competition. The finance literature has analyzed this 
effect in detail and found strong evidence for this accelerator mechanism (Abel and Blanchard 1986, Hubbard 
1990, Hubbard and Kashyap 1992). Against this backdrop, Köllinger (2003) analyzed the dynamics of turnover 
and e-business development, finding that firms that invested into e-business technologies in the past are more 
likely to experience increasing turnover today and also are more likely to increase their e-business investments 
in the future. Although the findings are only suggestive because the analysis was based on a cross-sectional 
dataset and not on a panel, they indicate that a “success-breeds-success” story could also occur in the deploy-
ment of e-business technologies. 
These dynamic aspects of technological competition have important implications for the diffusion of new 
technologies. They suggest that if learning-by-doing occurs, or if firms can increase their “absorptive capacity” 
by investing into R&D or other innovative activities, or if financial markets over-proportionately benefit the 
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winners of past technological competition, the decision to adopt a new technology will not be independent 
from past investment decisions. Hence, path-dependent developments and a “success-breeds-success” story 
could emerge. Chapter 3.5 further elaborates on these issues. In addition, these theories suggest that the per-
formance and the success of an enterprise is closely linked to its ability to keep up in technological competition. 
Thus, investments into new technologies have explicit strategic implications and should be treated as such. 
Chapter 7 further investigates on this issue. 
2.4. Productivity and growth 
One of the most widely accepted insights from economics is the recognition of technical change as a major 
driver of long run economic growth. Scholars of economic growth attribute the development of wealth and the 
differences in wealth across nations to a large degree towards technological advance. Already Schumpeter 
(1934) suggested that the diffusion of major innovations is the driving force behind the business cycle, in par-
ticular the long run Kondratieff cycle. Economists’ attention to the role of technological progress in improving 
wealth has been reinforced by Solow’s (1957) discovery that only a small fraction of per-capita growth was as-
sociated with an increase in the ratio of capital to labor. The famous Solow residual in the growth accounting 
framework turned out to trace seven-eighth of total GDP growth, while increased capital per man hour made up 
for only one-eighth. Studies of economic historians have also delivered direct evidence for the role of industrial 
innovation as the engine of growth (Grossman and Helpman 1994). For example, Fogel (1964) estimated that 
railroads as a single innovation added 5% to U.S. GNP by 1890. Other studies by Rosenberg (1972) and Landes 
(1969) have also emphasized the role of new technologies to spur industrial development and the purposive and 
profit-driven nature of technological progress. The role of technological progress as a driver of economic growth 
also becomes intuitively clear if one tries to imagine what last century’s growth performance would have been 
like without the innovations in generating and using electricity, the emergence of the automobile industry, air-
planes and air traffic, the transistor and integrated circuits, computers, radio, television, mobile telephony and 
others.  
In a seminal paper, Solow (1956) advanced a neoclassical model of long run macroeconomic growth that be-
came the standard reference for the following decades. Solow assumed a production function with capital and 
labor as inputs, constant returns to scale, an exogenously given growth rate of labor (fertility) and technology 
(inventions and their assimilation in the production process) and an endogenously determined rate of savings. 
One of the results of this model is that the steady-state rate of growth of income per person depends only on the 
rate of technological progress and not on the rates of saving and population growth. Furthermore, in the steady 
state, the marginal product of capital is constant, whereas the marginal product of labor grows at the rate of 
technological progress. If technology would be constant over time, the only rise in per capita income would 
come from the accumulation of physical capital. An economy with an initially low capital-labor ratio will have a 
high marginal product of capital. Over time, capital per worker will rise, which will generate a decline in the 
marginal product of capital. At this point, savings will also decline to the rate were new capital will only be pur-
chased to replace worn out capital. At this point, the economy would reach a steady state with an unchanged 
standard of living (Grossman and Helpman 1994). However, if technological advance takes place (which Solow 
assumed to be exogenous or “falling from the sky”), the marginal product of capital need not decline as capital 
per worker increased. Instead, technology makes workers more productive and the accumulation of capital 
would continue to keep pace with the effective labor force, even with a constant population. 
Thus, technological progress leads to higher wealth because it makes labor more productive. To illustrate this 
result in a simplistic way, one can think of a farmer plowing a field with a horse or with a tractor – the tractor 
will enable the farmer the plow a much larger field in one day, the increase in productivity will be due to techni-
cal progress and the purchase of the tractor. As long as technological innovations come up that enable farmers to 
plow more land in one day, an additional accumulation of capital in the form of new machines will occur to take 
advantage of the possibility of achieving higher labor productivity. This mechanism leads to higher production 
and a higher income per capita.  
However, this neoclassical framework also turned out to have some weaknesses. Notably, one of the key vari-
ables in the model (technological advance) was treated as exogenous and hence the theory said nothing about 
whether technological advance and hence sustained long term growth are plausible and realistic assumptions. 
Also, the model turned out to have some weakness when put to the test against real world data. For example, the 
independence of growth and cross-country saving rates that was suggested by the Solow model could not be 
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found. Instead, it turned out that savings and growth are strongly positively correlated (Mankiw et. al. 1995). 
Furthermore, the model has weaknesses to explain the large magnitudes of international differences in per capita 
income. Also, it predicts a much faster rate of convergence between countries as empirical studies suggest. In 
addition, it predicts much higher returns to capital in poorer countries than what is actually observable.  
Consequently, later research has focused on solving these limitations by proposing various extensions and 
changes to the original framework. Most noticeable, the endogenous growth literature has made contributions by 
making technological progress endogenous. This helps to explain the existence of technological progress and of-
fers a more realistic description of R&D (Mankiw et. al. 1995). In particular, the influential model by Romer 
(1990) sees economic growth as driven by the generation of new technologies in a research and development 
sector that are then used in the sector that produces final goods and services.4 Grossman and Helpman (1991) 
show that by making R&D endogenous and allowing firms to appropriate private returns to their R&D invest-
ments leads to a macro model with sustained growth in per capita output, even if population size is constant and 
the economy has no physical capital. Other scholars have also included the theory of monopolistic competition 
into growth theory to account for the fact that successfully innovating firms are likely to gain at least temporarily 
monopoly positions (Romer 1990, Aghion and Howitt 1992), giving rise to models that predict sustainable 
growth as plausible outcomes.  
Other approaches have suggested a broader definition of capital investments than proposed in the original 
neoclassical framework. Romer (1986, 1987) argued that capital investments create an externality that may not 
only benefit the owner, but also others in society. Furthermore, the role of human capital and knowledge has 
been emphasized. The argument is that agents do not only forgo consumption to accumulate physical capital, but 
also human capital (skills) by investing into schooling and training. Because human capital and physical capital 
are complementary inputs in the production process, both are needed to generate sustained growth (Lloyd-Ellis 
and Roberts 2002). Rosenberg (1982) and Young (1993) stressed the inherent uncertainties associated with in-
novative activities and the fact that producers using new technologies rarely achieve commercial viability until 
after they experience a prolonged period of learning-by-doing. In particular, Young (1993) has integrated both 
innovation incentives for R&D and bounded learning-by-doing in a growth model. 
Recent advances in growth theory have also explicitly considered the diffusion process of new technologies, 
hence recognizing the fact that newly invented technologies do not gain immediate full usage (Barro and Sala-I-
Martin 1997, Grossman and Helpman 1991, chp 9 and 11, Rivera-Batiz and Romer 1991). For example, Barro 
and Sala-I-Martin (1997) point out that imitation is usually cheaper than invention, advancing a theoretic argu-
ment that explains why some countries become technological leaders and some followers. They show that the 
ability and the costs of imitation have a substantial effect on the expected rate of convergence between countries. 
In an empirical paper, Parente and Prescott (1994) find that technology adoption barriers can account for a sub-
stantial part of income disparity across countries, emphasizing the role of technology diffusion as an important 
driver of economic growth. 
From a policy perspective, the findings from the growth literature emphasize the role of technological pro-
gress and capital accumulation as the most important factors that determine the wealth of nations in the long run. 
In particular, this implies that the abilities of a country to innovate (to do R&D), to assimilate knowledge and 
new technologies, and to accumulate high levels of human capital through education and training are the key 
variables to promote long run economic growth and wealth. This is good news because the provision of R&D 
and technology centers, universities, schools, as well as incentives to utilize these resources are all variables that 
governments can favorably influence.  
 
ICT, productivity and growth 
 
Given the recognized importance of technological change as a driver of productivity and GDP growth, it is 
not surprising that the joint emergence of a productivity growth resurgence in the US in the 1990’s and the si-
multaneous massive diffusion of new ICT’s has stimulated a debate about a “new economy”, where ongoing 
productivity improvements in ICT were believed to lead to a sustainable and higher rate of total factor produc-
___________ 
4 This model, however, assumes instant transfer from the R&D to the producing sector and thus abstracts from the com-
plications of technology diffusion. 
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tivity growth. Numerous studies have since dealt with two major questions in this context: (1) How much pro-
ductivity growth is due to ICT, and (2) will ICT be an additional and sustainable source of growth? 
Numerous authors stressed that ICT may be characterized as a typical general purpose technology that, like 
earlier technological breakthroughs, has a wide range of applications and a large impact on economic activity 
(Breshnahan and Trajtenberg 1995, Helpman 1998). At the aggregate level, Jorgenson (2001) and Jorgenson and 
Stiroh (2000) argue that the resurgence of growth in the US is mainly founded on the development and deploy-
ment of semiconductors that continuously exhibit a price decline and increasing performance, following 
Moore’s law (Moore 1965, Ruttan 2001 pp. 317-365). Other authors have also demonstrated an increasingly 
productive use of ICT in the user-sectors, and not only a productivity growth in the ICT producing sector itself 
(Oliner and Sichel 2000, Baily and Lawrence 2001). Gordon (2000) raised doubts about this productivity growth 
acceleration story and attributed most of the observed changes in US-productivity to price-measurement prob-
lems and cyclical factors. Although measurement problems and a debate about the sustainability of ICT-enabled 
growth remain, there is wide consensus that ICT does have positive effects on productivity growth (for an inter-
national overview article, see van Ark 2002).  
However, the ICT-induced productivity effects vary significantly between sectors (Nordhaus 2002). The larg-
est productivity growth effect occurs in the ICT-producing sectors themselves, and only smaller (but still meas-
urable) effects in the well-measured non-farming business sectors. In the US, the largest positive effects of ICT-
enabled growth in the ICT using sectors occurred in retail, wholesale, and security trading. Interestingly, the 
same industries in Europe experienced much slower productivity growth although they also invested heavily in 
ICT, but were not able to recoup growth effects due to mostly structural factors (van Ark 2002, Nordhaus 2002). 
In fact, the growth differences in these three industries explain much of the total observed productivity growth 
gap between the US and Europe at that time (Gordon 2002). 
Some authors have also analyzed the impact of ICT on firm-level productivity. It is usually stressed that ICT 
investments must be combined with complementary investments in work practices, human capital, and firm re-
structuring to have an impact on performance (Brynjolfsson and Hitt 2000, David 1990, Greenwood and 
Jovanovic 1998, Malone and Rockart 1991). Brynjolfsson and Hitt (2003) find that computers make a positive 
and significant contribution to output growth at the firm level. The implied returns increase if longer time differ-
ences are taken into account, which suggests that time-intensive complementary investments into organizational 
restructuring have to be undertaken. In a similar spirit, Hempell (2002) argues that firms with innovative experi-
ence are particularly well prepared to make productive use of ICT by introducing appropriate complementary 
innovations. Bertschek and Kaiser (2004) show that ICT has indirect effects on productivity by enabling work-
place reorganization and organizational change, stressing strong complementarities between these investments. 
Summarizing, ICT is indeed a relevant part of current technological change processes and an important factor 
that contributes towards growth. However, the magnitude of impact varies significantly between sectors and can 
either be hampered or promoted by structural factors. Most of the productivity gains occur in the ICT-producing 
sectors themselves. At the level of individual firms, ICT investments lead to productivity gains if they are com-
bined with complementary investments into innovative activities like workplace reorganization, organizational 
change, or process restructuring. Hence, ICT does currently play an important role both for economic develop-
ment and for the efficiency of individual firms. Whether ICT induced growth effects will remain sustainable as 
some of the scholars suggest, will, however, only be seen in the long run. 
2.5. Firm performance 
The management and organization science literature looks at innovation primarily from the perspective of the 
individual business unit, viewing innovation as a possible source of competitive advantage and superior per-
formance of firms. Thus, this stream of research focuses on the question if and under which conditions compa-
nies are able to appropriate private returns from an innovative activity. Firm performance is related to productiv-
ity, but is much more broadly defined. Firm performance includes productivity as one possible measure of per-
formance, but is not limited to it. Numerous concepts and variables are used to measure performance. For exam-
ple, March and Sutton (1997) mention profits, sales, market share, productivity, debt ratios, and stock prices. Itt-
ner et. al. (1997) differentiate between financial and non-financial measures of performance. Financial measures 
include operating income before tax, cash flow, net income, earnings-per-share, sales, economic value added, re-
turn on invested capital / assets / sales, stock price return and cost reduction. Non-financial measures are, for ex-
ample, customer satisfaction, employee satisfaction, product or service quality, employee safety, market share, 
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non-financial strategic objectives, innovation and employee training. Evidently, these different measures of 
performance are correlated. Which of the measures is given priority is essentially a matter of perspective - man-
agement, employees, and stake holders will most likely emphasize different performance measures as most rele-
vant to them. In empirical studies, the choice of the performance measure is often limited by the availability of 
data.  
It is obvious that numerous factors influence the performance of an enterprise, for example its market of op-
eration, the presence of economies of scale and the size of the firm, market structure and market share of an en-
terprise, as well as firm-internal structures and resources (like technology, organizational structure, human re-
sources, or managerial competence). Lenz (1981) provides an interdisciplinary summary of numerous “determi-
nants” of organizational performance. 
Among all factors, how does innovation affect performance? Scholars of firm performance have made nu-
merous contributions to this topic. However, a fundamental problem is the identification of causality in such 
studies. As March and Sutton (1997) noted: “Most studies of organizational performance are incapable of 
identifying the true causal relations among performance variables and other variables correlated with them 
through the data and methods they normally use. Although there are studies that mitigate these shortcomings, the 
emperor of organizational performance studies is for the most part rather naked.” With respect to the 
relationship of innovation and performance, the principal question that is so hard to answer is whether firms’ 
perform well because they are innovative, or if they are able to innovate because they perform well. The two-
way interdependence of innovation and performance has also been discussed in theoretical papers. For example, 
the game-theoretic literature on patent races has shown that innovation incentives, market share, turnover, and 
profitability are all endogenous variables with complex relationships.  
Notwithstanding the principal limitation to identify cause and effect, there is some robust evidence that inno-
vation and good performance are related, i.e. that innovative firms perform better and vice versa. For example, 
Mansfield (1968) reported that innovators in the steel and petroleum industries grew more rapidly than other 
firms in those industries during the years after an innovation. Armour and Teece (1978) showed that the adop-
tion of administrative innovations in petroleum firms increased the rate of return on owners’ equity. Lawless and 
Anderson (1996) tested the effects of innovation and market complexity on firm performance, using data from 
the US computer industry 1982-91. The dependent variable in their study is the difference between a firm’s pre-
dicted market share in each year and its realized market share. They find that generational technological change 
fosters the emergence of product market niches and local rivalry. Firms that differentiate within a niche are re-
warded, while changing niches bears a short-term penalty. Notably, strong performers adopt new technologies 
quickly, without changing niches. Easton and Jarrell (1998) conduct an empirical study about the performance 
effects of Total Quality Management (TQM), an organizational innovation. The findings indicate that perform-
ance, measured by both accounting variables and stock returns, is better for the firms adopting TQM (not imply-
ing a clear causality). Bolton (1993) showed that the propensity to innovate fluctuates with organizational per-
formance, rather than stemming solely from a firm’s inherent characteristics. The results emphasize the two-way 
relationship between innovation and performance. 
An important aspect of innovation and performance is the “success breeds success” story that was mentioned 
earlier in chapter 2.3. The basic argument was that successful innovation in the past leads to superior perform-
ance today, which increases the chances of conducting successful innovation again, which will lead to superior 
performance in the future and so on, leading to a virtuous circle. If the success breeds success story is true, does 
this imply that failure also breeds failure? Masuch (1985) analyzed the possibility of the occurrence of vicious 
circles in organizations, concluding that many structural sub-optimalities of organizations, such as underperfor-
mance, stagnation, or decay, are caused by vicious circles. An interesting aspect of vicious circles is the behav-
ior of decision makers in risky situations, such as the decision to invest into an innovative activity with uncertain 
outcome. Wiseman and Bromiley (1996) deliver empirical evidence that firms facing decline change their in-
vestment behavior in risky projects and fall into a trap of taking unprofitable risks that ultimately exacerbates 
their decline. The authors point out an interesting theoretical conflict surrounding the risk-taking behavior of 
firms in decline. Many scholars believe that declining firms reduce their risks and cut back on innovative in-
vestments, which leads to further decline because of foregone profit opportunities. Other scholars, who have a 
primary interest in risk per se, come to the opposite conclusion that low performing firms take more risks than 
other firms and such risks reduce their subsequent performance. According to Wiseman and Bromiley (1996), 
this argument is closely related to prospect theory (Kahneman and Tversky 1979), assuming that firms facing a 
loss context (where expected performance falls below performance targets) usually have project options that 
they frame as continued losses. Firms facing this situation may opt for projects of higher risk, where that higher 
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risk translates into greater variance in project outcomes. If a project’s outcome variance is large enough, the 
project may include a small probability of success. Firms that follow such reasoning will choose riskier projects, 
since lower risk projects guarantee failure to meet aspiration levels (Singh 1986). However, on average firms 
pursuing projects with unreasonable risk will experience loss, and that loss may exceed that of a lower risk pro-
ject. Both mechanism could give rise to vicious circle dynamics, but for different reasons. The empirical results 
of Wiseman and Bromiley (1996) support the latter theory. 
Although the causal relationship between innovation and performance is not unambiguous, it is clear that in-
novation and success are strongly correlated and therefore of high strategic importance for managers. This im-
plies that Internet-based technologies should also be of high strategic importance, as far as they are used as en-
ablers of process or product innovation rather than as mere infrastructural technologies. Recently, there has been 
a lively debate about the strategic importance of IT and the Internet (Porter 2001, Carr 2003). The dispute is 
about whether investments into IT and Internet-based technologies enable firms to gain sustainable advantages. 
Chapter 7 provides some new insights that contribute towards this debate. 
2.6. Employment effects 
Another highly relevant and much debated issue are the employment effects of innovation and technical 
change. The central question is if technological change creates or destroys jobs. The debate is as old as econom-
ics as a scientific discipline, with early contributions to the debate by Adam Smith, Karl Marx, and Ricardo 
(Vivarelli 1995). There is no unambiguous answer to it, and recent research has emphasized that employment ef-
fects vary with the level of analysis (firm, sector, national economy) and the type of innovation (product vs. 
process). A common belief is that because innovation is related to growth, rapid innovation and growth would 
solve the unemployment problem. However, an innovation might lead to productivity growth without leading to 
GDP growth. The employment effects can be very different for the two kinds of growth (Edquist et. al. 2001). 
Growth effects vary for miscellaneous types of innovation (Kuznets 1972). A common conceptual framework is 
to differentiate between product and process innovations. Product innovations can occur in goods or in services, 
while process innovations can be either technological or organizational, with varying implications for employ-
ment effects.  
A product innovation corresponds to the creation of a new supply function. Given a sufficient demand for the 
new product, it will usually create additional demand for both capital and labor production factors by the inno-
vating firm. This is often called the compensation effect (Pasinetti 1981). However, if the new product does not 
satisfy a completely new kind of demand or does not serve an entirely new function, i.e. if it only functionally 
replaces an old one, there will also be a substitution effect. The net employment effect of such an innovation 
could be either negative or positive, depending on (1) whether the new demand for satisfying the function 
changes when the new product replaces the old one and (2) the labor intensity of the production technology of 
the new product compared to the old one. However, in most cases product innovations are employment creating 
even if substitution effects are taken into account (Katsoulacos 1986, Kuznets 1972, Edquist et. al. 2001, p. 97).  
Process innovations usually also have both a compensation and a substitution effect, however, their net effect 
is much less clear than for product innovations. Process innovations reduce the costs of production for a given 
unit of output, hence they increase productivity per unit of input. This corresponds to an outward shift of an ex-
isting supply function. Depending on the price elasticity of demand and the degree of competition in the indus-
try, this outward shift of the supply function will lead to growth and lower equilibrium prices. This compensa-
tion effect is stronger for competitive industries and high price elasticity’s of demand. However, an increase in 
productivity implies that a given level of output can be produced by less amount of input. Thus, if demand and 
output remain constant, a process innovation will lead to a reduction of labor, ceteris paribus. While the com-
pensation effect can mitigate job losses, they can only promote net employment gains when growth in produc-
tion and demand outstrips productivity growth. This usually only happens when the price elasticity of demand is 
greater than zero, which is only a rare case (Edquist et. al. 2001, p. 119).  
Also, the effects depend on the specific kind of process innovation. Technological process innovations that 
replace labor by capital will have a stronger employment reducing effect than process innovations that lead to 
organizational changes. In fact, organizational process innovations might be either labor-saving or capital-
saving, while technological process innovations are primarily labor-saving (Edquist et. al. 2001, p. 35-37). Or-
ganizational innovations are also special in the sense that they can be viewed as investments into human capital 
by the provision of new knowledge through education, training, and learning-by-doing (Becker 1975). This con-
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stitutes a special kind of investment because it is durable, generates continuing returns, and is embodied in 
“knowledge carriers” (Machlup 1980). Thus, if an employment reducing effect of organizational process innova-
tions exists at all, it is likely to be much smaller than the employment reducing effect of technological process 
innovations. 
In addition to this static firm-level view on different kinds of innovation, a dynamic macro-level view empha-
sizes that there are likely to be secondary effects of innovation because whether something is a process or a 
product innovation is essentially a matter of perspective (see chapter 1.4.1). Some product innovations in one 
sector can turn out to be process innovations in another sector leading to secondary employment effects. Edquist 
et. al. (2001, p. 100) differentiate the net-employment effect of product innovations according to three product 
categories: 
- Consumer products 
- Investment products 
- Intermediate products 
Only investment products can play the double role of employment generation in one sector and labor dis-
placement in another. The net-employment effect of an investment product innovation hence depends both on 
the effect in the technology producing sector, and the effects in the using sectors. For consumer and intermediate 
goods innovation, there is usually only the primary (typically employment increasing) effect.  
A double role of product innovation can also occur in the service sector if the new product is an organiza-
tional innovation that is commoditized and sold as a consulting service. The net employment effect of such an 
organizational innovation depends also on the size of the compensation and the substitution effect in the sectors 
adopting the innovation and in the sector that supplies the consulting service. 
Thus, it is clear that the employment effects of innovations depend on the specific type of innovation. They 
can also vary significantly between aggregation levels (firm, industry, national economy). An employment in-
crease in one (successfully innovating) firm might lead to employment losses at the industry level or at the na-
tional level, depending on whether output growth offsets productivity growth. Thus, the net impact of an innova-
tion on employment remains essentially an empirical issue that cannot be unambiguously predicted ex ante. 
Empirical evidence suggests that overall employment effects of innovation at the firm level tends to be posi-
tive. Firms that innovate in products, but also in processes, grow faster in their respective markets and are more 
likely to expand their employment than non-innovative firms, regardless of industry, size, or other characteris-
tics (for an overview see Pianta 2004).  
Studies on the industry level show that the employment impact is positive in industries characterized by high 
demand growth and orientation towards product (or service) innovations, while process innovation tends to lead 
to job losses. Recent sectoral evidence for Europe suggests a prevalence of labor-saving process innovations. 
Slow growth on the demand side and increasing international competition has pushed many firms towards re-
structuring and process innovations. This leads to the well-known phenomenon of jobless productivity growth 
which is currently being witnessed in many European countries. However, product innovation has confirmed its 
positive effects on output and jobs (Pianta 2000, 2001, Antonucci and Pianta 2002, Evangelista and Savona 
2002, 2003). 
The overall effect depends on the country and period being studied. The higher economic growth (total output 
and demand), the higher is the positive impact of innovation, while technical change in stagnating or closed 
economies tends to be associated with serious employment losses. According to Pianta (2004), empirical evi-
dence suggests that institutional factors and macroeconomic conditions play an important role for the nature and 
the effect of technical change on employment at the macro level. The employment impact is generally more 
positive the higher is the ability to generate new products and to invest in new economic activities, and the 
stronger is the effect of price reduction, leading to increased demand. Aggregate studies generally point out the 
possibility of technological unemployment, which emerges when industries or countries see the prevalence of 
process innovations in contexts of weak demand. Firms innovating in both products and processes may be suc-
cessful in expanding output and jobs regardless of economic context, but often at the expense of non-innovating 
firms.  
In addition to the quantity impact of innovation on employment, there also exists a quality aspect. The ques-
tion is what kind of jobs are created or destroyed by innovation? A large literature on skill biased technical 
change (Acemuglu 2002) finds that technical change is biased towards skilled workers as it replaces unskilled 
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labor and increases wage inequality and polarization. Unskilled jobs have long been declining in absolute 
terms in Europe and growing only slowly in the US, while skilled jobs for educated workers are created at a 
faster pace in most countries (Pianta 2004). Analyzing the particular skill-biased effects of ICT-enabled innova-
tion, Brynjolfsson and Hitt (2002) find that innovative firms that combine investments into ICT, complementary 
workplace reorganization, and innovations in products and services tend to use more skilled labor. In particular, 
the effects of ICT on labor demand are greater when IT is combined with organizational restructuring, highlight-
ing the importance of IT-enabled innovation. 
The employment effect of e-business technologies have yet to be analyzed. E-business will most probably 
generate new jobs in the hardware, software, and consulting industries because for these sectors e-business es-
sentially is a product (or service) innovation that creates new supply functions. On the side of the technology us-
ing sectors and on the aggregate level, however, the net employment impact of e-business is less clear. While we 
can expect that firms that successfully conduct product or processes innovations using e-business technologies 
will grow faster than non-innovating firms, they will probably do so at the expense of non-innovating firms, es-
pecially considering the currently stagnating demand dynamics in many markets in Europe. Hence, a certainly 
plausible assumption would be that e-business technologies will just be another instrument for many firms to ra-
tionalize and restructure at the expense of total employment in a low GDP growth scenario. Also, we may expect 
that the diffusion of e-business technologies will have a skill-biased effect on labor demand, favoring well-
educated workers with ICT skills. 
 
2.7. Implications for e-business diffusion 
The above discussion on the consequences of technological change has emphasized that technological devel-
opment is endogenous to the development of productivity, growth, market structure, employment demand and 
firm performance.  
Some implications and hypotheses for the diffusion of e-business technologies can be derived from the dis-
cussion which can be tested using firm-level data in later parts of this study. To the extent that e-business tech-
nologies turn out to be effective in either (1) enabling companies to conduct process innovation and reduce their 
marginal costs or (2) to come up with new product or service varieties, the following impacts can be expected: 
First, it was discussed that the emergence of new technologies may lead to changes in market structure (chap-
ter 2.3). Thus, not every company will benefit from the diffusion of e-business technologies, there will be win-
ners and losers. The direction and the extent of these changes will, however, largely depend on past and current 
market structures. Also, the effects of e-business technology-induced process innovations in an industry will 
vary with the degree of price-elasticity of demand and the degree to which e-business related product or service 
innovations raises consumers’ willingness to pay (Sutton 1991). Hence, the incentives to invest into e-business 
technologies and related innovations can be expected to vary from industry to industry, similar to earlier innova-
tive activities (Sutton 2001, Acs and Audretsch 1987, Cohen and Klepper 1996). Also, following the argument 
of Geroski (1994), the technological opportunities of e-business might be very different across industries. This 
leads to Hypothesis 1: 
Hypothesis 1 - Diffusion patterns of e-business technologies will vary across industries. 
Sutton’s (1991) theory also suggests a systematic relationship between industry concentration ratios and the 
intensity of technological competition: Industries with a high level of technological competition are more likely 
to be concentrated because this is the only way how firms in such industries can recover the sunk costs of fast 
technological progress. In addition, a generally high level of technological competition will increase firms’ ab-
sorptive capacities for new technologies like e-business (Cohen and Levinthal 1989). To the extent that e-
business provides sufficient industry-specific opportunities, the following hypothesis can be derived: 
Hypothesis 2 - Industries with high levels of technological competition and high concentration ratios 
are likely to be leaders in e-business adoption. 
Independent from industry membership, the discussion suggested a number of firm-specific factors that influ-
ence whether a firm will invest in e-business and whether it will be able to benefit from the investment. For ex-
ample,  
e-business technologies are likely to be subject to network externalities. Thus, as far as systems are compatible 
  31
between firms, the higher the number of firms that use e-business technologies, the more valuable it becomes 
for other firms to join in too. Once a critical mass of users is reached, Internet-based process technologies are 
likely to become a “new standard” of communicating within and across companies. In addition, large firms with 
many employees have more potential in-house users of communication technologies. In conjunction with the in-
side that large firms are, up to some threshold, more likely to invest in innovation (Acs and Audretsch 1987, 
Comanor 1967, Scherer 1967, Schumpeter 1942), this leads to: 
Hypothesis 3 - Large firms are more likely to adopt e-business technologies that are primarily used in-
house. 
Also, a possible inverse U-shaped relationship between market power and innovative activity has been dis-
cussed (Comanor 1967, Scherer 1967, Mansfield 1977). Thus, we can also expect that there will also be an in-
verse U-shaped relationship between firms’ market power and their probability to adopt e-business technologies: 
Hypothesis 4 – Firms with a medium degree of market power are more likely to adopt. 
The game-theoretic literature has also pointed out who are likely to be the winners in technological competi-
tion (Beath et. al. 1995): Firms that are able to outpace their direct competitors in technological development 
will capture market shares from the rivals, possibly up to the degree that they the drive their competitors out of 
business and gain dominance in the market. Conditional on the assumption that the new technology of the early 
mover is indeed superior, this mechanism simply reflects that “time is money” and therefore being quick can 
yield competitive advantages: 
Hypothesis 5 - Early movers in technological competition can enjoy excess returns as long as their com-
petitors have not perfectly copied them. 
However, once imitation was successful and an innovation has successfully diffused among market players, 
no single firm will be able to realize excess returns on the innovation anymore. Yet, the positive effects of the 
innovation will not be lost, they will simply be passed on to consumers in the form of greater product variety 
and lower prices. As a consequence, successful diffusion of an innovation will increase market size. Hence, in-
dependent from whether innovating firms will be able to appropriate private profits from their investments, suc-
cessful innovation will lead to growth of the innovator, ceteris paribus (Hannan and McDowell 1990, Mansfield 
1983, Phillips 1966, Sutton 1991, 2001): 
Hypothesis 6 - Innovators are more likely to grow than their competing non-innovators, independent 
from their ability to achieve excess profits. 
The discussion about the employment impacts of innovations and new technologies stated that the net impact 
depends on the relative strength of the substitution effect and the compensation effect. On the one hand, the sub-
stitution effect implies a reduction in the demand for labor because new technologies and more efficient proc-
esses partially replace low-skilled labor. On the other hand, the compensation effect implies a growing demand 
for labor due to an expansion of the innovative firm. The net employment effects of new technologies and inno-
vations vary across different aggregation levels (firm, sector, national economy). Also, they vary for different 
kinds of innovations and new technologies (e.g. product vs. process innovations). Most e-business technologies 
promise efficiency gains because they enable to automate a variety of routine tasks. Thus, they can be expected 
to have a labor substituting effect after the implementation is completed and the routines have been effectively 
changed and optimized. Consequently, firms that are more advanced in using e-business technologies can be ex-
pected to reduce their staff due to the substitution effect, ceteris paribus. 
Hypothesis 7: Firms that are more advanced in using e-business technologies are more likely to reduce em-
ployment than their less advanced competitors, ceteris paribus. 
Yet, the compensation effect also suggests that process innovations lead to efficiency gains that allow the in-
novator to grow at the expense of non-innovating rivals. Also, product or service innovations are usually associ-
ated with growth because they enable a company to fulfill new needs and wants of customers. The growth of the 
innovating firm will be especially pronounced if direct competitors have not yet imitated the innovation. Thus, 
the compensation effect will be more pronounced in the short run than in the long run (after all rivals have cop-
ied the innovation). To the extent that e-business technologies are used to introduce innovations to a firm, they 
can be expected to have a compensation effect in the short run. 
Hypothesis 8: Firms that recently used e-business technologies to innovate are more likely to increase 
employment than non-innovative firms, ceteris paribus.  
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Furthermore, the research on the dynamics of technological competition has demonstrated that a “success 
breeds success” story could emerge as a consequence of five distinct reasons – complementarity of technologies 
(Milgrom and Roberts 1990), strategic behavior of agents (Beath et. al. 1995), learning by doing (Arrow 1962a), 
increases in absorptive capacity (Cohen and Levinthal 1989), or imperfections in capital markets (Abel and 
Blanchard 1986). Provided that the early movers in technological competition are able to appropriate some pri-
vate gains of their investments5, it is likely that they will be successful in building a sustainable advantage over 
their rivals in the dynamic process of technological competition, possibly even up to degree that they achieve in-
dustry dominance, if one or more of these accelerating forces are at work. This will be discussed in more detail 
in section 3.5. Finally, two additional aspects have been mentioned in the above discussion that seem important. 
First, it was pointed out that changes in technology might influence the degree of economies of scope and the 
MES of an industry. These are additional ways of how new technologies can induced changes in industry struc-
ture (see page 18). However, the direction of the effect of e-business technologies is not unambiguously deter-
minable because two contrary effects are at work. On the one hand, the network characteristics of Internet-based 
technologies imply economies of scale. On the other hand, Internet-based technologies also offer new business 
opportunities to start-ups and small firms that previously did not exists. The net effect will probably vary among 
industries. Given the data that was available for this study, it is not possible to track changes in market structure 
over time and relate these changes unambiguously to the diffusion of e-business technologies. Therefore, no par-
ticular hypothesis is formulated for this point. Second, on various occasions it was mentioned that investments 
into technology might be subject to market failure, which can result in either too much or too little investment in 
technology compared to the social optimum (e.g. page 12 and 21). This could occur because firms anticipate 
problems to protect their innovation from immediate imitation or because the competitive dynamics in an indus-
try induce sub-optimal investment levels. However, it is also not clear a-priori which scenario is likely to occur, 
if market failure will occur at all, or what the social optimum would actually be in reality. Thus, no hypotheses 
are formulated for this aspect either because the direction of the relationship is ambiguous and the estimation of 
social optima are subject to severe difficulties in an empirical investigations.  
___________ 
5 This assumption reflects the argument of  movers can enjoy excess returns as long as their com-
petitors have not perfectly copied their practices. 
Hypothesis 5 that early
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3. Theories of technological diffusion 
Formel-Kapitel 3 Abschnitt 1 
Theories of innovation diffusion are concerned with the process by which new technologies, practices, prod-
ucts, or services spread across their potential market over time. Empirical studies of innovation diffusion identi-
fied a very robust stylized fact that seems to apply to all kinds of innovations, including new technologies, pro-
duction processes, organizational innovations, or consumer products: Innovations spread in their potential mar-
ket over time following an S-shaped aggregate curve, featuring early adopters, a majority of followers, late 
adopters and frequently also a substantial number of non-adopters (Bain 1964, Bass 1964, Griliches 1957, 
Mansfield 1968, Rogers 2003, Stoneman 2002). Frequently, years pass from the first introduction of an innova-
tion to a market to the point where saturation levels are reached. At first sight, it is not intuitively clear why this 
process may take so long. If an innovation satisfies a new mean or achieves a given mean in a superior way, why 
do not all potential users adopt the innovation immediately? This is the fundamental question that theories of in-
novation diffusion address.  
The study of innovation diffusion is interesting and relevant for various reasons. From an academic perspec-
tives, it concerns questions that deal with decision dynamics of consumers or firms in situations that can involve 
incomplete information, risk, and ambiguity. Understanding the nature of these dynamics is an indispensable 
cornerstone to understand the nature of technological change and development. It also has important practical 
implications: For example, theories of innovation diffusion reveal insides into who will be the winners and the 
losers of innovation diffusion, when is the optimal time to adopt an innovation for a particular firm or individ-
ual, and they can help marketers of innovation to optimize marketing strategies and production plans. From a 
policy perspective, it is relevant to understand the optimal rate of diffusion, to identify possible market failures, 
and to understand which policy actions could be undertaken to reach the optimal rate of diffusion. 
3.1. Different perspectives on innovation diffusion 
A long tradition of research on the diffusion of innovations can be found both in the economics and the man-
agement literature. Both fields developed their own research agendas independently and surprisingly little cross-
reference and acknowledgment of the contributions of the respective other side can be found, although numer-
ous parallels and complementarities exist.  
Fundamentally, there is one branch of work devoted to the diffusion of innovative consumer products, and a 
second branch that considers innovations among firms, including technological, process, and organizational 
types of innovation. Innovations for consumer markets or firm markets are very different and have thus lead to 
different streams of research: First, innovations for consumers or firms are often different in their nature and do 
not necessarily overlap. Some innovations that are relevant for firms (for example a new production technique) 
are irrelevant for consumers and vice versa. Second, the incentive to adopt an innovation is very different for 
consumers and firms. Consumers maximize their personal utility given their budget constraint (Becker 1965, 
Horsky 1990). For private individuals and households the purchase of a new good or service is a consumptive 
activity that yields immediate or ongoing utility gains from the time of purchase on, which is adjunctive to the 
time spent on consuming the new good or service. Firms, on the other hand, maximize their profits in a given 
market setting (Götz 1999, Fudenberg and Tirole 1985, Reinganum 1981a,b). Their payoff from an innovation 
does not only depend on the innovation itself, but on the amount they produce, the costs they bear, and the price 
they can charge for their product. For firms, the decision to adopt an innovation is an investment decision that 
involves costs in the expectation of future – rather than immediate - rewards which is based on efficiency gains 
in their production activities (Dixit and Pindyck 1996, Huisman 2001). Third, firms are usually in competitive 
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situations6 – their gains from an innovation depend on the behavior of their competitors and their costumers. 
Consumers do not compete against each other on output markets, their utility from purchasing an innovation is 
directly and exclusively determined by the new product or service itself and their own behavior. 
Depending on the purpose of each particular study, scholars have emphasized different perspectives on the 
diffusion process and different levels of analysis were chosen. As a general trend, the economics literature has 
put more emphasis on the study of innovations for firms, while the marketing literature has focused more on 
consumer product innovations. The strategic management literature has numerous contributions for both types of 
innovations. The focus in the economics literature has recently been on the analysis of individual decisions and 
behavioral foundations of innovation diffusion, thus emphasizing a micro-level of analysis. On the other side, 
the marketing profession has put more emphasize on forecasting performance, introducing various extensions 
upon the seminal epidemic diffusion model of Bass (1969) (see Mahajan et. al. 1990). These epidemic type of 
models take an aggregate view of the diffusion process and abstract from individual-level decision making. The 
strategic management literature, once again, features contributions to both streams of research.  
Yet another aspect in the study of innovation diffusion is the distinction between intra-firm diffusion and in-
ter-firm diffusion (see for example Stoneman 2002, pp. 57-58). While intra-firm diffusion considers how new 
technologies, work practices or organizational changes gain acceptance within a given firm after management 
has decided to adopt the innovation, inter-firm analysis abstracts from inner-organizational dynamics and treats 
adoption as an investment decision and an all-or-nothing event. The level of use of the innovation within the 
firm after the adoption decision is not considered explicitly in inter-firm analysis. Obviously, studies on intra-
firm diffusion focus on organizational aspects and human resources, while inter-firm studies have an emphasis 
on firm-heterogeneity and strategic, market-oriented aspects. 
For the purpose of this study, the focus is henceforth on the diffusion of technological innovations among 
firms because e-business technologies clearly belong to this category (see chapter 1.4.4). Furthermore, the inter-
firm perspective is taken. Hence, the interest is primarily on the market and inter-firm dynamics of the diffusion 
process. The primary objective of this approach is to explain differences in the adoption behavior among firms. 
Inner-firm processes (such as learning-by-doing) are considered as factors that contribute towards the heteroge-
neity of firms. However, consistent with the literature on inter-firm diffusion of innovations, the adoption of a 
new technology is treated as an investment decision and an all-or-nothing event, abstracting from the level of 
utilization of the new technology within each firm. The following sub-chapters will summarize important in-
sights both from the management and the economics literature on the diffusion of technological innovations 
among firms. Selected work is cited that is most relevant to this study. A particular purpose of this literature re-
view is to link important insights from the economics and the management literature as a preliminary to derive 
adoption criteria for e-business technologies in section 3.6. The chapter concludes with section 3.7 which points 
out parallels and connections between the diffusion of new technologies (chapter 3) and the consequences of the 
technological diffusion (chapter 2). In the subsequent empirical chapters (5 and 6), this study pursues a micro-
level view emphasizing the adoption dynamics at the level of the individual firm, testing explicitly some of the 
hypothesis developed in chapters 2 and 3.  
3.2. Economic theory of technology adoption 
The economic literature has identified various factors that influence the diffusion of new technologies among 
firms. In particular, the most prominent factors discussed are: 
- The distribution of information among agents, including learning and dissemination of information 
- The cost of acquiring new technology and changes therein over time 
- The performance of new technology and changes therein over time 
- Number and characteristics of technologies (only one new technology, two or more competing tech-
nologies, two or more complementary technologies) 
- Existence of network externalities 
___________ 
6 Not meaning competition to purchase a potentially scarce technology, but competition on a given output market. 
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- Level of competition among agents (none, duopoly, oligopoly, monopolistic competition, perfect 
competition) 
- Firm characteristics and their distribution 
- Discount factors 
- Risk and ambiguity aversion of agents 
- The extent of first mover advantages 
- The extent to which realized profits generate new investment 
These factors are not independent. Instead, different combinations of these factors can lead to very different 
diffusion dynamics. The various theories of technology diffusion among firms that are found in the economic lit-
erature can be subsumed as belonging to either the epidemic, rank, stock, or order effect type of models. This 
terminology and classification of economic diffusion models has been introduced by Paul Stoneman (Stoneman 
2002, Karshenas and Stoneman 1993, Stoneman 1995). The basic arguments and conclusions of these different 
approaches to explain the diffusion of new technologies among firms are briefly outlined below, focusing on the 
diffusion of a stand-alone technology without network effects. For a comprehensive and in-depth overview, the 
book of Stoneman (2002) is a valuable resource. 
3.2.1. Epidemic effects 
Epidemic models of innovation diffusion take a macro-view of the diffusion process. As the term “epidemic” 
suggests, these models have a close analogy to the analysis of the spread of infectious diseases. The basic idea is 
that users and non-users of a new technology mix socially and make contact over time. When a user meets a 
non-users, she “contaminates” the non-user with the innovation, which eventually results in an adoption decision 
of the non-user. The process starts with a few original users who are “infected” by the new technology. As time 
proceeds, the share of “infected” agents in the population increases due to  the social mixing. Thus, in the begin-
ning of the processes the number of agents who adopt per period increases. While more and more agents have 
adopted, the share of non-users gets continuously smaller. Thus, after some point of inflection, the number of 
adopters per period decreases again towards the end of the process, eventually leading to a saturation level 
where all agents have adopted the innovation.  
Mathematically, this idea can be simply expressed as a logistic function that gives rise to the empirically ob-
servable S-shaped diffusion curve. Let N  be the number of potential adopters, and M(t) the number of adopters 
at time t. Assume that there is constant mixing within the population such that individuals will make contact 
with  users of the technology. If q is the probability that contact will lead to adoption, the number of 
new users in period t can be expressed as 
M(t) / N∂
 
(3.1) { }dM(t) M(t) N M(t)
dt N
θ= −  
 
where  is the probability of an infectious contact. This equation can be solved with respect to M(t) 
yielding 
qθ = δ
 
(3.2) NM(t)
1 exp( p t)
= + − − θ  
 
which is the standard logistic function (Stoneman 2002, pp. 29-33). Here, p defines the starting date of the 
diffusion process (the intercept term), θ  determines the speed and the shape of the diffusion curve, and N is the 
market potential of the innovation.  
Examples of the epidemic approach in the economic literature are Griliches (1957), Bain (1964), Mansfield 
(1968), and more recently Gruber and Verboven (2001) and Beck et al. (2005). Although logistic type of models 
often provide good fit to historical diffusion data, the approach has been criticized on various grounds. First of 
all, the model is silent about what exactly happens when a user and a non-user meet, i.e. why such a contact 
should result in an adoption. A common interpretation is that social contact leads to a transfer of information be-
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tween agents. Non-users may originally not know about the new technology or may not be convinced about its 
benefits. In this way, social contact may indeed spur the spread of an innovation.  As such, the essence of epi-
demic models is that the dissemination of information is driving the diffusion process.  
However, this interpretation also has clear limits. Social contact is clearly not the only source of information 
that real world agents have. In many ways, the epidemic model is lacking behavioral and economic content. For 
example, given that many innovations take years to reach their market potential, it is implausible to assume that 
the only reason why some agents have waited with the adoption was because they did not know about it. If they 
knew about the new technology and were not convinced about its benefits, it is not plausible why they should 
passively wait for an information to arrive and not actively search for it up to some optimal stopping point of the 
searching process. Furthermore, if uncertainty or ambiguity about the new technology are prevalent and deter 
agents from adopting, this should be modeled explicitly rather than being mixed together with ignorance of 
agents with respect to the innovation. In addition, the model takes the number of potential users N as exoge-
nously given, being silent about what determines N. Also, there is no story involved about why and which new 
technologies should be chosen by a company. The model also assumes that the technology remains constant 
over time, both in terms of performance and costs of acquisition. However, changes in technology might influ-
ence both the diffusion speed as well as the number of potential users N.  
Epidemic models of innovation diffusion are in essence disequilibrium models, as noted by Stoneman (2002). 
The equilibrium level of users of a technology is N, the model explains the adjustment process towards the equi-
librium within a population, but until the end of the diffusion process the market is out of equilibrium. Further-
more, the epidemic model is a self-propagating, deterministic mechanism that cannot be stopped before all po-
tential users have adopted.  
In summary, epidemic models stress the role of information dissemination as a key factor that drives the dif-
fusion process. This basic insight is useful. Also, the model often has good fit to historical diffusion data. How-
ever, beyond the information story, the behavioral and economic content of epidemic models is limited.  
3.2.2. Rank effects 
In contrast to epidemic models, the theory of rank effects takes a micro-perspective on the diffusion process 
leading to probit- or logit-type of models. Rank effect models assume perfect information and rational profit-
maximizing behavior of firms. The diffusion process is not deterministic and does not occur endogenously. In-
stead, it is driven by exogenous factors, such as technological improvements over time or falling costs for ac-
quiring the technology.  
The basic idea is that firms differ from each other in at least one relevant dimension such that the net present 
value of a technological innovation is higher for some firms than for others. This makes it possible to rank firms 
in terms of the benefit to be obtained from the use of the new technology. Firms that rank higher are expected to 
adopt more rapidly. Important dimensions of heterogeneity are e.g. firm size, location, previous investments, 
availability of complementary inputs, R&D intensity, market factors, inner-organizational factors, different ex-
pectations, or different access to financial resources (David 1969, 1991, Davies 1979, Stoneman 2002). There 
are numerous parallels between the theory of rank effects and some of the literature on the consequences of 
technological change that was discussed in chapter 2. For example, large firms might be more likely to adopt a 
new technology because they have the necessary financial resources (see section 2.3.4 and the Schumpeterian 
hypotheses) or because the technology has increasing returns to scale (see section 2.3.1 and 2.3.3 on network ex-
ternalities). Also, Sutton’s (1991) theory predicts that innovative efforts will be higher for firms that act in mar-
kets where innovative activities successfully raise consumers’ willingness to pay and where product groups are 
close substitutes (see section 2.3.5). Thus, the market on which a firm is active is one source of heterogeneity 
that contributes to different adoption dynamics among companies. In addition, section 2.3.7 pointed out that the 
history can matter for the dynamics of technological progress. In particular, past investment decisions of firms 
can lead to learning-by-doing effects, affect their ability to absorb new technologies, or influence their ability to 
finance new investment projects. Hence, past investment decisions of firms are one factor that contributes to-
wards the heterogeneity of firms and possibly influences the adoption behavior of new technologies. 
The theory of rank effects argues that the benefits of adoption have some kind of distribution within the 
population, usually following some bell shaped curve. Each firm considers the gross benefits and the cost of ac-
quisition for its own situation and, in the absence of uncertainty, adopts if the former exceeds the latter.  
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Let their be N heterogeneous firms without strategic interaction. Define the costs of acquisition at time t as 
c(t) and the net present value of the technology at time t as G(t). The new technology is adopted if . 
Because firms are allowed to be heterogeneous, only a fraction m(t) of the entire population will exhibit 
and adopt. Hence, the level of ownership of the technology at time t will be .  
can change over time due to exogenous changes that either increase G(t) via technological improvements or de-
creases in c(t), giving rise to a diffusion curve. The shape of the diffusion curve depends on the distribution of 
m(t). Note that m(t) may remain smaller than unity even if . Thus, depending on the characteristics of the 
technology, the distribution of firm characteristics, and the costs of the technology there might be a significant 
number of non-adopters in the population even in the long run.  
G(t) c(t)≥
(t)N M(t)G(t) c(t)≥ M(t) m=
t → ∞
Rank effect models provide an economic explanation for the occurrence of diffusion processes even if agents 
behave perfectly rational and all information about the new technology are public knowledge. They emphasize 
heterogeneity of firms as the primary source of differences in adoption decisions. A particular strength of the 
rank effects approach is that it allows to incorporate any dimension of firm heterogeneity into the modeling ap-
proach that is related to the ability and the propensity of firms to innovate. Thus, it is a very general and flexible 
approach for empirical studies of innovation diffusion at the micro level. Also, in contrast to epidemic models, 
the market potential of a new technology must not be assumed exogenously, instead it depends on factors that 
are endogenous and can vary between different firm populations and technologies.  
A limitation of the approach is that the empirically observable S-shaped pattern cannot be explained by rank 
effects in the absence of technological improvements or falling costs of the technology over time. Also, firms are 
assumed to be independent of each other. Thus, rank effect models are not informative about strategic aspects of 
technology adoption.  
3.2.3. Stock effects 
The strategic aspects of technology adoption are emphasized by stock effect models. They take a game-
theoretic approach that focuses on the interdependencies of payoffs between firms that compete on the same out-
put market. Important contributions in this spirit are Reinganum (1981a,b), Quirmbach (1986), and more re-
cently Götz (1999) who integrates stock and rank effects in one model. 
Similar to rank effect models, the game-theoretic approach to innovation diffusion assumes rational, profit-
maximizing agents and perfect information. Also, the diffusion process does occur due to exogenous factors, 
such as technological improvements or falling costs of the new technology. However, in contrast to the rank ef-
fects approach, stock effects do not assume firms to be independent or heterogeneous. Instead, firms are as-
sumed to be identical ex ante and they compete on some given output market. Then a new process technology 
arrives that has the potential to reduce production costs. The payoff of each firm depends on its costs of produc-
tion, its output level, and the price it can charge. All three variables might be different before and after the adop-
tion of a new technology. Also, the decision of one firm to adopt will affect the payoff level of all competitors. 
In this way, stock effect models have parallels to the game-theoretical models of technological competition that 
were discussed in section 2.3.6.  
In stock effect models, the diffusion process also occurs as an equilibrium that changes its level over time due 
to exogenous changes. The basic idea is that as more and more firms adopt the cost-reducing process technol-
ogy, industry output will be expanded and the equilibrium market price will fall. At any point in time, it is not 
profitable for all firms to adopt the innovation because this would pass on all excess gains directly to the con-
sumer via higher output levels and lower prices. Excess returns from adopting can only be realized as long as 
not all competitors have also adopted. Thus, at any point in time there is a unique equilibrium number of firms 
that will use the new technology, depending on market conditions and the costs and benefits of the new technol-
ogy vis-à-vis the old technology.  
To illustrate the basic argument, consider the basic Reinganum (1981b) model which, in addition to all as-
sumptions listed above, supposes myopic expectations of firms. The following notations are used: 
p(t)  - equilibrium market price at time t 
M(t)  - the number of users of the new technology at time t 
0c  - cost per unit of output of the old technology 
1c  - cost per unit of output of the new technology 
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0q (t)  - output of the firm at time t using the old technology 
1q (t)  - output of the firm at time t using the new technology 
0 (t)Π  - annual profit at time t using the old technology 
1(t)Π  - annual profit at time t using the new technology 
0V (t, t)  - present value of the profit streams of the old technology 
1V (t, t)  - present value of the profit streams of the new technology 
r - the discount rate 
C(t)  - costs for purchasing the new technology at time t  
 
The annual profits of firms using the old or the new technology depend on the market, production costs, and 
quantities produced. Thus, they are respectively defined as 
 
(3.3)  0 0
1 1
(t) (p(t) c )q (t)
(t) (p(t) c )q (t)
Π = −
Π = −
0
1
0
 
If the new technology is superior to the old, 1c c<  and . Therefore, firms using the new technology 
have a cost advantage and produce more. Hence, they exhibit excess returns compared to firms using the old 
technology: 
1q q> 0
1 1V (t, t) ( , t) exp( r )d
∞
= Π τ − τ τ
τ
∫
 
(3.4)  1 0 1 1 0 0(t) (t) (p(t) c )q (t) (p(t) c )q (t) 0Π − Π = − − − ≥
 
As the number of users of the new technology increases, aggregate output will be expanded and thus the equi-
librium market price will fall. Because of this, profits of both old and new technology users will decline. De-
pending on the shape of the demand curve, profits of the new technology users usually decline faster than profits 
of the old technology users. Thus, the profit difference between old and new technology users also decline over 
time, but remains positive until all firms have adopted the new technology. 
The decision to invest depends on the present value of all future profit gains. If the technology has an infinite 
life, the present value of the new and the old technology respectively can be written as 
 
(3.5)  t
0 0
t
V (t, t) ( , t) exp( r )d
τ=
∞
τ=
= Π τ − τ∫ 
 
Now consider that firms have myopic expectations, thus at time τ  for all tτ > , they expect the number of 
users  at that point in time to be the same as at time t. In such circumstances, the profits realized at M(t) tτ >  
will depend on the number of users at that time, firms will expect that for all tτ >  the profits they generate will 
be the same. This simplistic approach can be extended  to include more realistic assumptions without changing 
the basic message of the approach (Stoneman 2002, p. 45). Under myopic expectations, the profits for users and 
non-users can simply be written as 
 
(3.6)  1 1
0 0
( , t) (M(t))
( , t) (M(t))
Π τ = Π
Π τ = Π
 
and the difference in payoff streams between the two technologies is given by 
 
(3.7) 1 01 0
( (M(t)) (M(t)))
V (t, t) V (t, t)
r
Π − Π− =  
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which is decreasing in . Given (3.7) the decision rule to invest into the new technology is given by  M(t)
 
(3.8) 1 01 0
( (M(t)) (M(t)))
V (t, t) V (t, t) C(t)
r
Π − Π− = ≥ . 
 
The equilibrium number of firms that should adopt at time t, , can be established (Reinganum 1981b) 
and depends on the costs of the technology at time t. As  declines over time,  will increase and a dif-
fusion process will occur.  
*M(t)
C(t) *M(t)
Note that in contrast to the rank effects model, here diffusion occurs although firms are ex ante identical. The 
only difference arises between users and non-users of the new technology. There is also no heterogeneity among 
adopters with respect to their annual profit flow depending on when they adopt. At all times, all non-users make 
the same profits and all users make the same (but higher) profits. Thus, over all periods, the early adopters do 
best in terms of excess returns they can earn. At the end of the process, all firms will have adopted the new tech-
nology – thus they will henceforth be identical again. In such a  setting, excess returns from technology adoption 
are not sustainable in the long run and have only a temporary effect. 
It is also interesting to observe that the basic stock effect model allows for the possibility of different diffu-
sion dynamics in various industries. Because the incentives to invest do not only depend on the technology, but 
also on the slope and the position of both the aggregate demand and supply functions in which firms operate, a 
very rapid adoption could be an equilibrium outcome in one industry, while in another industry a much slower 
pace could also be an equilibrium. Thus, as long as aggregate supply and demand conditions are not equal across 
industries, we can expect different diffusion dynamics in different industry sectors. 
Notice further that the basic stock effects model says nothing about which firms should adopt first. It only es-
tablishes an equilibrium number of new technology users that would maximize profits. It is silent about how 
firms should coordinate to reach this equilibrium by assuming that firms precommit themselves to an adoption 
date. In the model, the firm which is able to precommit itself to adopt first does best, yet any firm can adopt first 
in equilibrium. The model does not consider how firms would solve this dilemma. Hence, in the basic stock ef-
fects model, in addition to responding to external stimuli, firms are also in a coordination game which adds stra-
tegic uncertainty to their decisions. This has, to my best knowledge, not been explicitly considered yet. How-
ever, this additional strategic uncertainty might have a considerable influence on the diffusion process. 
3.2.4. Order effects 
Order effects models can be viewed as an extension of the stock effects approach. The basic stock effects 
model claims that the annual profits of all users of the new technology are the same, irrespective of when they 
have adopted and how many other firms have adopted at that time. Hence, firms are identical ex ante and ex post 
to their adoption decisions.  
However, this must not be the case if some of the assumptions of the stock effect model are relaxed some-
what. This is the extension that is proposed by order effects models. If, for example, we allow free entry and exit 
in the market, positive returns to scale, learning-by-doing effects, scarce complementary resources to the new 
technology, market reputation effects, competition about the timing of adoption, or discount rates that are lower 
for previously more profitable companies, this can yield a story where firm size, market structure, and perform-
ance are endogenous to the diffusion model, i.e. where being an early adopter yields much higher returns which 
can be sustained even if other firms adopt later. The first adopter thus influences the adoption decision of fol-
lowers in additional (strategic) ways and first mover rents may not be completely extinguished by other firms 
following. It might also make it less profitable for late movers to adopt at all. In this case, early adopters will be 
able to sustain an advantageous position even in the long run, as long as one abstracts from technological uncer-
tainty or technological improvements over time. The relevance of these additional strategic elements of the tim-
ing of investment decisions has been discussed in section 2.3.7. 
Interesting contributions to this line of reasoning are Fudenberg and Tirole (1985), who show that early (pre-
emptive) adoption of one firm can impact on the preferred adoption date of other firms, with varying results for 
equilibrium adoption strategies for different market structures. Ireland and Stoneman (1985) argue that early 
adoption might allow the first mover to pre-empt certain scarce inputs, such as the best geographical location or 
scarce skilled labor.  
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The bottom-line is, an order effect is said to occur when early adoption yields sustainable excess returns 
that cannot be replicated or extinguished by later adoption decisions of other firms. If this is the case, firms 
might preemptively adopt a new technology although this would not be indicated by return on investment con-
siderations alone. The timing of adoption decisions in such a setting becomes an explicitly strategic move. 
3.2.5. Risk and uncertainty 
Rank, stock, and order effect models all assume complete information and certainty with regard to the payoff 
from a technology investment. However, in reality the decision to invest in a new technology involves risk and 
uncertainty in a number of dimension. First, there is uncertainty about the performance of a technology, i.e. the 
potential of cost reduction due to the new process technology is usually not known precisely. Second, there is 
uncertainty about whether the firm can succeed in implementing the technology successfully, thus realizing the 
potential of the technology. Implementation could fail due to technological problems or a failure of the technol-
ogy to diffuse successfully within the firm. Third, the firm’s payoff obviously also depends on demand condi-
tions on its output market. Fluctuation in demand will make the payoffs from technological investments uncer-
tain. Fourth, the ability of a firm to appropriate private gains from a technology investment depends also on the 
behavior of its competitors, as emphasized in stock and order effect models. Thus, there is also strategic uncer-
tainty about the expected payoffs from the investment. 
The imitation effect in epidemic models (Mansfield 1968, Stoneman 2002, pp. 55-57) has been interpreted as 
a result of uncertainty reduction over time. As more and more firms use a technology, non-adopters learn about 
the true potential of the technology by observation and their level of uncertainty reduces, making adoption more 
probable. However, this approach can be criticized on various grounds. For example, one strange implication of 
this interpretation is that uncertainty is reduced over time (the variance of the expected payoff is reduced), how-
ever firms never change their initial expected value of the technology and only learn that their initial expectation 
was right as uncertainty reduces (Stoneman 2002, p. 56). This implies that a firm never learns that adoption 
could be unprofitable or that its initial estimate was wrong. Also, the epidemic approach does not allow for im-
provements of the technology over time and models diffusion as a deterministic process with a fixed (a priori de-
termined) end level of use, which is by itself contradictory to the concept of uncertainty. 
Two additional modeling approaches can be found in the literature that explicitly deal with uncertainty – the 
mean variance approach and the real options approach. 
The mean variance approach (Stoneman 1980, 1981) assumes that firms simultaneously use a mix of old and 
new technologies. Each technology is characterized by an expected or mean return and the variance attached to 
the mean return. Firms try to optimize their portfolio of old and new technologies, trading off the expected re-
turns and variances of the technologies following the standard optimal portfolio approach from the finance lit-
erature. The variance of the expected returns for each technology is comprised of two parts: A true variance 
(which is determined by the state of the world and the nature of the technology) and a second part that results 
from a lack of knowledge about the technology. This second part only exists for new technologies, not for old 
ones that the firm has already been using for some time. Also, the true mean of the returns of a new technology 
are not known to firms a priori, they have to be figured out by learning. Learning occurs according to Bayesian 
rules, leading to updates in the expected mean return of new technologies (the expected mean can either increase 
or decrease) and to reduction of that part of the variance which is due to lack of knowledge. Firms might differ 
in their characteristics, having a distribution of different levels of risk aversion, initially expected prior estimates 
of the mean returns of a new technology, or proportions of estimated variance which is due to a lack of knowl-
edge. As time proceeds, firms learn about the new technology and the variance which is due to lack of knowl-
edge is reduced, spurring additional usage (i.e. a restructuring of the technology portfolio towards the newer 
technologies given that prior estimates of mean returns had not to be corrected downwards; or a larger share of 
the population using the new technology).  
The real options approach takes yet another perspective on risks, yielding some interesting insides into in-
vestment decisions that can also be incorporated into stock, order or rank effect type of models (see Huisman 
2001 for some interesting examples of this). The basic idea of the real options approach is to view technology 
adoption as an investment decision that possesses three characteristics: irreversibility, uncertainty, and possibil-
ity of delay (Dixit and Pindyck 1996, ch. 3). In contrast to the net present value method, which suggests that 
firms should invest when the expected present value exceeds the expected present value of expenditures of the 
technology, the real options approach results in a different investment rule. While the net present value method 
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assumes that an investment project is a now or never decision, the real options approach explicitly considers 
the possibility to delay the investment and specifies the value of the option to defer the investment decision.  
The approach exploits an analogy between technology investments and financial call options. A financial call 
option gives the holder the right, but not the obligation, to buy a particular good (e.g. a stock, bond, or a ton of 
cement) for a specified price before or at a specified time. Similar, a new technology can be viewed as an in-
vestment opportunity that gives a firm the right, but not the obligation, to carry out the investment. Assuming 
that the technology will not disappear again, the opportunity to invest into the technology can be viewed as an 
infinitely lived call option on a dividend paying activity. The dividend of the activity is the expected benefit 
from the technology at each future point in time. Because the future payoffs of the technology are uncertain due 
to various possible changes in the environment, the possibility to delay the investment into the technology has a 
value vis-à-vis an immediate investment or the pre-commitment to invest at some specific time in the future. 
This value of waiting is expressed by the value of the call option. The resulting investment rule is that firms 
should only invest when the expected net present value of the technology exceed the option value of waiting 
(Huisman 2001). This investment rule can rationalize diffusion processes even in worlds with complete informa-
tion, homogeneous agents, and no external continuous technological improvements or falling prices. Note that 
the option value of waiting is greater for higher levels of uncertainty of the payoffs. 
A central result of these approaches is that the extent of uncertainty associated with the payoffs from a new 
technology will affect the preferred adoption date of a firm (Sarkar 2000, van den Goorbergh et. al. 2001, Thi-
jssen et al. 2001a, b, Pawlina and Kort 2001). Delaying adoption is more attractive to firms for higher levels of 
uncertainty about the future price or future returns of the technology. Delay will also be more attractive if firms 
expect the mean acquisition costs of the technology to grow only slowly or negatively over time (falling prices).  
Although recent theoretical advances about uncertainty in technology investment decisions have significantly 
improved our understanding of the role of uncertainty in particular decision environments, these insides have – 
to my best knowledge – not yet been combined with insights from the behavioral economics and psychological 
literature about the behavior of individuals in uncertain environments. The above cited economic literature 
makes only rough assumptions about the behavior of individuals in risky and ambiguous situations. For exam-
ple, even for the rare case that risk aversion is assumed, it is usually ignored that people tend to have systemati-
cally distorted perceptions of risks and payoffs. However, the rapidly emerging field of behavioral economics 
provides manifold evidence that actual human behavior in risky and ambiguous situations is very complex and 
only badly described by the standard assumptions of risk aversion or expected utility theory (see for example 
Kahneman and Tversky, 1979; Thaler et. al., 1997; Fox and Tversky, 1995; Schade et al., 2002, Burmeister and 
Schade 2005, Schröder and Schade 2002). It has not yet been analyzed how these psychological phenomena in-
fluence the behavior of real decision makers in the specific context of technology investments in firms. Thus, we 
do not yet know how different information conditions and levels of uncertainty actually influence the spread of 
new technologies among firms in the real world where perceptions and risk attitudes of decision makers do mat-
ter. This could be subject to interesting future research.  
3.3. Empirical results from the IO literature 
Given the insights provided by the theoretical IO literature, the natural role of empirical studies should be to 
test theories and to indicate the relative importance of different factors that have been suggested to influence the 
diffusion process. However, many articles are either purely theoretical without an empirical test, or they engage 
in a rigorous econometric analysis, but without explicitly testing the theoretical models that are proposed else-
where. One might speculate about the causes of the divide between theoretical and empirical studies in the IO 
literature, but two obvious reasons are the technical difficulties in transferring complex theoretical models into 
econometrically testable equations and the lack of appropriate data sources that incorporate all relevant variables 
(e.g. expectations of benefits, price changes, information asymmetries between firms, or differences in risk pref-
erence and premiums). Also, the different theoretical explanations of innovation diffusion are based on some-
times conflicting assumptions, which makes it difficult to integrate them in one all-embracing estimation equa-
tion. The few noticeable exceptions are the studies of Karshenas and Stoneman (1993) and Stoneman and Kwon 
(1994) that include rank, stock, order, and epidemic effects in their estimation framework.  
The results from various empirical studies provide considerable evidence for both rank and epidemic effects, 
thus suggesting that different facets of firm heterogeneity and the spread of information over time are important 
drivers of the diffusion process. The evidence for strategic stock and order effects, however, is much weaker and 
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also less frequently analyzed in empirical studies (Karshenas and Stoneman 1993, Stoneman and Kwon 1994, 
Zettelmeyer and Stoneman 1993, Stoneman 2002, p. 103).  
Important dimensions of firm heterogeneity that have been identified to influence adoption decisions are firm 
size, market structure, market share and industry characteristics, consistent with the arguments presented in sec-
tion 2.3. Most studies have found a positive relation between firm size and speed of adoption analyzing numer-
ous different technologies, industry sectors, and geographical regions (for example Mansfield 1968, Romeo 
1975, 1977, Davies 1979, David 1969, Hannan and McDowell 1984, Rose and Joskow 1990, Pennings and 
Hariato 1992, Thomas 1999). However, as an exception Oster (1982) finds negative size effects in a study of the 
diffusion of basic oxygen furnace and continuous casting in the US steel industry.  
The evidence on the effects of market share and market structure are more inconclusive. Hannan and 
McDowell (1984) find a positive relation between market concentration and the diffusion of automatic teller 
machines in the US banking industry. A positive effect of market concentration on diffusion is also found in 
Romeo (1977). In contrast, Levin et. al. (1987) find a negative effect of both concentration ratio and market 
share in a study of optical scanner diffusion in retail grocery stores in the US. Karshenas and Stoneman (1993) 
find no significant effect of concentration ratios in their study of controlled machine tool diffusion in the UK 
engineering industry.  
The costs of adopting a new technology have been shown to influence the speed of diffusion. The probability 
to adopt usually increases as the price of the technology falls or opportunity costs increase (e.g. the price of la-
bor when a new labor-saving technology is available). Evidence for this is provided by Karshenas and Stoneman 
(1993), Stoneman and Kwon (1996), and Hannan and McDowell (1984). 
Furthermore, empirical evidence suggests that technologies diffuse faster and reach higher market penetration 
levels the higher the expected benefits from adoption (Mansfield 1968, Griliches 1957, Davies 1979). However, 
the correct measurement of firms’ expectations in empirical studies is still a critical issue and a potential field for 
future research (Karshenas and Stoneman 1995). 
Some empirical studies have also analyzed the effect of government intervention in the diffusion process. 
Evidence suggests that governmental intervention rarely speeds up the diffusion process and government-
controlled firms do not move faster than privately owned companies (Hannan and McDowell 1984, Oster and 
Quigley 1977, Rose and Joskow 1990). 
There is also some evidence that cyclical effects influence firms’ adoption decision with more technology in-
vestment taking place in periods of cyclical upswing and less in periods of a downturn (Romeo 1977, Davies 
1979).  
Some important questions regarding the dynamics of technology diffusion still remain open and present po-
tential for future research. For example, a panel data analysis incorporating technology investment decisions and 
performance parameters (such as profits or market share) over time would provide valuable new insights into the 
dynamics of market structure development and technological change. Also, the strategic dynamics (as proposed 
by stock and order effect models) need a more rigorous empirical analysis. How do real decision makers behave 
in such situations of strategic uncertainty? Furthermore, the role of risk with regards to the properties of tech-
nologies need to be disentangled from the role of ambiguity and the process of information acquisition about the 
new technology. As theory suggests, these are different concepts with different impacts on the diffusion process. 
Empirical studies with real world data clearly have limitations to answer these questions. Instead, laboratory ex-
periments might provide useful new insights because they allow to control and to manipulate risk, ambiguity, 
and information conditions in explicit ways.  
3.4. Management literature on technology adoption 
As pointed out above, the management literature also has a long tradition of studying innovation diffusion 
among firms. Surprisingly though, there is very little acknowledgment of contributions made outside the own 
profession and only scarce cross-reference between the IO literature and the management literature respectively. 
In the language of epidemic diffusion models, one might speculate that the various contributions have failed to 
“contaminate” research in the neighboring discipline due to a lack of social mixing and information exchange 
between scholars of both professions. This is unfortunate because the research agendas of both professions are 
highly complementary.  
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The studies concerning innovation diffusion in the management literature are more frequently of empirical 
nature and only a few papers make purely theoretical contributions. The theoretical papers are either optimiza-
tion models in the tradition of operations research or micro-economic market equilibrium models. Numerous pa-
pers also make theoretical contributions by developing conceptual relationships based on taxonomies and testing 
their usefulness in empirical studies.  
The management literature complements the IO literature in various ways. First, there is an extensive litera-
ture focusing on organizational heterogeneity as a determinant of differences in innovation adoption. Thus, there 
is compelling evidence for the existence of rank effects in the management literature. Also, the management lit-
erature provides a much richer view of different factors that contribute towards rank effects. Second, manage-
ment research has put more emphasis on different attributes of the innovation itself as a determinant of its diffu-
sion process. Third, the management literature features some interesting approaches that deal with information 
acquisition and uncertainty in more detail. On the other hand, the management literature lacks an overarching 
theoretical framework and a common terminology that unifies the manifold approaches to study innovation dif-
fusion. The IO literature has such a framework, and most contributions from the management literature fit into 
the rank or epidemic type of models outlined above. As such, the IO framework helps to survey and to classify 
the various approaches found in management papers. Also, IO scholars have emphasized the strategic aspects of 
technology diffusion in their stock and order effect models – this perspective is almost entirely missing in the 
management literature. Thus, both research agendas together provide a much better understanding of what de-
termines technology diffusion than either field alone.  
As indicated above, the management literature has identified numerous relevant dimensions of firm heteroge-
neity that contribute to differences in adoption behavior and timing.  
Souitaris (2002) and Pavitt (1984) stress the importance of sector membership as a driver of different innova-
tion dynamics among firms. Pavitt (1984) identified different technological trajectories in four sectoral classes 
of industrial firms (supplier dominated firms, scale intensive firms, specialized suppliers and science-based 
firms). Souitaris (2002) tests Pavitt’s taxonomy and concludes that it resolves the problem of various inconsis-
tent results on the determinants of technological innovation by differentiating between the four sectoral classes.  
DeCanio et. al. (2000) point out that organizational structure influences a firm’s ability to adopt a new tech-
nology. Hence, different organizational forms can lead to rank effects among firms. They build a theoretical 
model of a firm-internal network structure of connected agents. The model examines the diffusion of a new tech-
nology throughout this network and how the network adjusts to exogenous changes. In the model, the profitabil-
ity of the firm depends on the structure of the firm-internal network and its ability to adapt well to a new tech-
nology and exogenous changes. The authors argue that a failure to recognize the importance of organizational 
structure on the performance of firms will lead to bias in estimation of costs or benefits of a change in external 
circumstances, including the arrival of a new technology. 
Hurley and Hult (1998) relate firms’ culture to the capacity to adapt and to innovate. They find that market 
orientation and organizational cultures that emphasize learning, development, and participative decision making. 
In a similar spirit, Zmud (1982) investigates different factors influencing the in-house adoption of organizational 
innovation in an empirical study. The results stress the importance of different types of organizational innova-
tion (technical vs. administrative) and their fit to the organization. Centralization and formalization of decision 
processes are identified as sources of heterogeneity among firms that lead to different adoption behavior.  
Various studies have focused on the endowment of firms with different forms of human capital as a source of 
different adoption behavior. Dewar and Dutton (1986) empirically tests whether different models are needed to 
predict the adoption of technical process innovations that contain a high degree of new knowledge (radical inno-
vations) and a low degree of new knowledge (incremental innovations). The results suggest that extensive 
knowledge depth – measured by the number of technical specialists in a firm – is important in the adoption of 
both types of innovations. Larger firms are likely to have more technical specialists and hence adopt more radi-
cal innovations. Their results fit into the complementary investments story proposed by Milgrom and Roberts 
(1990): Investment into human capital in the form of technical specialists appears to be a major facilitator of 
technical process innovation adoption. In a related spirit, Kelley and Brooks (1991) present an empirical study to 
explain why certain types of small firms have failed to adopt well-known improvements in process technology. 
They argue that three sets of factors explain which establishments are likely to have adopted programmable 
automation: 1) cost and profitability incentives, 2) internal resources and accumulated technical competencies of 
the firm including complementary IT applications, and 3) firm’s linkages to external sources of expertise for 
learning competencies about the new technology’s capabilities and limitations. The results suggest that technical 
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competencies and the availability of complementary resources and technologies helps firms to learn faster 
about a new technology and thus increase the chance of adoption. Nilakanta and Scamell (1990) study how dif-
ferent information sources and communication channels influence the diffusion of database development tools. 
They also stress the importance of technical specialists, concluding that the nurturing of inhouse specialists who 
might take on the role of boundary spanning individuals or champions will be useful to educate the users of the 
innovations. Ahire and Ravichandran (2001) also emphasize the importance of complementary investments into 
skills and processes as a determinant of organizational innovation. 
In a related spirit, Glynn (1996) develops the concept of organizational intelligence which is conceptualized 
as being functionally similar to individual intelligence (i.e. as purposeful information processing that enables ad-
aptation to environmental demands). Organizational intelligence is viewed as a social outcome that relates to the 
individual intelligence of employees by mechanisms of aggregation, cross-level transference, and distribution. 
Differences in organizational intelligence are viewed as a source of firm heterogeneity and might lead to differ-
ences in innovation adoption.  
Hauschildt (1999), Gemünden and Walter (1996), and Witte (1998) emphasize the importance of individuals 
who act as innovation promoters in organizations. The presence of such individuals might lead to different adop-
tion dynamics among enterprises. 
Ettlie and Vellenga (1979) identify the risk-taking climate of an organization as a factor that contributes to 
different innovation dynamics. Risk-taking organizations adopt innovation earlier, consider innovations with 
fewer concrete performance criteria, and see innovations as less complex.  
Srinivasan et. al. (2002) find that firms’ adoption decisions can be attributed to differences in “technological 
opportunism” among firms. Technological opportunism is a construct that captures sense-and-response capabil-
ity of firms with respect to new technologies and is not identical to organizational innovativeness in general.  
Papadakis and Bourantas (1998) and Tabak and Barr (1999) focus on different personality characteristics of 
managers and CEOs as a determinant of innovation decisions. Both papers find that different characteristics such 
as risk propensity, self-efficacy, demographic characteristics and individual perceptions of strategic decision 
makers are relevant and help to explain differences in adoption decisions among firms. 
In summary, the management literature has identified the following relevant aspects that contribute towards 
rank effects:  
- sector membership,  
- organizational structure, - culture, and - intelligence,  
- different endowments with human capital (including in-house specialists and innovation promoters) 
and 
- the availability of other complementary inputs to a technological innovation (such as related tech-
nologies, accumulated experience, skills and adequate processes),  
- the risk taking climate of a organization,  
- the ability of the organization to perceive and pursue technological opportunities,  
- different characteristics and personalities of strategic decision makers among firms.  
The management literature also features some interesting extensions to epidemic diffusion models. One of the 
short-comings of the most basic forms of epidemic models that was mentioned above is that they interpret the 
epidemic effect as a result of the dissemination of information through social contact, however they do not ex-
plain what exactly happens when two agents meet or why agents might not actively search for information in-
stead of passively waiting to “get infected” by it. Two papers by McCardle (1985) and Oliva (1991) overcome 
this limitation by building models of optimal information acquisition. McCardle (1985) analyzes the adoption 
decision of a firm for a new technology with original uncertainty about the profitability of the technology. A 
firm can wait to adopt in order to gather additional information about the technology via observation of other 
firms and Bayesian updating. Optimal stopping rules for the information acquisition are derived via dynamic 
programming. The model predicts that even managers who behave optimally will occasionally adopt unprofit-
able technologies and reject profitable ones. The study of Oliva (1991) combines a theoretical model with a nu-
merical simulation. The model uses a response surface based on catastrophe theory to examine the interaction of 
information and profitability estimates on the firm’s adoption of a new technology or innovation. Oliva’s (1991) 
approach allows a positive estimate of the firm’s decision process, against which the normative theoretical rules 
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of McCardle (1985) can be compared. Note that both models take a micro-perspective and view information 
acquisition as an active search process with optimal stopping rules instead of a passive “contamination” of a firm 
with the “truth”.  
Mamer and McCardle (1987) make an interesting contribution towards the modeling of uncertainty and com-
bine it with strategic considerations. Their model considers both the uncertainty about the technology and the 
uncertainty about actions of competitors. While uncertainty about the technology can be reduced by gathering 
additional information (Bayesian updating), uncertainty about competitive reaction cannot be reduced. The pa-
per combines game theory and dynamic programming to solve the optimization problem. The analysis shows 
that substitute competition induces the firm to use a less optimistic decision strategy and thus decreases the 
probability of adoption. Complementary competition, on the other hand, has the opposite effect. In addition, the 
model shows that occasionally unprofitable technologies might be adopted even if firms follow an optimal strat-
egy. This is because of the costly sequential nature of information and uncertainty associated with the profitabil-
ity of the new technology. 
Various authors in the management literature have also stressed different attributes of the innovation itself as 
a determinant of its commercial success and speed of diffusion. For example, Gatignon et. al. (2002) provide a 
valid and reliable measurement instrument to differentiate between different kinds of technological innovations 
and show that the type of the innovation has an influence on its diffusion. The constructs they use are: new com-
petence acquisition, competence enhancing / destroying, core / peripheral, incremental / radical, and architec-
tural / generational. It turns out that the commercially most successful innovations are those that built on existing 
competencies in companies as well as acquiring new competencies from outside the firm. Radical innovations 
are more likely to be commercially successful than incremental ones. Innovations that relate to the core business 
of a firm seem to be considered as strategic and diffuse faster, while innovations that either destroy competen-
cies or require the acquisition of new competencies diffuse slower. 
Rogers (2003) specified five criteria that describe an innovation and relate to its commercial success and dif-
fusion: relative advantage, compatibility, complexity, testability, and observability. According to Rogers, al-
though these attributes are inherent to the innovation, it is not the objective value of these attributes but the per-
ception of these attributes by customers that determines the success of the innovation. The potential for commer-
cial success and a fast diffusion of an innovation is hypothesized to be positively related to high values of the 
perceived Roger’s criteria. The emphasize on the innovation-specific Rogers’ criteria is especially prominent in 
Marketing studies. 
Other authors that have also compared different innovations, their attributes, and consequences for their speed 
of diffusion are Mansfield (1993), Meyer and Goes (1988), and Nault et. al. (1997), all confirming that innova-
tion-inherent attributes are relevant for the diffusion process.  
 
3.5. Multiple related technologies and development paths 
Up to this point, the discussion has focused on the diffusion of stand-alone technologies which are adopted in 
isolation from other technologies. However, in reality technologies are rarely completely detached from each 
other. In particular, e-business technologies are characterized in the introduction as a number of technologies 
that can serve different purposes within firms, but are all members of the group of ICT’s that use the Internet as 
a communication platform. Thus, they belong to the same technological paradigm. Consequently, firms are not 
only faced with the option to invest into any one of the technologies belonging to this paradigm, but with the op-
tion to invest into progress upon the technological trajectory that is defined by the attributes and possibilities of 
the numerous technologies that belong to this paradigm. This section addresses the main issues that arise when 
firms are not only confronted with the opportunity to invest in one particular technology, but with a set of in-
vestment opportunities into a number of related technologies.  
Dosi (1982) noted in his original paper that “’progress’ upon a technological trajectory is likely to retain 
some cumulative features: the probability of future advances is in this case related also to the position that one (a 
firm or a country) already occupies vis-à-vis the existing technological frontier”. The following chapters con-
tribute by making this relationship explicit. This is possible by showing that, under specific circumstances, pro-
gress upon a technological trajectory can be subject to increasing returns, which leads to an acceleration mecha-
nism. This has, to my best knowledge, not been done yet. This section aims to link different theories that can ra-
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tionalize an acceleration mechanism on a conceptual basis and it discusses its strategic relevance by using the 
resource-based view of the firm. It concludes that the existence of a self-propagating process of technological 
development would aggravate the potential of new technology adoption as a possible source of sustained com-
petitive advantage. Chapters 5 and 6 make the nature of this acceleration mechanism mathematically explicit and 
empirically testable.  
The relevance of considering interdependencies between various technologies in diffusion models has been 
demonstrated by Stoneman and Kwon (1994), Stoneman and Toivanen (1997) and Colombo and Mosconi 
(1995). Stoneman and Kwon (1994) analyze the simultaneous diffusion of multiple process technologies, using 
a probit model on survey data from the UK engineering and metalworking industries that includes the date of 
adoption of five different technologies. Their results indicate that the more complementary the technologies are, 
the greater the likelihood that firms will adopt both technologies simultaneously. Closely related is the study of 
Colombo and Mosconi (1995) who analyze the diffusion of multiple technologies, employing a hazard rate 
model on a sample of firms from the Italian metalworking industry. They pay particular attention to technologi-
cal complementarities and learning effects associated with experience of previously available, related technolo-
gies. Their results confirm that technological synergies and cumulative learning by using effects are key deter-
minants to a firm’s adoption behavior. The legacy of a firm’s technological history is found to greatly affect 
adoption choices. Stoneman and Toivanen (1996) study the simultaneous diffusion of five technologies, using 
panel data on UK manufacturing industries. Their results suggest that technological and strategic interdependen-
cies between individual technologies do affect the diffusion path.  
The following discussion and the empirical analysis in chapters 5 and 6 extends this line of research in a num-
ber of aspects. (1) A theoretical underpinning of the effects of related technologies is offered. Specifically, it is 
argued that complementarities, learning effects, rebates and imperfections in the financial markets can lead to a 
self-propagating mechanism that increases the probability of adoption the more related technologies a firm has 
previously installed. Thus, if technologies are based on the same principles but do not substitute another, the rate 
of progress upon a trajectory can be an increasing function of the position of a firm upon the trajectory. (2) A 
mathematical framework is offered to make these thoughts explicit and testable. (3) Various different economet-
ric approaches and two different datasets are used that together allow for conclusive findings on the relation-
ships analyzed. (4) The theory and econometrics are applied to two exceptional and very large data sets that in-
clude information on the usage of numerous e-business technologies.  
 
Technological complementarity 
 
The related technologies belonging to a paradigm can either be technological substitutes, partial substitutes, 
or complements. To illustrate, let’s consider the most simple case of two technologies, A and B. Following 
Stoneman (2000) and Stoneman (2002), assume that the decision to invest in both technologies is a non-
reversible, all-or-nothing decision which yields profit gains Aπ  and Bπ greater than zero if only one of the two 
technologies is installed. If the firm decides to adopt both technologies, the profit gain will be . 
Technologies A and B are defined as: 
A Bπ + π + ν
 
1. complements if: ν >  and thus 0 A B A Bπ + π + ν > π + π  
2. total substitutes if:  and thus 0ν < A B A Bπ + π + ν < π + π , but also , 
 
A Bπ + π + ν ≤ πA
B
B
A Bπ + π + ν ≤ π
3. partial substitutes if: , and thus 0ν < A B Aπ + π + ν < π + π , but also , 
. 
A Bπ + π + ν > πA
BA Bπ + π + ν > π
 
For the case that any of the above scenarios applies, the technology choice decision of the firm in time t will 
depend upon its previous investments. For example, if A and B are technological complements, it might be prof-
itable for a firm that has previously installed A to install B in t; whereas for some other firm that has not previ-
ously installed A it might not be profitable to install B (or A). Also, the decision to install either A or B do not 
only depend on the price of A or B alone, but also on the price of the respective other technology. For example, 
as the degree of technological complementary between A and B increases, the “threshold prices” at which a firm 
will buy either A, B, or both will also increase (Stoneman 2000). 
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More generally, complementarity implies that “the sum of the changes in the payoff function when several 
arguments are increased separately is less than the change resulting from increasing all arguments together” 
(Milgrom and Roberts 1990). Mathematically, this corresponds to a payoff function that is supermodular in its 
arguments. The notion of complementarity implies increasing returns to adoption from any technology, given 
that other complementary technologies are also adopted. Note that in terms of progress upon a technological tra-
jectory, this implies that the momentum of progress should be an increasing function of all complementary ar-
guments of the underlying technological paradigm.  
Complementarities between technologies seem to suggest that a firm would always upgrade or install all com-
plementary components simultaneously, leading to radical changes instead of continuous development paths. 
However, this conventional wisdom must not be true. Jovanovic and Stolyarov (2000) show that if upgrading 
each input involves a fixed cost, firms may upgrade them at different times, asynchronously. Thus, complemen-
tarity does not necessarily imply comovement of all complementary variables, not even for a single decision 
maker. However, given that complementarity prevails, the chance that a given firm will invest into a technology 
will increase with the number of complementary investments it has already conducted.  
A necessary condition for technological complementarity is that technologies are compatible (Economides 
1996a). Compatibility means that technologies can be costlessly combined to produce a demanded good. Com-
patibility can for example be observed between hardware and software, CD players and CD’s, computers and 
printers, fixed-line and mobile telephone networks etc. If technologies are compatible, one technology will be a 
prerequisite for the functioning of the other, or at least make the other technology more attractive.  
Compatibility might also be expected among various e-business technologies. For example, online sales and 
online purchasing systems within an enterprise fulfill clearly different functional purposes – thus they are not 
substitutes. However, they make use of the same communication infrastructure of the firm (typically a LAN and 
the Internet protocol) and they might both be connected to an ERP and the in-house database system. In fact, 
many efficiency gains of e-business technologies arise because they run on a common infrastructure and have 
the ability to exchange information across applications. Many consulting projects have the explicit objective to 
establish these links and to integrate the various applications such that they can exchange data. A seamless inte-
gration of various applications is often viewed as an ideal because it promises to save in-house transaction costs 
and allows to speed up processes. Consider again the simple example of two technologies, A and B. Although 
the costs of making A and B compatible is not necessarily zero (in fact, consultants charge considerable amounts 
for such services), they could simply be integrated in the investment rule of the firm by assuming that 0ν >  
comes at some additional price . If Pν ≥ 0 Pν  is zero or the present value of 0ν >  outweighs , it will be more 
attractive for a firm to purchase both A and B together, or increase the chances that a firm will purchase A (B) 
given that it previously installed B (A), respectively. Thus, the complementary story for technologies belonging 
to the same paradigm applies as long as  is sufficiently small and technologies do not substitute each other in 
their functionalities, ν > .  
Pν
Pν
0
 
Complementary inputs 
 
Complementarity between technologies can also arise if they require similar joint inputs to function properly. 
For example, this could be skilled labor or the presence of technical specialists. So even if technologies are com-
pletely independent and not connected in any way, they might be subject to a supermodular payoff function be-
cause they utilize joint complementary inputs. Thus, the sum of changes in the payoff function of a firm for in-
creasing the arguments of the technologies and the joint inputs simultaneously might be higher than the sum of 
increasing each argument alone. The difference of complementary inputs to the technological complementary 
discussed above is as follows: While technological complementary requires compatibility of technologies to ar-
rive at a supermodular payoff function, this is not the case for technologies that have complementary inputs. In 
this latter case, a supermodular payoff function arises via the presence of some third variable which is comple-
mentary to the technologies, although the technologies themselves might not be directly compatible or connected 
in any way. For the case of complementary inputs, it is immediately obvious that the payoff flow of each tech-
nology will at least partly depend on the quality and quantity of the joint input purchased or used. The net bene-
fit of the technology will thus depend on the price and availability of the joint input; changes therein can there-
fore influence the adoption decision of a firm. An interesting example of this is Gandal et. al. (2000) who study 
the effect of CD prices and availability of CD’s on the diffusion of CD players.  
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A well recognized joint input to computer technology in firms is skilled labor (Acemoglu 2002, Bryn-
jolfsson and Hitt 2002, Greenwood 1997, Krueger 1993). It is argued that investments into ICT lead to a higher 
demand for skilled labor, which leads to skill-biased technological change and eventually also impacts on wage 
structures, favoring well educated individuals with IT knowledge. In addition to skilled labor, ICT investments 
have been shown to profit from complementary investments into the re-organization of processes and organiza-
tional structures (Brynjolfsson and Hitt 2003, Black and Lynch 2004). Therefore, skilled labor, investments in 
training, education, process re-engineering and organizational change can be viewed as complements to invest-
ments in e-business technologies. Thus, these complementary investments can be expected to increase the payoff 
flow from each e-business technology. In addition, a firm that has previously made investments into human 
capital, adequate processes and organizational structures, will expect a higher return from any additional e-
business technology than a firm that is still lacking these complementary inputs.  
Note again that this result is also strictly increasing in its arguments. Thus, the momentum of progress upon 
the trajectory should be an increasing function of all complementary inputs of the technologies belonging to the 
paradigm. 
 
Learning-by-doing 
 
Learning-by-doing may be another factor that endogenously influences a firms’ ability and costs of making 
further progress upon a technological trajectory. As pointed out by Arrow (1962a), learning is a product of ex-
perience. Thus, the more experienced a firm is in using a particular technology, the more likely will it be able to 
improve that technology and to make progress on the trajectory. The knowledge and experience a firm has ac-
cumulated will be reflected in the technology it currently uses, but also in its expected payoffs from any ad-
ditional related technology. In Arrow’s (1962a) model, the accumulation and continuous investment into 
knowledge is reflected in a downward drift in cost curves over time. In the same spirit, it can be argued that a 
firm that has already gained substantial knowledge in a given technological paradigm will have advantages in 
making further progress on the associated trajectory. Sheshinski (1967) provided a similar argument, pointing 
out that learning-by-doing dynamics are “irreversible”, providing advantages to those firms that have an early 
start in competition. Thus, firms that are on a higher position on a technological trajectory have collected more 
experience with that technology, and therefore have cost advantages in “making the next step”. Again, this 
reasoning results in a positive relationship between the position upon a trajectory and the momentum of 
progress.   
Financial slack and imperfect capital markets 
 
Another reason why firms that are already advanced on a trajectory might have advantages in making further 
progress are imperfections in the capital market and financial slack. If progress upon a trajectory leads to higher 
profits, firms that are more advanced on the trajectory can be expected to have more internal finances available 
for investing in further progress, ceteris paribus. In addition, information asymmetries between financial inter-
mediaries and firms seeking external funding for investment projects could exist, favoring the financing condi-
tions of those firms that have been successful in the past (see 2.3.7). If the net worth of a firm improves, lenders 
will become more willing to lend, and additional investments can be financed. This accelerator mechanism has 
for example been demonstrated in studies by Abel and Blanchard (1986), Hubbard (1990), and Hubbard and 
Kashyap (1992). Again, this mechanism is strictly increasing in its arguments.  
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Development paths and the rate of progress 
 
The above discussion identified four distinct theories that can be related to technological development paths 
(trajectories) and the rate of progress: technological complementarity, complementary joint inputs, learning-by-
doing, and imperfections in capital markets. All four theories are strictly increasing in their arguments, implying 
that the development of a firm along a given technological trajectory could be a self-propagating mechanism 
with increasing momentum. In other words, the more “advanced” a firm already is, the more likely it will make 
further progress on the trajectory. This is in the essence the “success-breeds-success” story that was discussed 
earlier in section 2.3.7. While the literature cited in section 2.3.7 deals with the dynamic relationships of invest-
ments into innovative activities such as R&D and firm performance, this line of reasoning is applied here to in-
vestments into new technologies and the expected costs and benefits of future technological investments, which 
also relate to firm performance. The parallel between investments into R&D and new technologies is straight 
forward: Both activities involve sunk costs in the expectation of future rewards, and both activities can be con-
sidered as “innovative” in the Schumpeterian sense because they aim to “carry out new combinations” (see sec-
tion 1.4.1). 
The link of technological development paths to diffusion theory is also straight forward: A technological 
paradigm is associated with a number of concrete, related technologies. Suppose that these technologies are not 
substitutes in their functionality and that firms can vary in their characteristics. The normal course of develop-
ment along the trajectory starts with the emergence of the new paradigm and the non-availability of any associ-
ated technology within a firm (or country), progresses with the adoption of various technologies, and possibly 
ends with the adoption of all available technologies belonging to the paradigm. The adoption of an additional 
technology associated with the paradigm is considered as progress upon the trajectory. Note that this is not a de-
terministic process. Not all firms need necessarily adopt all technologies because the expected payoff from a 
technology can vary among heterogeneous firms. Also, alternative paradigms might exist in parallel that offer 
viable substitute technologies, providing some firms with alternative investment opportunities. 
Each technology from a given paradigm that the firm has not previously adopted is an investment opportunity 
at time t. Depending on the specific characteristics of each firm, the expected payoff from each investment op-
portunity can vary among firms (rank effects). In particular, the availability of complementary technologies, in-
puts, relevant experience, and financial resources will positively influence the expected payoff from adoption at 
time t and make adoption more probable. In analogy to the argument of Arrow (1962a), the continuous invest-
ment into knowledge, complementary inputs, and the resulting advantages are reflected in the technology a firm 
currently uses. Thus, the number of previously adopted technologies from the associated paradigm can serve as a 
proxy for the availability of complementary technologies, inputs, relevant experience, and financial resources. 
All of the above trigger a self-reinforcing mechanism that increases the momentum of progress. The more ad-
vanced a firm is upon the trajectory, the more likely it will make further progress. Or, in terms of technology 
adoption, the probability to adopt any technology should increase the more related but non-substitutable tech-
nologies the firm has previously adopted, ceteris paribus. 
In other words, firm-specific resources are both a source and a consequence of the adoption of new technolo-
gies that are associated with some trajectory and development path. Thus, history matters for the rate and the di-
rection of technological progress. The self-propagating development mechanism continues until firms have ex-
hausted the potentials of a given trajectory. As pointed out above, this does not imply that all firms must neces-
sarily adopt all technologies that are associated with a trajectory. Some may and some may not, it depends on 
their specific characteristics which combination of technologies and complementary inputs will be optimal given 
their remaining characteristics. Also, it depends on whether they have technological alternatives available that 
belong to a different paradigm. 
The possibility of a self-propagating mechanism of technological development upon a given trajectory has 
important strategic implications. There is an explicit link between technology adoption and the resource-based 
view of the firm, which provides a conceptual framework to analyze the relationship between firm-specific re-
sources and competitive advantage (Barney 1991). Firm resources are conceptualized to include all physical, or-
ganizational, and human capital resources controlled by a firm that enable the firm to conceive of and implement 
strategies that improve its efficiency and effectiveness. A firm is said to have a competitive advantage when it is 
implementing a value creating strategy not simultaneously being implemented by any current or potential com-
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petitors. A sustained competitive advantage arises if other firms are unable to duplicate the benefits of the 
strategy that creates the competitive advantage.  
The resource-based view assumes that firms are heterogeneous in the resources they control and that these re-
sources may not be perfectly mobile across firms, which implies that heterogeneity might be a lasting phenome-
non. Barney (1991) identifies four attributes of firm resources that are necessary if they are to be a source of sus-
tained competitive advantage:  
• The resource must be valuable in the sense that it improves the efficiency and effectiveness of a firm. 
• It must be rare among a firm’s current and potential competitors, i.e. not simultaneously imple-
mented by a large number of other firms. 
• It must be imperfectly imitable. This can occur if acquiring the resource is dependent upon unique 
historical circumstances, if there is causal ambiguity between the resources of the firm in its per-
formance, or if it comprises of a socially complex phenomenon that is beyond managerial ability to 
systematically influence. 
• There cannot be strategically equivalent substitutes for this resource that are valuable but neither rare 
or imperfectly imitable. 
The technological endowment of a firm, including its integration into production processes, organizational 
structure, the social dynamics of the enterprise and its combination with other complementary assets of the firm 
(such as human capital) is clearly a firm-specific resource that is likely to be a source of sustained competitive 
advantage, as suggested by the resource-based view of the firm. The extent to which this holds for a particular 
technology depends on how well it fulfills the four above mentioned, necessary attributes.  
The presence of a self-propagating process of technological development substantially increases the strategic 
importance of technology adoption decisions in general and their timing in particular, because it limits the extent 
to which the technological endowment is imitable once a firm got a head-start in its development vis-à-vis its 
competitors. Figure 2 illustrates these relationships. 
 
Figure 2 – Technology adoption as a source of competitive advantage 
 
Asynchronous technology adoption decisions of enterprises obviously contribute to (temporary) firm hetero-
geneity. The different endowment with technologies can have a direct impact on firm performance, e.g. there 
might be productivity advantages for those firms that have adopted a new technology first. These differences in 
performance among companies might affect future technology adoption decisions, because companies that per-
formed better in the past might have easier access to capital to finance additional investments (Abel and Blanch-
ard 1986, Hubbard 1990 and Hubbard and Kashyap 1992). This is one mechanism how particular firm-specific 
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resources can be both a source and a consequence of technology adoption decisions. In addition, if firms have 
the opportunity to invest into related technologies that belong to a particular paradigm and trajectory, their cur-
rent technological endowment directly influences future adoption decisions via learning-by-doing, technological 
complementary and the availability of complementary resources, which makes the heterogeneous distribution of 
firm-specific resources a possibly lasting phenomenon which is contingent upon historical events. Also, there 
might be early mover advantages and the possibility to build up entry barriers. Both effects could be sustainable 
in the long run and have an impact on the performance of enterprises. For example, early movers might have ad-
vantages to hire scarce technical experts or to build up a positive reputation among customers that leads to long-
term customer loyalty. In these cases, early progress on a new technological trajectory can yield sustainable 
competitive advantages. Hence, the decision to adopt a new technology and the timing of this decision can have 
important strategic consequences, especially if a self-propagation mechanism of technological development ac-
tually exists.  
Are investments into e-business technology are a possible source of competitive advantage? According to the 
resource-based view, the answer is “yes”. Investments into e-business and ICT in general can be valuable be-
cause they promise to improve the efficiency and the effectiveness of a firm. Also, a particular endowment with 
ICT and e-business tools can be rare because the diffusion of these technologies takes times. If early movers 
make indeed continuously faster progress, this makes their unique set of implemented technologies rare com-
pared to competing firms that adopt later. The presence of an endogenous acceleration mechanism suggests that 
the ability of firms to acquire and exploit technological resources depends upon their place in time and space. 
Once this particular unique time in history passes, firms that try to follow might not be able to perfectly imitate 
the resources and their benefits. In addition, investments into ICT and e-business technologies need to be or-
ganizationally imbedded to become beneficial and hence often require investments into complementary assets, 
such as organizational design and human capital. These complementary assets can also be rare, valuable, and 
hard to imitate, which adds to the strategic relevance of ICT and e-business adoption decisions. Finally, whether 
e-business and ICT related firm-specific resources can be substituted probably depends on the specific technol-
ogy and the context in which it is embedded in the organization. In general, two valuable firm resources are stra-
tegically equivalent when they can be exploited separately to implement the same strategies (Barney 1991). For 
example, if the strategic advantage of a firm is build on its ability to manage large amounts of information 
quickly and to process it efficiently, this might be achieved either by a highly developed ICT infrastructure that 
is deeply imbedded in an organization. But the same benefits might accrue to a firm with a closely knit, highly 
experienced management team, without the use of ICT (Hambrick 1987). However, this substitute is also likely 
to be rare and not perfectly imitable. Therefore, according to Barney (1991), an embedded and highly developed 
ICT infrastructure might be a source of sustainable advantage.  
In summary, the resource-based view of the firm suggests that the decision to invest into a new technology 
has clear strategic implications because it could be a source of a sustainable competitive advantage. This is espe-
cially likely to occur if technological investment decisions are dependent on each other over time, giving rise to 
a self-propagating mechanism. The presence of such an acceleration effects makes the unique set of technologi-
cal competencies of a firm rare and imperfectly imitable, provided that competing firms start at different times 
with their progress upon a given trajectory. This self-propagating mechanism could arise due to technological 
complementarities, joint complementary inputs, learning-by-doing, or imperfections in capital markets. Chapters 
5 and 6 will engage in a rigorous empirical analysis to test whether such a self-propagating mechanism actually 
exists. If so, this would indicate additional advantages of an early adoption strategy.  
 
3.6. Implications for e-business diffusion 
 
Chapter 3 has discussed numerous factors that influence the adoption and diffusion of new technologies. 
However, not all of them are testable in later chapters due to data limitations. I restrict the explicit wording of 
hypotheses to those aspects that can be addressed in the empirical parts.  
First, as technologies become cheaper and their performance increases, more firms will adopt them. This 
mechanism was identified as driving the diffusion process in rank, stock, and order effect models. Rapid pro-
gress both in computer hardware and software (Moore’s law) suggests that the prices of ICT fall over time, 
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while the performance simultaneously improves. Provided that this mechanism also holds for e-business tech-
nologies, we can expect that adoption becomes more probable as time proceeds. Second, the more firms already 
have  adopted e-business technologies, the higher the probability that non-adopters will eventually switch to the 
new technologies as well. This may happen totally independent from possible network externalities of e-
business technologies, purely as a result of better information conditions and less uncertainty about e-business, 
as pointed out by epidemic effect models. Both effects imply that the probability to adopt is strictly increasing 
with time: 
Hypothesis 9: The probability to adopt e-business technologies strictly increases with time. 
Furthermore, in the presence of technological complementarities, complementary joint inputs such as skilled 
human capital, learning-by-doing effects, and returns to new technology usage in conjunction with imperfect fi-
nancial markets, a self-reinforcing mechanism can emerge that increases the momentum of progress for those 
firms that are already advanced in e-business usage, ceteris paribus. This results directly from the discussion 
about the diffusion of multiple related technologies in chapter 3.5: 
Hypothesis 10 – The probability to adopt any e-business technology is an increasing function of the 
number of other e-business technologies that a firm has already adopted, provided that the technologies 
do not substitute each other in their functionalities. 
Finally, better knowledge of the technologies will reduce the level of uncertainty and thus speed up diffusion. 
Also, better knowledge is indicative of the presence of complementary inputs (such as technical specialists or in-
frastructures) which will also make adoption more attractive. Thus, we might expect that industries that either 
have prior experience with intensive usage of ICT in general (e.g. banks, insurances, automotive, media) or in-
dustries that are somehow involved in the production of ICT goods and services (e.g. electronics industry, tele-
communications) will show more rapid rates of e-business diffusion.  This leads to Hypothesis 11: 
Hypothesis 11 – Industries with ex ante better knowledge about ICT will adopt e-business technologies 
more rapidly. 
Table 2 provides an overview of all hypotheses from chapters 2 and 3, which points out to which theories in 
both chapters the hypotheses are linked. It becomes obvious that there are numerous parallels between the litera-
ture analyzing the consequences of technological diffusion and the diffusion literature itself. In particular, those 
theories of technology diffusion that have a micro-economic foundation (stock and order effects) are closely 
linked to the game-theoretic literature on technological competition (e.g. patent races and models of technologi-
cal competition with endogenous market structure). Also, the theory of rank effects provides an overarching 
framework to include factors that are related to firm heterogeneity and the unequal distribution of specific re-
sources among firms and markets (e.g. economies of scale, network effects, market structure, managerial compe-
tence) into models of technological diffusion. Section 3.7 further elaborates on these interdependencies and how 
these different theories contribute towards a consistent view of technological change. 
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Table 2 – Overview of hypotheses 
Number Content Theories Chapters 
1 Diffusion varies across sectors Sutton (1991), 
Geroski (1994), 
rank effects, or-
der effects, mul-
tiple techn. 
2.3, 3.2.2, 
3.2.4, 3.5 
2 Sectors with high concentration ratios 
and high technological competition are 
more likely to adopt 
Sutton (1991), 
Geroski (1994), 
absorptive capac-
ity, rank effects, 
order effects, 
multiple techn. 
2.3, 3.2.2, 
3.2.4, 3.5 
3 Large firms are more likely to adopt Economies of 
scale, network ef-
fects, Schumpeter 
(1942); rank ef-
fects 
2.3, 3.2.2 
4 Firms with medium degree of market 
power are more likely to adopt 
Comanor (1967), 
Scherer (1967), 
Mansfield (1977), 
rank effects 
2.3, 3.2.2 
5 Early movers enjoy excess returns Patent races, 
stock effects, or-
der effects 
2.3.6, 2.3.7, 
3.2.3, 3.2.4 
6 Innovators are more likely to grow Patent races, in-
novation and 
market structure, 
stock effects, or-
der effects 
2.3.5, 2.3.6, 
2.5, 3.2.3, 
3.2.4 
7 Firms that are advanced in using e-
business are more likely to reduce em-
ployment 
Substitution ef-
fects 
2.6 
8 Firms that recently used technology to 
innovate are more likely to increase em-
ployment 
Compensation ef-
fects 
2.6 
9 The probability to adopt e-business 
technologies strictly increases with time 
Epidemic effects, 
network external-
ities, falling 
prices, techno-
logical improve-
ments 
2.3.3, 3.2.1, 
3.2.2, 3.2.3, 
3.2.4 
10 The probability to adopt any e-business 
technology increases with the number of 
previously adopted e-business technolo-
gies 
Complementar-
ity, strategic be-
havior, learning-
by-doing, absorp-
tive capacity, im-
perfect capital 
markets, rank ef-
fects, multiple 
technologies 
2.3.6, 2.3.7, 
2.5, 3.2.2, 3.5 
11 Industries with high ICT competence are 
more likely to adopt e-business technol-
ogy 
Learning-by-
doing, absorptive 
capacity, rank ef-
fects, technical 
experts, reduced 
uncertainty, mul-
tiple technologies 
2.3.7, 3.2.2, 
3.2.5, 3.5 
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In addition to these hypotheses that can be empirically tested in later chapters, the above discussion of diffu-
sion theories suggests a number of other relevant and interesting factors that will influence the diffusion of e-
business technologies and are worth summarizing. First, one can substantiated in which industries diffusion will 
be particularly rapid (thus further specifying hypothesis 1): Industries that are characterized by low price-
elasticity of demand will experience faster rates of diffusion, as pointed out by stock effect models. Second, ac-
cording to order effect models, the presence of positive returns to scale, significant market reputation effects, or 
competition for scarce complementary inputs (such as skilled labor) in an industry can speed up the diffusion 
process because it makes pre-emptive adoption attractive. Third, industries and countries that are in a period of 
cyclical upswing will have a higher probability to adopt because they generally increase their investment spend-
ing in such periods (see 3.3).  
Diffusion theory is also informative about who can be expected to benefit most from e-business adoption. 
According to stock, order, and multiple technology models early adoption should yield the highest overall re-
turns. The presence of first mover advantages (resulting from complementarities, learning effects, increasing re-
turns to scale, reputation etc.) may even lead to sustainable advantages of early adopters that cannot be perfectly 
copied by rivals that adopt at later times. Apparently, models involving rank effects, information acquisition, 
epidemic effects, or uncertainty are not very informative about who will be the likely winners of technology 
adoption. However, they provide reasonable explanations why firms may not adopt instantaneously, even 
though this might be the best strategy if purely competitive effects are considered.  
 
 
3.7. The process of technological change 
The preceding two chapters provided a literature review on the diffusion of new technologies and their impli-
cations. This section intends to highlight a number of parallels between these two research directions and to 
show how they jointly contribute to a consistent, market-based view of technological progress.  
Figure 3 shows a flowchart that gives a simplified illustration of the process of technological change. Techno-
logical change, meaning changes in the goods or services produced and the means by which they are produced, 
can be broken down into four main stages: 
1. Invention of a new product or process: This can be the result of coincidence or purposeful R&D ac-
tivities. A new product or service might also arise as a by-product of an investment into a new tech-
nology which is introduced to a company.  
2. Market entry: Once the new product or service has been invented, it is introduced to the market. Po-
tential customers of the invention can be either private consumers and households or other firms.7 
Once the invention gains practical use in a market or process, it turns into an innovation. 
3. Diffusion: A new product is adopted by consumers and / or firms over time until it reaches its market 
potential. Alternatively, it can also fail if neither consumers nor firms are willing to purchase the in-
vention. If firms invest into the new product, their gain from it is usually not direct but requires an 
implementation process which can either trigger a new product or service offer by the adopting com-
pany, or / and a process innovation within the adopting company. Alternatively, the implementation 
can also fail, usually ending in a write-off of the investment. 
4. Market adjustments: Finally, numerous market adjustments can occur as a consequence of the diffu-
sion process. In the case of the successful diffusion of a new consumer product or service, the pur-
chasing habits of consumers changes, possibly affecting the demand on markets for products that are 
substitutes or complements to the innovation. This can trigger further complex adjustment processes 
___________ 
7 A process invention is usually not offered to a market for sale, but directly implemented in the company it was invented 
in. In case the company decides to sell the knowledge about the new process to other companies, it becomes a product or ser-
vice invention. 
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on the supply side of these related markets, possibly also affecting the labor market. In the case of 
a successfully introduced process innovation, the adopting company expands its production8, which 
leads to total output growth9, a decrease in prices10 and changes in market shares11. 
This very simplified illustration leaves out important elements that also contribute in important ways to tech-
nological change. For example, the role of entrepreneurship and new firm foundation is not explicitly consid-
ered, although it does have a crucial role in the process of technological advance. However, this price was paid 
for the purpose of clarity and for investigating the role of technology diffusion in the process of technological 
change, which is the main objective of this study.  
 
 
Figure 3 – Simplified process of technological change 
 
Action Actor Event
∨ ∀ ∧“or” “exclusive or” “and”  
Legend to Figure 3 
 
Interestingly, the literature cited in chapters 2 and 3 points out that the four stages of the process of techno-
logical change mentioned above are closely related. In particular, firm’s expectations of the market adjustments 
succeeding the successful introduction of a new product or process provide an incentive for investing into new 
products or processes, either via R&D efforts or through the investment into a new technology sold by someone 
else. Also, the realization of profits from such investments is inseparably connected with the market adjustments 
outlined above. Table 3 summarizes the incentives that drive the decision of firms and customers to invest into 
innovative activities, products or services. 
___________ 
8 Lower production costs lead to higher optimal production quantities, ceteris paribus. 
9 Provided that demand is somewhat price-elastic. 
10 Because the demand curve slopes downward. 
11 Provided that not all companies serving the same product market adopt the new process at the same time. 
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Table 3 – Incentive scheme to Figure 3 
Incentives I - Opportunities for profitable investment 
- Opportunity to gain strategic advantage 
- Capturing market shares from rivals via production cost advan-
tages or market entry 
- Achieving (temporary) monopoly position via entry to a new mar-
ket 
Incentives II - Opportunities for profitable investment 
- Opportunity to gain strategic advantage 
- Capturing market shares from rivals via production cost advan-
tages or market entry 
- Achieving (temporary) monopoly position via entry to a new mar-
ket 
Incentives III - Utility gains from consumption 
 
Remarkably, it appears that the selfish motives of consumers and companies seem to be the engine that drives 
technological progress and hence spurs the creation of wealth and economic growth. These selfish motives seem 
to unfold their creative and productive impacts particularly well in free-market societies where firms are en-
gaged in fierce competition, as recently pointed out by William Baumol (2002): 
“What differentiates the prototype capitalist economy most sharply from all other economic systems is free-
market pressures that force firms into a continuing process of innovation, because it becomes a matter of life and 
death for many of them… Firms cannot afford to leave innovation to chance. Rather, managements are forced by 
market pressures to support innovative activity systematically and substantially, and success of the efforts of any 
one business firm forces its rivals to step up their own efforts. The result is a ferocious arms race among the 
firms in the most rapidly evolving sectors of the economy, with innovation as the prime weapon.” (p. viii-ix) 
In the context of this study, it becomes obvious that investments into new technologies are an essential part of 
this “ferocious arms race” that spurs economic growth, creates prosperity and enables firms to gain competitive 
advantages. Table 4 summarizes the connections between the four main steps of technological progress and the 
various theories that were discussed in the preceding two chapters. 
 
Table 4 – Theories relating to technological change 
Process step Theories Chapter 
Invention and 
R&D  
Patent races, market structure and 
innovation incentives, appropriabil-
ity problems 
2.2, 2.3.4, 2.3.6 
Market entry Patent races, market structure and 
innovation incentives 
2.3.4, 2.3.6 
Diffusion Epidemic-, rank-, stock- and order 
effects, risk and uncertainty, multiple 
related technologies, Roger’s criteria 
3.2, 3.4, 3.5 
Market adjustment Innovation and market structure, pat-
ent races, economies of scale and 
scope, network effects, employment 
effects, productivity and growth, 
stock- and order effects 
2.3.1, 2.3.2, 2.3.3, 2.3.5, 
2.3.6, 2.4, 2.6, 3.2.3, 3.2.4 
 
This concludes Part I of this study, which aimed to provide an overview of what we currently know about 
how new technologies gain increasing usage among firms and how innovation diffusion is embedded in the 
more general process of technological progress. Chapter 2 emphasized that the diffusion of new technologies 
can have far reaching consequences for the competitiveness of individual firms, the organization of production 
processes and market structures, the demand for labor and certain types of qualifications, and for productivity 
growth and the creation of prosperity and wealth. In particular, the strategic relevance of technology adoption 
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decisions was stressed. Chapter 3 provided an overview of the current literature on technology diffusion. The 
primary objective of this research is to rationalize and to explain the puzzling observation that new technologies 
– even if they promise clear benefits and are objectively superior to old technologies – are not immediately 
adopted by all firms that could possibly profit from them. Rather, diffusion appears to be a dynamic process that 
often takes surprisingly long until the new technologies have gained saturation levels in usage. Different theories 
have been suggested to explain this phenomena. Some of these theories complement each other (e.g. the rank ef-
fects theory and the majority of the management literature on technology diffusion), while others are based on 
conflicting assumptions to explain the same phenomena (e.g. epidemic effects versus stock effect models). In 
particular, we found that some of the most interesting and challenging effects occur when firms’ investment de-
cisions are observed as a dynamic sequence, i.e. when past investment decisions influence the probability and 
the payoff of future investment decisions, which can lead to non-linear dynamics, lock-in effects and path-
dependent developments. Also, the existing literature suggests that such non-linear dynamics are especially 
likely to occur if firms are faced with a new technological paradigm that offers various, related investment op-
portunities instead of just one stand-alone technological solution that is independent from any other technology 
the firm uses or could purchase in the future. However, there is still a gap in the literature analyzing explicitly 
how such dynamic interdependencies influence the adoption behavior of firms and also a clear lack of empirical 
evidence for such dynamics. In addition, there is still only very few empirical work on the diffusion of e-
business technologies and on the relationship of e-business usage with firm performance12.  
Part II continues with original research that is carried out to address these gaps in the literature and to empiri-
cally test the hypotheses that were developed in Part I. The estimation results will be indicative about which of 
the above identified theories abides the test of the data and which particular factor has the strongest and most 
dominant influence on the diffusion dynamics of e-business technologies. In addition, the analysis of the interre-
lationship of e-business usage, innovative activities and firm performance yields interesting and new insights 
into the strategic relevance of ICT. Last but not least, a number of implications can be derived based on the em-
pirical evidence. 
___________ 
12 Primarily because this technological paradigm is still relatively new and firm level data that is adequate and useful for 
academic purposes is still rare. 
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PART  II 
4. Data description 
Formel-Kapitel (nächstes) Abschnitt 1  
The data used for the empirical analysis in the following chapters originates from enterprise surveys of the e-
Business Market W@tch, an observatory initiative sponsored by the European Commission. The e-Business 
W@tch monitors the adoption, development and impact of electronic business practices in different sectors of 
the European economy. The initiative was launched in late 2001 with the purpose to provide reliable and me-
thodically consistent empirical information about the extent, scope, and factors affecting the speed of e-business 
development at the sector level in an internationally comparative framework, information which have previously 
not been available from other sources such as official register-based statistics or market research studies.  
The European Commission launched the project to get more in-depth information about e-business develop-
ment in Europe in order to identify possible needs for policy action to concur with the eEurope 2005 Action 
Plan, which was endorsed by the Seville European Council in June 2002. In that Action Plan, the European 
Council agreed on the goal “to promote take-up of e-business with the aim of increasing the competitiveness of 
European enterprises and raising productivity and growth through investment in information and communication 
technologies, human resources (notably e-skills) and new business models”.  
Until 2004, the e-Business W@tch initiative had conducted three large scale enterprise survey rounds and 
published Sector Impact Studies on 17 different sectors in the European economy, three comprehensive synthe-
sis reports, statistical pocketbooks and other resources13. These various publications and resources contain a 
very comprehensive collection of descriptive statistics from the three enterprise survey waves, thus making an 
additional descriptive analysis of the data for the purpose of this study dispensable. Results from the e-Business 
W@tch received high attention among policy makers, industry representatives and have been quoted and utilized 
by other research institutions, for example EITO (2003) and OECD (2004).  
The three enterprise surveys were carried out in July 2002, March 2003 and November/December 2003. Each 
survey used a slightly modified questionnaire and had a different coverage of industrial sectors and countries. 
Thus, no real panel data were collected. Instead, the surveys are based on independently drawn random samples 
from pre-specified country-sector combinations, stratified by three enterprise size classes (<49 employees, 50-
250 employees, >250 employees) to enable a representative representation of the respective country-sector find-
ings. A consistent survey method was used, interviewing decision makers in companies (e.g. IT managers, man-
aging directors or the owner) by computer-aided telephone interviews (CATI). Translation of the questionnaire 
into the respective languages and fieldwork was carried out by specialized polling companies.  
Each interview collected basic information about the company, including  confirmation of sector member-
ship, number of employees, number of establishments, and basic financial information such as turnover devel-
opment. The majority of questions related to the availability and usage of various ICT and e-business technolo-
gies. In addition, companies were asked about their IT training efforts. Also, various questions related to the 
perceived importance and impact of e-business at the firm level. The average interview time was close to 15 
minutes for all three survey waves, thus a comprehensive set of firm-specific information could be gathered.  
Due to budgetary constraints, not all sectors and all European countries could be included in each survey. In-
stead, the choice of sectors and countries varied in each survey round in order to get an increasingly broad cov-
___________ 
13 all available free of charge at the project’s website at www.ebusiness-watch.org. 
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erage, which was desired by the European Commission. The definition of all sectors was in accordance with 
NACE Rev. 1 statistical classification of economic activities.  
Table 5 shows the number of successfully completed interviews in each country-sector cell for the first e-
Business W@tch survey which was carried out in July 2002. In sum, the dataset contains 9,264 valid observa-
tions from 15 sectors in 15 European countries. However, not all 15 sectors were covered in each country with 
the exception of the four largest European countries – France, Germany, Italy, and the UK – which exhibit a 
complete and homogeneous sector coverage that enables cross-country and cross-sector comparisons.  
Table 5 – Country-sector coverage e-Business W@tch survey July 2002 
Country  
Sector A B DK FIN F D GR IRL I L NL P E S UK
01   99  100 100   102  96 100 101  100 
02     101 100 51  102  102  100  101 
03  101   50 100  36 100     51 100 
04    60 103 100 53  133 31     100 
05 105    100 100   129     54 105 
06    61 100 100   102     50 104 
07     50 100   104    100 53 102 
08 102    101 100 52  105  84 100   100 
09 101    100 100 100  96    100  102 
10  97   103 100   99 41   101  100 
11     50 100 52  41 30    52 101 
12   104 61 101 100   101   100   101 
13   101  103 100  63 103  117    105 
14    63 100 100   100  101    103 
15  102  63 100 100  56 100      114 
Note: Table shows number of successfully completed interviews, country names abbreviated by their interna-
tional license plate codes 
 
The July 2002 survey covered seven manufacturing industries and eight service sectors. Table 6 provides the 
exact definition of the sectors according to NACE Rev. 1 codes. Within each sector, sampling was adjusted ac-
cording to the relative size of sub-sectors measured by value-added. Thus, sub-sectors with a relatively larger 
share of contribution to national GDP were included with a proportionately larger number of interviews, allow-
ing to get an approximately representative picture at the country-sector level.  
Table 6 – Sector definition of e-Business W@tch survey July 2002 
 Sector short name NACE Rev. 1 Codes 
01 Food 15 – Manufacture of food products and beverages 
16 – Manufacture of tobacco products 
02 Publishing 22 – Publishing, printing and reproduction of recorded me-
dia 
92.1 – Motion picture and video activities 
92.2 – Radio and television activities 
03 Chemicals 24 – Manufacture of chemicals, chemical products and 
man-made fibers 
25 – Manufacture of rubber and plastic products 
04 Metal products 28 – Manufacture of metal products 
05 Machinery 29 – Manufacture of machinery and equipment 
06 Electronics 30 – Manufacture of office machinery and equipment 
31.1 – Manufacture of electric motors, generators and 
transformers 
31.2 – Manufacture of electricity distribution and control 
apparatus 
32 – Manufacture of radio, television and communication 
equipment and apparatus 
07 Transport Equipment 34 – Manufacture of motor vehicles, trailers and semi-
trailers 
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35 – Manufacture of other transport equipment
08 Retail 52.11 – Retail sale in non-specialized stores with food, 
beverages or tobacco predominating 
52.12 – Other retail sales in non-specialized stores 
52.4 – Other retail sale of new goods in specialized stores, 
except of motor vehicles and motorcycles 
09 Tourism 55.1 – Hotels  
55.2 – Campsites and other forms of short-stay accommo-
dation 
62.1 – Scheduled air transport 
63.3 – Activities of travel agencies and tour operators; tour-
ist assistance activities n.e.c. 
92.33 – Fair and amusement park activities 
92.52 – Museum activities and preservation of historical 
sites and buildings 
92.53 – Botanical and zoological gardens and nature re-
serve activities 
10 Monetary Services 65.12 – Total credit institutions 
65.2 – Other monetary intermediation 
11 Insurances 66 – Insurances and pension funding, except compulsory 
and social security 
12 Real Estate 70 – Real estate activities 
13 Business Services 74.1 – Legal, accounting, book-keeping and auditing ac-
tivities; tax consultancy; market research and public opin-
ion polling, business and management consultancy; hold-
ings 
74.2 – Architectural and engineering activities and related 
technical consultancy 
74.3 – Technical testing and analysis 
74.4 – Advertising 
74.5 – Labor recruitment and provision of personnel 
74.6 – Investigation and security activities 
74.7 – Industrial cleaning 
74.8 – Miscellaneous  
14 ICT Services 64.2 - Telecommunications 
72 – Computer-related activities 
15 Health Services 85.1 – Health activities 
85.3 – Social work activities 
 
The same surveying and sampling methods were maintained for the March 2003 and November/December 
2003 survey waves. The March 2003 survey covered only the five largest European countries (France, Germany, 
Italy, Spain and the UK) and seven sectors (four manufacturing, three service sectors), but all sectors were cov-
ered in all countries, thus yielding a homogenous coverage that allowed to make representative cross-country 
and cross-industry comparisons. In total, 3,515 interviews were successfully conducted in March 2003. Table 7 
provides a detailed breakdown of the number of interviews per country-sector cell.  
Table 7 - Country-sector coverage e-Business W@tch survey March 2003 
Sector  
Country 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 
F 100 100 100 101 101 99 100 
D 100 100 100 100 100 101 100 
I 102 101 101 100 102 102 101 
E 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
UK 100 101 101 100 101 100 101 
Note: Table shows number of successfully completed interviews, country names abbreviated by their interna-
tional license plate codes  
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Some of the sectors that were covered in June 2002 were surveyed again in March 2003. The definition of 
sectors was maintained to achieve some level of comparability of results, with the only exception of the tourism 
sector that now also included restaurants, cafes and bars. 
Table 8 shows the respective definitions.  
Table 8 - Sector definition of e-Business W@tch survey March 2003 
 Sector short name NACE Rev. 1 Codes 
01 Food as above 
02 Chemicals as above 
03 Electronics as above 
04 Transport Equipment as above 
05 Retail as above 
06 Tourism 55 – Hotels and restaurants 
62.1 – Scheduled air transport 
63.3 – Activities of travel agencies and tour operators; tour-
ist assistance activities n.e.c. 
92.33 – Fair and amusement park activities 
92.52 – Museum activities and preservation of historical 
sites and buildings 
92.53 – Botanical and zoological gardens and nature re-
serve activities 
07 ICT Services as above 
 
The November/December 2003 survey extended the scope of the project to the 10 Acceding Countries and to 
two new sectors that were previously not covered (textile industries and crafts & trade), now covering a total of 
25 countries and 10 sectors. This, however, resulted in a loss of homogeneity in country-sector coverage and a 
loss of cross-country and cross-sector comparability on the aggregate level due to budgetary constraints. In total, 
the November/December 2003 survey included 7,302 successfully completed interviews; 4,670 in the old EU 
and Norway, 2,632 in the Acceding Countries. Table 9 shows the detailed coverage break-down. 
Table 9 - Country-sector coverage e-Business W@tch survey Nov/Dec 2003 
Sector  
Country 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 
A    68   132  100  
B  101    100    100 
DK      67 67  66  
FIN           
F 100    101    100 100 
D 100    100    100 100 
GR 84  76 89 75  75    
IRL  70     70 71   
I 100    100    100 101 
NL 100       101 102  
P    104  100    100 
E 101    108    101 100 
FIN 75  75     76   
S  80 75 79      80 
UK 100    100    100 100 
CY      64     
CZ  60  60   60 60 60  
EST 50 50 50 21 65 50 50 50 50 50 
H   80 80      80 
LT      57     
LV 51 49    51     
M       51    
PL 80 80 80 80 80 80 80 80 80 80 
SLO   56    51 53 55 58 
SK 50  50   50    60 
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N 30     70     
Note: Table shows number of successfully completed interviews, country names abbreviated by their interna-
tional license plate codes 
 
Table 10 again shows the definition of the 10 sectors covered in the November/December 2003 survey. Eight 
of the sectors had already been part of the June 2002 survey, and their definition was retained, with the only ex-
ception of the tourism sector that included restaurants, cafes and bars as in May 2003. The textile and the crafts 
& trade sectors were, however, covered for the first time in November/December 2003. Crafts & trade is not an 
official industry according to NACE Rev. 1 codes. The e-Business W@tch considered crafts & trade to be a 
group of professions in which “workers apply their specific knowledge and skills to produce or process goods” 
and in which “the tasks call for an understanding of all stages of the production process, the materials and tools 
used and the nature and purpose of the final product”. The operational definition was “firms with less than 50 
employees in craft-related NACE Rev. 1 business activities” (European e-Business Market W@tch 2004a, p. 
122).  
Table 10 - Sector definition of e-Business W@tch survey Nov/Dec 2003 
 Sector short name NACE Rev. 1 Codes 
01 Textile 17 – Manufacture of textile and textile products 
18.1 – Manufacture of leather clothes 
18.2 – Manufacture of other wearing apparel and accesso-
ries 
19.3 Manufacture of footwear 
02 Chemicals as above 
03 Electronics as above 
04 Transport Equipment as above 
05 Crafts & trade 17 – Manufacture of textiles and textile products 
18.1-2 – Manufacture of wearing apparel and dressing 
19.3 – Manufacture of leather and leather products (foot-
wear only) 
30 – Manufacture of office machinery and computers 
31.1-2 – Manufacture of electrical machinery and appara-
tus 
32 – Manufacture of radio, television and communication 
equipment and apparatus 
34 – Manufacture of motor vehicles, trailers and semi-
trailers 
35 – Manufacture of other transport equipment 
20 – Manufacture of wood and products of wood and cork, 
except furniture; manufacture of articles of straw and plait-
ing materials 
36.1 – Manufacture of furniture 
45.2-4 – Construction (Building of complete constructions, 
building installation and completion) 
06 Retail as above 
07 Tourism 55 – Hotels and restaurants 
62.1 – Scheduled air transport 
63.3 – Activities of travel agencies and tour operators; tour-
ist assistance activities n.e.c. 
92.33 – Fair and amusement park activities 
92.52 – Museum activities and preservation of historical 
sites and buildings 
92.53 – Botanical and zoological gardens and nature re-
serve activities 
08 ICT Services as above 
09 Health Services as above 
10 Business Services as above 
 
During the course of the project, changes have also been made to the questionnaire that was used for the sur-
veys. These changes partially reflected prior experience with survey results (including response rates, wording 
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of questions), identification of additional aspects that deserved more attention (including an extension of 
available background information about companies and a retrospective time dimension on some technology 
variables), but also changes in the technological environment due to newly emerging trends and specific inter-
ests of the client or of consortium members that needed to be reflected in the questionnaire. The implemented 
changes necessarily led to inconsistencies between the surveys, thus making a comparison of time trends from 
one survey wave to another a dodgy exercise from a methodical point of view. Thus, for purposes of academic 
analysis it is more useful to consider each survey wave as an independent, stand-alone cross-sectional dataset 
that cannot be easily compared or connected to other survey waves. While this might be viewed as a disadvan-
tage (we have three cross-sections that are neither poolable nor a true panel), it also has merits because each sur-
vey focused on slightly different aspects and generated a slightly different set of variables that can be used to 
analyze different questions. Also, each survey wave by itself is large enough to draw some fairly representative 
conclusions about the underlying sampling population. The complete questionnaires for all three survey waves 
are publicly available on the website of the e-Business W@tch project at:  
http://www.ebusiness-watch.org/menu/The_European_e-Business_Survey/14 
For the purpose of this study, the most important features of each survey wave are 1) which and how sectors 
and countries were covered, 2) which background information about companies are available, and 3) which in-
formation on technology usage are available.  
 
Table 11 – Features of the three cross-sectional datasets 
Survey Coverage Background informa-
tion variables 
Technology usage 
variables 
June 2002 - Homogeneous cover-
age of 15 sectors in 4 
countries 
- Heterogeneous sector 
coverage in 11 addi-
tional countries 
- Largest cross-section 
with 9,264 valid ob-
servations 
- Limited to size class, 
country, sector, number 
of establishments, 
turnover development 
last year, primary cus-
tomers of the enterprise 
and information about 
IT training efforts 
- A large number of 
ICT and e-business 
technology vari-
ables are available. 
- Disadvantage: No 
information about 
when technologies 
have been used for 
the first time. 
March 2003 - Homogeneous cover-
age of 7 sectors in five 
countries 
- Same as in June 2002 - Comparable to 
June 2002, however 
for 8 technologies 
companies were 
also asked when 
they first started to 
use it 
Nov/Dec 2003 - Heterogeneous cov-
erage of 10 sectors in 
25 countries, no com-
parability across coun-
tries or sectors on the 
aggregate level 
- Important additional 
variables have been 
added, including prof-
itability last year, % of 
employees with college 
degree, market share, 
product innovations 
last year, process inno-
vations last year, 
Internet-related inno-
vations last year 
(product or process) 
- Comparable to 
March 2003, includ-
ing the retrospective 
time dimension for 
8 technologies 
 
According to Table 11, the major advantage of the June 2002 survey is its comprehensive and homogeneous 
coverage of 15 sectors in 4 countries. Also, this is the survey with the highest number of successfully completed 
interviews. Since the main objective of this study is to analyze technology adoption and its impact at the level of 
___________ 
14 Link active as of April 1st, 2005. 
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the individual firm, the major disadvantage of this dataset is the lack of a time dimension and a lack of impor-
tant background information about each company (e.g. market share, employee qualification, innovative activi-
ties), including a lack of objective performance variables such as profitability that could be related to technology 
usage in a meaningful way. However, for a static analysis of adoption patterns this dataset is very attractive due 
to its sheer size and the comprehensiveness of technology usage variables that were collected.  
The major advantage of the March 2003 survey for the purposes of this study is the introduction of a retro-
spective time dimension on eight technology variables: Firms that confirmed in the interview that they currently 
use a particular e-business application (e.g. online purchasing or e-learning) were asked when they first started 
to use that technology. This enables a dynamic view of the diffusion process. Of course, there is some additional 
variance in the data due to the fact that respondents may not precisely remember since when their enterprise has 
been using a particular technology. Nevertheless, the ratio of missing values on these questions were always be-
low 20% of the respective subjects indicating that most respondents were at least able to make an “educated 
guess”. Also, one might reasonably assume that the error distribution will not be significantly skewed towards 
one or the other side of the true values. Thus, without additional information or conflicting evidence, it is most 
reasonable to treat the reported adoption date as the true adoption date.  
An additional advantage of the March 2003 survey is the achieved level of homogeneity in country-sector 
coverage. However, compared to the June 2002 survey, less country and sectors were included, yielding less de-
grees of freedom in the explanatory variables for diffusion analyses. The major disadvantage of the March 2003 
survey is that important background information about companies and objective financial performance variables 
are still missing. 
This shortage was overcome by the Nov/Dec 2003 survey, which also included information on market shares, 
profitability, and innovative activities within firms. Especially the questions on innovative activities turned out 
to yield very interesting insights. Two introductory questions that were asked to every respondent elicited 
whether a company had introduced substantially improved products or services to its customers during the past 
12 months prior to the date of the interview. It was also asked if the company had introduced new internal proc-
esses during the past 12 months. These introductory questions were adopted from the Community Innovation 
Survey (CIS 2004) to determine the share of companies that recently introduced product or process innovations. 
The advantage of adopting the questions from CIS was that it enabled to use a well accepted and tested survey 
instrument. In addition to the introductory questions on innovation, the interest was also on the share of innova-
tive activity that is directly related to or enabled by Internet-based technology. Therefore, companies that indi-
cated in the introductory questions that they have conducted innovations in the past 12 months were asked fol-
low up questions. In addition to these new and important background information, the Nov/Dec 2003 survey 
maintained the retrospective dynamics introduced in March 2003, thus yielding a particularly rich dataset with a 
pseudo-dynamic perspective. The only disadvantage of the survey is the high level of heterogeneity in country-
sector coverage that does not allow to compare results across countries or sectors. However,  econometric tech-
niques can be used to overcome this problem (see chapters 6 and 7).  
For the studies in the following chapters, the choice was made to use the June 2002 survey for the static 
analysis of e-business adoption due to the comprehensive and homogeneous coverage of 15 sectors in 4 coun-
tries, which yielded an exceptionally large dataset with detailed information about e-business technology usage. 
To study the dynamics of e-business adoption and the relationship of e-business technology usage, innovation 
and firm performance, the Nov/Dec 2003 survey is used because it contains the required retrospective time di-
mension of the data and the necessary background information which are lacking in the previous surveys. The 
disadvantage of heterogeneity in this sample is accommodated with panel-econometric techniques. Thus, no use 
is made of the March 2003 data, primarily because they are lacking important variables for the purposes of this 
study. The dataset may, however, turn out to be a useful source for other studies15.  
___________ 
15 The European Commission grants access to the dataset for non-profit research purposes. 
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5. Static analysis of e-business adoption 
Formel-Kapitel (nächstes) Abschnitt 1  
This chapter presents a static analysis of the adoption of various e-business technologies. A theoretical under-
pinning of the effects of related technologies on diffusion processes is offered. Provided that the technologies do 
not substitute another, it is hypothesized that the probability to adopt any technology is an increasing function of 
the number of other related technologies that a firm is also using. A simple mathematical framework is intro-
duced to make these thoughts explicit and testable. Two structural parametric approaches are used to test the 
proposed relationships using enterprise survey data on various e-business technologies. Furthermore, non-
parametric classification and regression trees (CART) are used to identify clusters of firms that exhibit signifi-
cantly different adoption probabilities. The parametric and non-parametric approaches together suggest that 
technological interdependencies are a crucial determinant of adoption decisions. The technological legacy of a 
firm has a systematic influence on its investment decisions and its future technological development. In particu-
lar, firms might experience an endogenous acceleration mechanism that leads to higher adoption rates and faster 
“progress” among those firms that are already technologically advanced. 
5.1. Theory 
 
Most studies on technology diffusion focus on isolated, stand-alone technologies (see chapter 3, Stoneman 
2002). However, in reality many technologies are not completely independent from other technologies or firm-
specific resources. Neglecting these interdependencies may lead to biased estimates and erroneous conclusions. 
The complication arises because the usage of some technologies within a firm might influence the costs and 
gains of adopting another technology, influencing adoption decisions and technological development in a sys-
tematic way. The only previous studies dealing with the diffusion of multiple technologies (Stoneman and Kwon 
1994, Stoneman and Toivanen 1997, Colombo and Mosconi 1995) have demonstrated that the presence of re-
lated technologies greatly affects adoption decisions. This line of research is extended here by making the nature 
of the interdependencies theoretically explicit and empirically testable, relating it to Dosi’s (1982) concept of 
technological trajectories. 
To formalize the argument, a decision theoretic adoption model based on investment principles is introduced: 
To analyze differences in adoption probabilities, the model simultaneously analyzes a large number ( N ) of 
companies. Let  N be a number of heterogeneous, profit-maximizing firms without strategic interaction. In addi-
tion, assume certainty with respect to expected payoffs and costs of a technology. Each firm  is charac-
terized by a vector of 
i 1...N=
ix  individual covariates. This vector captures variables indicating relevant differences be-
tween firms, e.g. firm size and market specifications.  
The focus of this study is on the initial purchase of a new technology and it abstracts from intra-firm diffusion 
and from the level of use of the technology by the acquirer. Let  be a number of related, non-substitutable 
technologies that belong to a joint technological paradigm (Dosi 1982): These technologies offer solutions to se-
lected technological problems, based on joint technological principles.  
K
The pattern and direction of progress based on the paradigm is called a trajectory. The normal path of devel-
opment starts with the non-availability of any of the  technologies in a firm, and progresses with the adoption 
of each additional technology. It is specified below how technologies could be related in an economic sense and 
which effects can be associated with the concept of a joint technological paradigm. But non-substitutability is 
the crucial assumption for the following argument.  
K
The technological equipment of a firm can be described as follows: Define a -component vector Y  of bi-
nary variables Y  with 
K
1 2 K(y , y ,..., y )= { }jy 0,1∈ and j 1,..., K= .  characterizes the current endowment of a 
firm with any of the K  related technologies. The concept of a supermodular function can be used to relate cur-
Y
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rent technological endowment to possible investments into additional technologies. This is warranted because 
technologies are – in this study – discrete variables: Either a firm has a particular technology, or not. Super-
modularity is a general concept to specify changes in a function with respect to several changes in its arguments, 
whether they are discrete or continuous.  
We say that  if the -th component in Y Y′ ≥ j Y′  is not smaller than the -th component in  for all . Fur-
ther, we define ma  to be the operation that takes the largest value of 
j Y j
x(Y ,Y)′ Y′  and  for all . Similar, we 
define  to be the operation that takes the smallest value of 
Y j
min(Y′, Y) Y′  and Y  for all .  implies an 
increase of one or more of the  components, i.e. the adoption of one or more additional technologies belong-
ing to the same paradigm. Also,  implies a higher position upon the technological trajectory. In general, 
supermodularity is defined as follows: 
j Y′ > Y
K
Y Y′ >
 
Definition 1: A function  is supermodular if for all  nf : R R→ nY, Y R′∈
 
(5.1)  
[f (Y) f (min(Y , Y))] [f (Y ) f (min(Y , Y))]
f (max(Y , Y)) f (min(Y ,Y))
′ ′ ′− + −
′ ′≤ −
 
The definition implies that the sum of changes in the function when several arguments are increased sepa-
rately is less than the changes resulting from increasing all arguments together. The function f is submodular if –
f is supermodular (Milgrom and Roberts 1990). 
Consider the decision of a firm to invest into one or more additional technologies, given its current equipment 
with related technologies, such that . Technological progress is costly and consists of two separate com-
ponents
Y Y′ >
16: 
- the cost to purchase the technology ip  (e.g. hardware, software); 
- the cost for complementary investments into human capital, process re-engineering, and organizational 
change . ic
These two cost components can vary among firms, for example because a large firm will need more licenses 
and more re-engineering efforts than a small firm. The costs for reaching  have been decided upon in the past 
and are sunk. A firm that considers switching from Y  to 
Y
Y′ , Y Y′ > , therefore considers its current technology 
 as an exogenous variable. The total costs for the switch is specified as  Y
 
(5.2) i i i i i i i i i i i iC (Y | x , Y ) p (Y | x , Y ) c (Y | x , Y )′ ′ ′= +  
 
Two cost components appear because the purchase of a new technology is only a necessary, not a sufficient 
condition for usage of the new technology in the production process. In order to utilize the new technology, em-
ployees have to be instructed in the use of the technology, experience and know-how has to be gained, and firms 
might also have to hire technical specialists to run or maintain the new technology. In addition, the introduction 
of a new technology often requires a re-organization of processes and structures within a firm. These adjust-
ments lead to the additional complementary investments c . For example, Brynjolfsson and Hitt (2003) and 
Black and Lynch (2004) have confirmed the importance of such complementary investments for the case of the 
computerization of firms. One could also think of c  as costs for consulting services or an initial loss of effi-
ciency during the period of switching from the old to the new technology.  
i
i
Acquisition costs  can depend on other technological variables in three distinct ways. First, provided that 
the  technologies belong to the same technological paradigm, it is possible that they will require joint com-
plementary inputs to function properly, such as specialized labor (Acemoglu 2002, Brynjolfsson and Hitt 2002, 
Greenwood 1997, Krueger 1993). Second, learning-by-doing effects (Arrow 1962a, Sheshinski 1967) may oc-
cur: Some experience gained with the usage of one particular technology might be transferable to another related 
iC
K
___________ 
16 One could also include a third cost component that reflects the option value of delaying the investment (Huisman 
2001), which is lost once the firm decides to invest. However, this would not change the results and is therefore not explicitly 
considered. 
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technology. In such cases, some part of  will not have to be paid again when a firm considers to invest into 
an additional technology from the same paradigm, and  will fall if the firm is already more advanced.  Third, 
firms that purchase more than one technology may achieve discounts on 
ic
ic
ip . If any or all of the above applies, 
this will lead to lower acquisition costs for firms that are already more advanced. Thus, the presence of comple-
mentary joint inputs, learning-by-doing effects, or discounts for multiple purchases would all result in invest-
ment cost advantages for adopting an increasing number of technologies. Note that all three effects are strictly 
increasing in their arguments, without a natural point of inflection. Consequently, if any or all of the above ef-
fects apply,  will be submodular in : iC iY
C (
x
′
i i(Y )= − C
i
iY
 
Assumption 1 - A(1): The investment cost function i i i iY | x , Y )′  is submodular in . iY
 
In addition to the adoption costs, the present value of benefits from adopting additional technologies, g , 
could also depend on the current technological endowment of the firm in two distinct ways:  First, technologies 
could be complementary, i.e. they could be compatible and not substitute each other in their functionalities. In 
this case, the payoff from installing these technologies together will be greater than installing each of these tech-
nologies alone. Provided our understanding that the  related technologies are based on the same technological 
principles and are not substitutes, technological complementarities are likely to arise. Second, suppose that pre-
vious technological investments have lead to positive returns on investment, i.e. a rise in profits. This additional 
financial slack could enable easier access to external funding due to information asymmetries between financial 
intermediaries and borrowers (Abel and Blanchard 1986, Hubbard 1990, Hubbard and Kashyap 1992). Thus, 
previous investments into technology could lead to better financing conditions for additional investments: 
 would result in higher values of g  for additional investments due to lower discount factors. Both fac-
tors – technological complementary and additional financial slack due to previous investments – lead to increas-
ing benefits. This leads to a second assumption: 
i
K
Y Y′ > i
 
Assumption 2 - (A2): The present value of benefit flows i i i ig (Y | x ,Y )′  is supermodular in . iY
 
However, the expected benefits from a technology will also depend on other relevant attributes of the firm, 
ix . For example, a Knowledge Management solution may yield benefits to a large firm with many employees, 
but be totally irrelevant to a micro-enterprise with just one or two employees. Thus, even though complementari-
ties, learning-by-doing effects or an acceleration mechanism via previous investments might be present, this 
does not necessarily imply that all firms will adopt all K  technologies. Note that neither (A1) nor (A2) specify 
the relation of  and C  with respect to ig i i .  
The net present value  of switching from  to iG Y Y , Y Y′ > , is defined as: 
 
(5.3) i i i i i i i i i iG | x , Y ) g (Y | x ,Y (Y | x ,Y )′ ′ ′ . 
 
A profit maximizing firm will invest into Y Y′ >  if .  G 0>
 
Theorem 1: Assume (A1) and (A2), then the net present value  is supermodular in . iG iY
Proof: If (A1) and (A2) hold,  is supermodular in  by definition.   iG
Theorem 1 states that if any of the above discussed effects apply and technologies are not substitutes, there 
can be an endogenous acceleration mechanism: Each technology becomes more “attractive” to the firm the more 
other related technologies it also uses.  
Two caveats are worth to reiterate at this point: First, theorem 1 does not imply that all firms will eventually 
adopt all  technologies since  also depends on K iG ix  with an undetermined effect. Second, theorem 1 does 
also not imply that firms will install all technologies simultaneously. A simple reason could be that prices and 
qualities of the technologies change at different rates over time, such that it makes sense to delay the adoption of 
some technologies while adopting others immediately. Also, firms may not have complete information about all 
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technologies when they are first introduced to the market. Thus, asynchronous adoption may occur due to epi-
demic effects: firms might be “infected” by information about each technology at different times, instead of re-
ceiving all information about all technologies at once. 
5.2. A logistic model of technology adoption 
 
In the real world, the net present value  of installing one or more additional technologies will not be di-
rectly observable. What is observable, however, is the result of the investment decision - , the vector of bi-
nary indicator variables describing whether a firm has adopted a particular technology or not. The index for each 
technology is  with  and  if firm  has adopted technology  and  otherwise. Since  
is a vector of  binary arguments, Theorem 1 implies that G  for each additional technology is increasing in 
the number  of other adopted related technologies. Firms adopt if the non-observable la-
tent variable  exceeds a critical value 
iG
1
iY
0j
K
i, j−
*
ijy
j 1...K=
1,2,...,K∈
ijy =
−
i j ijy = iY
ij
k [0, 1]
*y , which depends on the net present value of technology , : j ijG
 
(5.4)  * *ij ij ijG 0 y y y> → > → = 1 . 
 
Theorem 2: Assume (A1) and (A2) - The probability to adopt ijP(y 1)=  is an increasing function of the 
number of other related technologies a firm also uses. 
Proof: Apply Theorem 1 to (5.4).  
 
Theorem 2 can be explicitly tested. We introduce a term α  to describe the baseline probability to adopt a 
technology at time t of the observation and an error term iε  to capture unobserved heterogeneity of firms which 
is independent from ix  and . For simplicity, we assume an index function with a linear structure. This 
yields 
i, jk −
 
(5.5) *ij i i, j iy x k −′= α + β + γ + ε  
 
where  is the count number of other related technologies that the firm also uses. Given that diffusion 
processes can often be well described by a logistic function (Griliches 1957, Mansfield 1961), we assume that 
the error terms  are independently distributed following a logistic probability density function. Then we can 
write the probability of firm  to adopt technology  as 
i, jk −
iε
i j
 
(5.6) *ij ij i i, j
i i,
1y P(y 1| x , k )
1 exp( x k )− −
= = = ′+ −α − β − γ j
 
 
The log-likelihood for observation i  is consequently a function of ( i i, jx , k , y− i ) given the data: 
 
(5.7) i i i i, j
i i
( , ) y log[G( x k )]
(1 y ) log[1 G( x k )]
−
−
′β γ = α + β + γ +
′− − α + β + γ
l
i, j
 
 
where G is the logistic cdf. The unknown parameters α , ′β  and γ  can be estimated by maximizing (5.7) 
given the data. Positive and significant estimates of γ  and strictly increasing values of  for higher values of 
 would  support theorem 2. 
γ
i, jk −
Equation (5.7) was estimated using a large sample of enterprise data from the June 2002 e-Business Market 
W@tch survey. The dataset has no time dimension but contains a homogenous coverage of 15 sectors in the four 
largest European countries and a wide range of technology variables. The considered K  related technolo-
gies and their relative frequency of occurrence is listed in Table 12. Each of these solutions serves a different 
purpose for supporting processes and information flows within a company, or between a company and its envi-
11=
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ronment. Only specific e-business applications are included in the analysis, not the platform technologies that 
these applications run on (e.g. Intranet or LAN). This choice was made in order to compare only technologies 
that are on the same level of conceptualization17. Because some basic ICT are prerequisites for the usage of any 
e-business technology, those enterprises that did not fulfill these basic requirements (computers, Internet access, 
email usage and WWW usage) are excluded from the sample18.  
Table 12 shows pronounced differences in observed occurrence among the 11 e-business technologies. While 
some applications, like purchasing online (Purch) and sharing documents online to perform collaborative work 
within a company (Share doc), had already gained wide acceptance among companies in June 2002, other appli-
cations, such as Supply Chain Management (SCM) and Knowledge Management (KMS), were not widely dif-
fused yet. According to rank effects theory, this could be explained by different expectations of firms regarding 
the benefits and the costs of various technologies. Both sharing documents online and purchasing online are ap-
plications with immediately obvious benefits and comparably low setup costs19. SCM and KMS, on the other 
side, are relatively complex specialized solutions that often involve considerable implementation, maintenance, 
and integration efforts.  
 
Table 12 – Relative frequency of 11 related e-business technologies 
Technology Occurrence 
in sample 
Content Management System (CMS) 14.4% 
E-learning 17.2% 
Sharing documents online to perform collaborative work within company
(Share doc) 
46.5% 
Customer Relationship Management System (CRM) 12.0% 
Designing new products online (Design) 18.8% 
Purchasing online (Purch) 46.9% 
Selling online (Sell) 15.6% 
Human Resource Management System (HRM) 18.4% 
Enterprise Resource Planning System (ERP) 16.6% 
Knowledge Management System (KMS) 8.0% 
Supply Chain Management System (SCM) 3.6% 
N=4,852, all firms included have computers, Internet access, use the WWW, and email. 
Unweighted results. 
Abbreviations in ( ) indicate variable names for the regression analyses.  
 
The sample distribution of the parameter , which includes all eleven technologies from , is shown in the 
next figure. The average enterprise in the sample has 2.18 installed technologies from group  in June 2002, 
the median value is 2. Only 3 (0.1%) out of 4,852 enterprises in the sample had installed all 11 technologies, 
while 966 (19.9%) had installed none of the above, although all enterprises had the necessary technological pre-
requisites available (computers, Internet access, usage of WWW and email). The distribution of  clearly indi-
cates that most enterprises in the sample were still in an early stage of e-business development at the time of the 
survey (78.1% of all enterprises have less than 4 technologies from  installed), while a few firms were already 
very advanced (1.9% have more than 7 technologies installed). Thus, there is considerable variance in the sam-
ple in terms of e-business usage of firms.  
ik K
K
ik
K
In the terms of Dosi (1982), one can interpret parameter  as a proxy of the technological development level 
of firm i  on the given trajectory. The higher , the more “advanced” firm  is on the e-business trajectory. 
Similarly, the distribution of all k ’s could be interpreted as the distribution of firms on the trajectory.  
ik
ik i
i
___________ 
17 Including infrastructural technologies like LAN, WAN, Extranet, and Intranet in the regression does not change the 
main results: Compare Köllinger and Schade (2004). 
18 Again, it is also possible to include these observations and add the technological prerequisites to the analysis as a part 
of K. This also does not change the main regression results. However, it would confound the effects we are interested in with 
plain technological dependence.  
19 Purchasing online does not necessarily require the installation of an e-procurement technology, it could also be realized 
by simple participation in online marketplaces via  WWW. 
 70
0%
5%
10%
15%
20%
25%
30%
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11
 
Figure 4  - Relative frequency of overall k’s 
 
Two different versions of regression model (5.7) were estimated. The first version treats the technology pa-
rameter i, jk −
20 as an integer variable. We are interested in whether the adoption probabilities for any of the 
 technologies increases in . However, there might also be non-linear effects. Thus, in order to iden-
tify whether adoption probabilities are strictly increasing in 
K 11= i, jk −
i, jk − , a second version of all models was estimated 
with  coded in 5 categories. The highest category ( ) typically contains around 10% of all observa-
tions. Categories with less observations do not change the main results, however they tend to yield insignificant 
parameter estimates. In addition to , 
i,k j− i,k − j ≥ 4
i,k − j ix  control variables are included in the regression, namely country of 
residence, size class, sector membership and whether a firm has more than one establishments. According to de-
scriptive evidence on e-business usage, it can be expected that these control variables have a strong influence on 
the results (European E-Business Market W@tch 2004, OECD 2004, Preissl 2003). 
All elements in ix  are specified as dummy variables. Thus, the regression coefficients of ix  can be inter-
preted as group-specific differences in adoption probability with respect to the pre-specified reference groups 
which are indicated at the bottom of the respective tables. To identify the significance of each coefficient in the 
regression, robust covariance estimates are employed using the sandwich estimation procedure (Huber 1967, 
White 1982, Lian, Zeger and Qaqish 1992). The sandwich estimation procedure has the desirable properties of 
yielding asymptotically consistent covariance standard error estimates without making distributional assump-
tions. Thus, the significance levels of the estimated parameters are independent of our assumption that G is the 
logistic cdf. The large sample size in our study makes robust covariance estimates particularly attractive (Kau-
ermann and Carroll 2001).  
We analyzed the adoption probability for each of the K 11=  technologies separately. Tables 10-12 present 
the results with  as an integer variable, tables 13-15 the results for the same technologies with k  coded in 
five categories.  
i, jk − i, j−
___________ 
20  is the count of installed e-business technologies from group K for each enterprise, excluding the technology under 
sc  Thus,  varies for each firm according to which technology is used as a dependent variable. 
 i, jk −
rutiny. i, jk −
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Table 13 – Logit regression results for 4 e-business technologies (k as integer) 
 CMS E-learning Share doc CRM 
Co-variables     
Sector     
Publishing 0,663** -0,037 0,257 -0,095 
Chemicals 0,115 -0,340 0,248 0,215 
Metal products -0,475 0,019 -0,076 -0,310 
Machinery -0,168 -0,341 0,095 -0,147 
Electronics 0,293 -0,170 0,400* 0,073 
Transport equip. -0,363 -0,190 -0,124 -0,144 
Retail 0,047 0,040 -0,363 0,190 
Tourism 0,527* 0,093 -0,334 0,255 
Monetary services 0,384 0,587* 0,791** 0,409 
Insurances 0,682* 0,381 0,340 0,706* 
Real estate 0,500 0,006 0,508** -0,011 
Business services 0,369 0,203 0,302 0,122 
ICT services 0,814** 0,238 0,501** 0,885** 
Health services -0,069 0,252 0,276 -0,796* 
Country     
Germany 0,080 0,266* -0,625** 0,524** 
Italy 0,605** 0,460** -0,519** 0,462** 
France -0,067 0,738** -0,230* 0,665** 
Size class     
50-249 empl. 0,334** -0,306** 0,537** 0,214* 
> 250 empl. 0,546** -0,128 0,656** 0,824** 
> 1 establishments 0,227* 0,210* 0,106 0,136 
i, jk −  0,360** 0,497** 0,541** 0,543** 
Constant -3,441** -3,245** -1,180** -4,411** 
 
Model Diagnostics 
N 4,843 4,843 4,843 4,843 
Pseudo-R2 0.1311 0.1550 0.1553 0.2267 
LL -1,740 -1,878 -2,826 -1,371 
Prob > chi2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Note: All firms included have computers, Internet access, use the WWW, and email. 
*: sign. at 95%, **: sign. at 99%. 
Reference categories: Food sector, France, 1-49 empl., one establishment. 
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Table 14  - Logit regression results for 4 e-business technologies (k as integer) 
 Design Purch Sell HRM 
Co-variables     
Sector     
Publishing 1,112** 0,352* 1,006** 0,250 
Chemicals 0,639* -0,212 0,035 0,476 
Metal products 0,570* -0,147 -0,258 0,634* 
Machinery 0,659** 0,186 -0,345 0,751** 
Electronics 0,895** 0,489** -0,004 0,691** 
Transport equip. 0,801** 0,110 0,192 0,488 
Retail 0,060 0,179 1,029** 0,257 
Tourism 0,391 0,078 1,911** 0,248 
Monetary services -0,103 0,118 0,749** 0,739** 
Insurances 0,137 -0,250 0,780** 0,707* 
Real estate -0,030 -0,041 0,252 0,697* 
Business services 0,577* 0,486** 0,014 0,821** 
ICT services 1,067** 1,436** 0,552* 0,572* 
Health services 0,086 0,039 -0,401 1,096** 
Country     
Germany -0,298* 1,365** 0,647** -0,481** 
Italy -0,011 -0,106 -0,010 -0,023 
France -0,019 0,953** 0,375** 0,328** 
Size class     
50-249 empl. 0,050 -0,108 -0,199 0,743** 
> 250 empl. 0,123 -0,403** -0,101 1,141** 
> 1 establishments 0,193* 0,000 0,135 0,210* 
i, jk −  0,329** 0,284** 0,300** 0,502** 
Constant -2,796** -1,324** -3,153** -3,846** 
 
Model Diagnostics 
N 4,843 4,843 4,843 4,843 
Pseudo-R2 0.1017 0.1221 0.1207 0.1979 
LL -2,102 -2,939 -1,846 -1,852 
Prob > chi2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Note: All firms included have computers, Internet access, use the WWW, and email. 
*: sign. at 95%, **: sign. at 99%. 
Reference categories: Food sector, France, 1-49 empl., one establishment. 
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Table 15  - Logit regression results for 3 e-business technologies (k as integer) 
 ERP KMS SCM 
Co-variables    
Sector    
Publishing -0,856** 0,354 -1,071* 
Chemicals 0,331 0,461 -0,351 
Metal products 0,258 0,099 -0,207 
Machinery 0,429* 0,065 -0,168 
Electronics 0,459* -0,095 -0,408 
Transport equip. 0,359 -0,559 0,262 
Retail -0,855** 0,609 -0,492 
Tourism -1,294** -0,034 -0,956* 
Monetary services -1,588** 0,407 -2,421** 
Insurances -1,638** 0,384 -1,132* 
Real estate -1,473** 0,708 -0,623 
Business services -0,929** 0,708* -1,770** 
ICT services -0,456* 0,839* -1,482** 
Health services -1,352** 0,972** -1,192** 
Country    
Germany -0,370** 0,615** 0,118 
Italy 0,284* 1,228** 0,277 
France -1,144** 0,373 0,247 
Size class    
50-249 empl. 1,130** 0,028 0,360 
> 250 empl. 1,533** -0,093 0,758** 
> 1 establishments 0,126 0,338* 0,029 
i, jk −  0,376** 0,548** 0,533** 
Constant -2,614** -5,234** -4,780** 
 
Model Diagnostics 
N 4,843 4,843 4,843 
Pseudo-R2 0.2191 0.2112 0.2070 
LL -1,704 -1,068 -594 
Prob > chi2 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Note: All firms included have computers, Internet access, use the WWW, and email. 
*: sign. at 95%, **: sign. at 99%. 
Reference categories: Food sector, France, 1-49 empl., one establishment. 
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Table 1 - Logit regression results for 4 e-business technologies (k in 5 categories) 
 CMS E-learning Share doc CRM 
Co-variables     
Sector  
Publishing 0,710** -0,059 0,264 0,008 
Chemicals 0,131 -0,383 0,239 0,188 
Metal products -0,457 -0,025 -0,091 -0,319 
Machinery -0,119 -0,368 0,085 -0,143 
Electronics 0,377 -0,142 0,399* 0,164 
Transport equip. -0,314 -0,186 -0,137 -0,123 
Retail 0,076 0,041 -0,374 0,201 
Tourism 0,565* 0,081 -0,336 0,313 
Monetary services 0,401 0,531* 0,786** 0,400 
Insurances 0,676* 0,345 0,339 0,661* 
Real estate 0,503 -0,050 0,513** -0,046 
Business services 0,400 0,186 0,307 0,181 
ICT services 0,897** 0,246 0,507** 0,948** 
Health services -0,012 0,257 0,293 -0,666 
Country     
Germany 0,127 0,291* -0,635** 0,564** 
Italy 0,630** 0,482** -0,518** 0,522** 
France -0,006 0,740** -0,238* 0,701** 
Size class     
50-249 empl. 0,343** -0,351** 0,526** 0,204 
> 250 empl. 0,608** -0,081 0,678** 0,890** 
> 1 establishments 0,271** 0,259** 0,124 0,205 
i, jk 1− =  0,208 1,009** 0,572** 0,684* 
i, jk 2− =  0,511** 1,733** 1,244** 1,456** 
i, jk 3− =  1,005** 2,425** 1,984** 2,123** 
i, jk 4− ≥  1,664** 3,016** 2,353** 2,909** 
Constant -3,413** -3,868** -1,244** -4,781** 
 
Model Diagnostics 
N 4,843 4,843 4,843 4,843 
Pseudo-R2 0.1198 0.1574 0.1540 0.2048 
LL -1,763 -1,873 -2,830 -1,410 
Prob > chi2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Note: All firms included have computers, Internet access, use the WWW, and email. 
*: sign. at 95%, **: sign. at 99%. 
Reference categories: Food sector, France, 1-49 empl., one establishment, i, jk 0− = . 
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Table 16  - Logit regression results for 4 e-business technologies (k in 5 categories) 
 Design Purch Sell HRM 
Co-variables     
Sector     
Publishing 1,121** 0,347* 1,015** 0,293 
Chemicals 0,631* -0,222 0,014 0,469 
Metal products 0,570* -0,159 -0,266 0,614* 
Machinery 0,676** 0,188 -0,345 0,742** 
Electronics 0,914** 0,486** 0,032 0,718** 
Transport equip. 0,805** 0,112 0,215 0,495 
Retail 0,077 0,182 1,039** 0,274 
Tourism 0,400 0,076 1,924** 0,264 
Monetary services -0,100 0,111 0,729** 0,713** 
Insurances 0,139 -0,262 0,762** 0,686* 
Real estate -0,044 -0,050 0,238 0,698** 
Business services 0,598* 0,492** 0,037 0,838** 
ICT services 1,095** 1,434** 0,606* 0,650** 
Health services 0,115 0,055 -0,366 1,139** 
Country     
Germany -0,275* 1,379** 0,666** -0,445** 
Italy 0,005 -0,095 0,014 0,008 
France -0,002 0,959** 0,400** 0,327** 
Size class     
50-249 empl. 0,027 -0,131 -0,218* 0,698** 
> 250 empl. 0,174 -0,394** -0,044 1,163** 
> 1 establishments 0,225* 0,009 0,161 0,259** 
i, jk 1− =  0,395** 0,323** 0,287 1,274** 
i, jk 2− =  0,835** 0,647** 0,695** 1,768** 
i, jk 3− =  1,216** 1,080** 1,209** 2,429** 
i, jk 4− ≥  1,732** 1,382** 1,548** 3,086** 
Constant -2,944** -1,374** -3,263** -4,578** 
 
Model Diagnostics 
N 4,843 4,843 4,843 4,843 
Pseudo-R2 0.0982 0.1224 0.1185 0.1945 
LL -2,110 -2,938 -1,851 -1,860 
Prob > chi2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Note: All firms included have computers, Internet access, use the WWW, and email. 
*: sign. at 95%, **: sign. at 99%. 
Reference categories: Food sector, France, 1-49 empl., one establishment, i, jk 0− = . 
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Table 17  - Logit regression results for 3 e-business technologies (k in 5 categories) 
 ERP KMS SCM 
Co-variables    
Sector    
Publishing -0,811** 0,420 -0,879 
Chemicals 0,339 0,414 -0,339 
Metal products 0,265 0,085 -0,207 
Machinery 0,433* 0,073 -0,093 
Electronics 0,476* 0,054 -0,226 
Transport equip. 0,375 -0,454 0,307 
Retail -0,813** 0,599 -0,435 
Tourism -1,269** 0,035 -0,841 
Monetary services -1,547** 0,355 -2,218** 
Insurances -1,607** 0,324 -1,132* 
Real estate -1,492** 0,670 -0,622 
Business services -0,891** 0,715* -1,535** 
ICT services -0,360 0,934** -1,141** 
Health services -1,289** 0,977** -1,009* 
Country    
Germany -0,352** 0,653** 0,249 
Italy 0,319** 1,227** 0,363 
France -1,084** 0,461* 0,386 
Size class    
50-249 empl. 1,108** 0,012 0,335 
> 250 empl. 1,570** 0,085 0,884** 
> 1 establishments 0,169** 0,424** 0,129 
i, jk 1− =  0,843** 1,017** 0,600 
i, jk 2− =  1,146** 1,309** 0,709 
i, jk 3− =  1,521** 2,270** 1,681** 
i, jk 4− ≥  2,156** 3,185** 2,906** 
Constant -2,998** -5,729** -5,047** 
 
Model Diagnostics 
N 4,843 4,843 4,843 
Pseudo-R2 0.2130 0.1898 0.1845 
LL -1,717 -1,097 -611 
Prob > chi2 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Note: All firms included have computers, Internet access, use the WWW, and email. 
*: sign. at 95%, **: sign. at 99%. 
Reference categories: Food sector, France, 1-49 empl., one establishment, i, jk 0− = . 
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All 22 models show highly significant, positive coefficients for i,k . Also, in the 11 models with  
coded in categories, the group with  always has the highest, and the group with  always the 
lowest probability to adopt. The regression coefficients for the intervals in between these two extremes are al-
most linearly increasing in . This supports Theorem 2 and Hypothesis 10, which stated that the probability 
to adopt is an increasing function of the number of other related technologies a firm already uses. In other 
words, the more advanced a firm already is in the adoption of e-business, the more likely it is to “go another 
step” and vice versa. On the grounds of this observation, we can hypothesis a growing “digital divide” among 
firm: There are pioneers with very timely adoption of many e-business technologies and other firms that never 
adopt any such technology. Given the observed adoption pattern, the gap between the two extremes will grow as 
long as the observed acceleration mechanism is at work. This idea is further explored in chapter 6.3.  
i, jk − ≥ 4 i, jk − = 0
i, jk −
i, jk −j−
Furthermore, Hypothesis 1 claimed that diffusion patterns will vary among industries. This is certainly also 
supported by our results. For example, firms in the retail sector are more likely to adopt online sales than the 
food, beverages and tobacco sector; but the opposite is true for ERP systems. Naturally, these sector differences 
in adoption reflect differences in market structure but also differences in the type of activities pursued in the 
various sectors. Consequently, firms from different sectors may have varying net present values of technologies 
which leads to different adoption decisions.  
The results also provide strong support for Hypothesis 3, stating that large firms will be faster in adopting 
technologies that are primarily used in-house, exhibiting positive returns to scale. Such technologies are CMS, 
sharing documents online internally, CRM, HRM, ERP and KMS. For all of the above, large firms have a sig-
nificantly higher adoption probability. Vice versa, positive size effects are not as pronounced and in some cases 
even reversed for those e-business technologies that primarily deal with processes and information flows that are 
connected to the environment of the firm, and not primarily internal. E.g., E-learning, online collaboration with 
business partners to design new products (Design) and selling online do not exhibit significantly higher adoption 
probabilities of larger enterprises.  
The regression results provide mixed evidence on Hypothesis 11 which argued that industries with ex ante 
better knowledge of ICT will have higher probabilities to adopt e-business technologies due to learning effects 
and experience-based advantages. Generally “IT savvy” industries are those that are either involved in the pro-
duction of ICT goods or services (electronics, ICT services, business services) and those that traditionally ex-
hibit high levels of IT use (monetary services, insurances, transport equipment manufacturers). The evidence is 
mixed, and results vary greatly among different e-business technologies. For example, firms from the ICT ser-
vices sector exhibit very high adoption probabilities for purchasing online, CRM, CMS, Design, Share doc, sell-
ing online, KMS and HRM. However, they also show significantly lower adoption probabilities than the “IT-
distant” food sector for ERP and SCM solutions, primarily because ERP and SCM solutions help to optimize 
material and information flows in manufacturing businesses, they are generally less relevant  in the services in-
dustries.  
Hypothesis 2stated that industries with high levels of competition and high concentration ratios will be 
among the group of early adopters of a technology. This is not directly supported by our results. For example, 
the transport equipment sector which has the highest industry concentration ratio of all sectors included in the 
sample (e-Business W@tch 2002), shows only average or below average adoption probabilities for most tech-
nologies. No clear statement can be made about the relationship of competition levels and adoption probability 
provided our data and results because our data do not allow unambiguous inference about the level of competi-
tion each firm in the sample is facing.  
5.3. A simultaneous equation model of technology adoption 
 
The econometric results of the previous section hinge on a number of  fairly strict assumptions. In this sec-
tion, three of these assumptions are relaxed to gain more conclusive evidence on the technological interdepend-
encies outlined above. In particular, we are interested to check whether the acceleration mechanism identified in 
the previous section is endogenous (as suggested by the theory) or merely a statistical artifact of some unob-
served factor which is driving the results, such as an “inherent need” of firms to invest in e-business technolo-
gies.  
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For this purpose, an iterative, simultaneous equation framework can be used. In particular this allows to re-
lax the following assumptions from the previous section. First, we do not assume anymore that all technologies 
have an equal influence on one another. The parameter i, jk −  does not distinguish between technologies, it only 
counts them one by one. It might be that the regression results on i, jk −  depend on only a few of the analyzed 
technologies, while others have a negligible or even negative influence. This is addressed by analyzing techno-
logical interdependencies in a pair-wise manner. Second, we allow for unobservable factors that might have a 
joint, systematic influence on the adoption of technologies. This enables to distinguish between the direct influ-
ence of technologies on another and exogenous factors that drive adoption decisions. Third, the possibility of 
simultaneous adoption decisions is explicitly accounted for by setting up an iterative simultaneous equation 
framework instead of assuming that all technologies other than the one under scrutiny are exogenous.  
Obtaining estimation results is possible because we are not interested in the precise marginal effect of each 
explanatory factor, a consistent estimate of its direction is sufficient for our purposes. Mainly, we want to know 
the pair-wise relationship of technologies and whether they provide evidence for the acceleration mechanism 
identified in the aggregate analysis. Consistent estimates of partial effects will suffice for this purpose because 
we are only interested in the sign and the significance level of the coefficients, not in their absolute magnitude.  
The following recursive simultaneous bivariate probit model is considered: 
 
(5.8) 1 2 2 1 2 2P(y 1, y 1| x) (x y , x , )′ ′= = = Φ β + δ β ρ  
 
with  being the bivariate normal cdf. The corresponding latent variable equations are: 2Φ
 
(5.9) 
*
11 1 2
*
2 2 2
y x y
y x
′= β + δ + ε
′= β + ε  
 
In this study, the variables have the following meaning: 
1y  - technology 1 
2y  - technology 2 
1x  - a constant term 
2x - a dummy vector indicating the home country of a firm 
3x - a dummy vector indicating the sector of a firm 
4x - a dummy vector indicating the size class of a firm 
5x - a dummy that indicates if the firm has more than one establishment 
 
All other technologies are excluded from the respective models. The following assumption are necessary for 
identification: 
 
(5.10) 
1 2E( | x) E( | x) 0ε = ε =
1 2
1 2
Var( | x) Var( | x) 1
Cov( | x)
ε = ε =
ε ε = ρ
 
 
Also, the error terms must be independent from x . Both equations contain an intercept term in x . Note that 
this is a recursive, simultaneous-equations model. It has some desirable properties that are worth mentioning. As 
Maddala (1983, p. 123), Burnett (1997) and Greene (2003, pp. 715-719) show, the endogenous nature of one of 
the variables on the right-hand side of the equation can be ignored in formulating the log-likelihood. Thus, the 
log-likelihood for (5.9) is the same as for a standard bivariate probit model of the form 
 
(5.11) 
*
1
2
1 1
*
2 2
y x
y x
′= β + ε
′= β + ε  
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in connection with (5.10). This enables to use a standard bivariate probit estimation procedure for (5.9) that 
is implemented in econometric packages like STATA. The second nice property of the model is that it allows a 
rigorous test for the presence of some unobserved factor which influences both  and  simultaneously. If 
the error terms of both equations are not correlated, 
1y 2y
0ρ = , this suggests that there is no joint unobserved factor 
that influences both variables. In this case, one can ignore ρ  and simply run single equation models for  and 
 separately. One can evaluate  with a Wald test. The correlation of the error term has its own inter-
pretation: It measures (roughly) the correlation of  and  after controlling for the direct effect of  on . 
Any such correlation is an indicator of some third unobserved factor that systematically influences both vari-
ables. Note, however, that there might be an unobserved factor which systematically influences  but not  
or vice versa. This would not show up in , however it would still lead to scaling biases in running the single 
equation models. However, neglected heterogeneity still leads to consistent estimates of the direction and the 
magnitude of β  in probit models. To illustrate, consider the following model 
1y
2y H0 : 0ρ =
ρ
1y 2y 2y 1y
2y1y
 
(5.12) P(y 1| x,c) (x c)′= = Φ β + γ  
 
and the equivalent latent variable equation 
 
(5.13) *y x c′= β + γ + ε . 
 
If x  includes an intercept, one can set E(c) 0=  without loss of generality. If c is independent of x , 
 and , running probit of y on 2c ~ N(0, )τ | x,c ~ N(0,1)ε x  consistently estimates . For the 
purpose of estimating the direction and magnitude of 
2 2 1/ 2ˆ /( 1)β = β γ τ +
β , this degree of accuracy is sufficient (Wooldridge 2002, 
pp. 470-472). Thus, we can consistently estimate β  up to scale in both parts of  (5.9)  even though  and 1ε 2ε  
might have unobserved systematic effects on  and  respectively that are independent of the other equation. 
Any unobserved effect that has a systematic effect on both  and  will be captured by ρ , as outlined above.  1
y y2
1y 2y
The further steps as follows: First, 11  bivariate regression models are estimated according to (5.8) 
to test for  between all technology pairs in our data. This is a specification test that indicates whether 
bivariate regression or singular equation regressions should be estimated. The results are reported in Table 18. 
Next, another 110 single equation regressions of all  on  have to be estimated. Then, according to the re-
sults of the Wald test of Table 18, the results of the appropriate regression model for  on  are reported in 
Table 19. If  is not rejected, the results from the single equation regression are reported, otherwise the 
results of the bivariate regression model. 
2 11 110− =
H0 : 0ρ =
H0 : ρ =
2y 1y
2y 1y
0
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Table 18 – Wald tests for pair-wise independence of regression equations 
 CMS Elear Share CRM Desig Purc Sell HRM ERP KM SCM 
CMS  .432 .086 
.37 
.026 
.89 
.614 .823 .219 .981 .011 
.38 
.000 
.63 
.000 
.51 
Elear .806  .991 .779 .000 
.99 
.611 .357 .904 .491 .720 .640 
Share .077 
.44 
.001 
.69 
 .161 .309 .422 .018 
.506 
.226 .075 
.20 
.609 .251 
CRM .419 .447 
 
.020 
.48 
 .608 .520 .834 .855 .019 
.40 
.014 
.80 
.003 
.61 
Desig .000 
.69 
.192 
 
.148 .008 
.65 
 .294 .063 
1 
.072 
.42 
.279 .009 
.61 
.004 
.36 
Purc .167 .627 
 
.057 
.68 
.887 .179  .04 
-.46 
.431 .137 .198 .059 
.39 
Sell .083 
.94 
.621 
 
.851 .000 
.82 
.000 
1 
.056 
.45 
 .000 
-.12 
.813 .633 .165 
HRM .223 .496 
 
.005 
.58 
.905 .062 
.67 
.942 .420  .050 
.80 
.001 
.71 
.000 
.41 
ERP .006 
.73 
.020 
.49 
.700 
 
.000 
.79 
.028 
.59 
.071 
.32 
.004 
.89 
.600 
 
 .000 
.75 
.002 
.49 
KM .497 .033 
-.43 
.157 .084 
.79 
.319 .841 .040 
1 
.423 .090 
.25 
 .047 
.70 
SCM .305 .301 
 
.354 .096 
.70 
.718 .91 .000 
.95 
.038 
.59 
.266 .297  
Table reports Wald test of rho=0, Prob > chi2 for bivariate probit SUR models with row 
regressed on column, robust covariance estimation. Significant values for Rho are re-
ported in italics. 
 
The results in Table 18 suggest that in 61 out of 110 cases, there is no unobserved effect that has a significant 
influence on both technologies, i.e.  cannot be rejected according to a Wald test. In these cases, the 
single equation model 
H0 : 0ρ =
 
(5.14) 2 2*
1 1 2 1
P(y 1| x, y ) (x y )
y x y
′= = Φ β + δ
′= β + δ + ε  
 
is appropriate to test for the direct effect of  on . Note that in these 61 cases,  and  are only related 
through the magnitude and size of . In the remaining 49 cases, model (5.9) is appropriate to measure the direct 
effects of  on  and the remaining correlation of both variables after controlling for  direct effects.  
2y 1y 1y 2yδ
2y 1y
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Table 19 – Direct relationships between technology pairs 
 CMS Elear Share CRM Desig Purc Sell HRM ERP KM SCM 
CMS  ++ o -- ++ ++ ++ ++ o -- -- 
Elear ++  ++ ++ -- ++ ++ ++ ++ ++ ++ 
Share o -  ++ ++ ++ - ++ o ++ ++ 
CRM ++ ++ o  ++ ++ ++ ++ o o o 
Desig -- ++ ++ --  ++ -- o ++ -- o 
Purc ++ ++ -- ++ ++  ++ ++ ++ ++ o 
Sell -- ++ ++ -- -- o  o ++ ++ ++ 
HRM ++ ++ o ++ -- ++ ++  ++ -- o 
ERP -- o ++ -- -- o -- ++  -- o 
KM ++ ++ ++ o ++ ++ -- ++ o  o 
SCM ++ ++ ++ o ++ ++ -- o ++ ++  
Table reports sign of the regression coefficients, technology row regressed on technol-
ogy column. The underlying regression model is single equation if Rho in Table  is not 
significant, and bivariate probit otherwise. All regression with robust standard error es-
timation. 
++ denotes a positive coefficient at >95% confidence 
+ denotes a positive coefficient at >90% confidence 
o denotes no significant direct influence 
- denotes a negative coefficient at >90% confidence 
-- denotes a negative coefficient at >95% confidence 
 
Table 19 displays the estimated direction of the direct effects of technology  (row) on technology  (col-
umn). Together with the results on ρ  in Table 18, they allow a detailed interpretation of the relationships of the 
55 analyzed technology pairs. It is crucial to consider the direct effects and possible unobserved factors that in-
fluence both technologies (
2y 1y
ρ ) together. There are 36 possible parameter combinations for each pair of technolo-
gies. Some of these combinations suggest that an endogenous acceleration mechanism between the two tech-
nologies exists, some would suggest the opposite (a “slowing down” or substitution effect), and some yield am-
biguous evidence. The findings are consolidated in Table 20 accordingly.  
 82
 
Table 20 – Interpretation of bivariate regression results 
Coeffi-
cient 
2way + 2way - 1way + 
1way 0 
1way – 
1way 0 
2way 0 1way + 
1way - 
Sum 
Rho  
2way 0 ++ 
16 
-- 
0 
+ 
0 
- 
0 
- 
0 
? 
0 
 
16 
1way 0 
1way + 
++ 
1 
? 
0 
+ 
9 
? 
0 
+ 
 
? 
17 
 
27 
2way + ++ 
0 
? 
1 
++ 
0 
? 
4 
+ 
4 
? 
0 
 
9 
1way 0 
1way - 
+ 
1 
- 
0 
? 
1 
- 
0 
- 
0 
? 
0 
 
2 
1way - 
1way + 
? 
0 
? 
0 
? 
1 
? 
0 
? 
0 
? 
0 
 
1 
2way - ? 
0 
-- 
0 
? 
0 
- 
0 
- 
0 
? 
0 
 
0 
Sum 18 1 11 4 4 17 55 
Table indicates which parameter constellation are evidence for or against the presence 
of an acceleration mechanism: 
++ strong positive evidence 
+ positive evidence 
? unclear effect 
- negative evidence 
-- strong negative evidence 
Numbers below indicate the count of technology pairs for which a parameter constella-
tion occurred.  
 
When  is zero or positive, technologies that have a positive direct impact on each other that goes both ways 
will exhibit an acceleration effect: The presence of one technology makes the adoption of the other more likely. 
Thus, they support Theorem 2. Vice versa, a negative direct effect of two technologies that goes both ways sug-
gests the opposite when ρ  is either zero or negative: The presence of one technology makes the adoption of the 
other less likely. The effect of  is particularly relevant for those technology pairs that have either no direct in-
fluence on another or a varying impact, depending on the direction of the relationship. For example, if two tech-
nologies have no direct influence on another (the parameter coefficients are not significantly different from zero 
in both directions – column 5), the presence of a significant and positive 
ρ
ρ
ρ  will still lead to an acceleration 
mechanism: The probability to adopt technology 2 will increase when a firm has adopted technology 1 and vice 
versa. However, this will only be due to some unobserved third factor which is driving the results, not due to a 
direct relationship of both technologies. In those cases where ρ  and the coefficients have opposite signs, the di-
rection of the total effect is ambiguous and will depend on the absolute magnitude of ρ  and the coefficients.  
Table 20 shows that 31 of the 55 technology pairs exhibit evidence for the presence of an acceleration mecha-
nism. 24 pairs have an undetermined effect, and no technology pair provides clear evidence against a possible 
acceleration mechanism.  
The 24 pairs with an undetermined effect require closer examination. In column one, we have one technology 
pair (KMS and E-Learning) with a two-way positive direct effect, but a one-way negative . The positive coef-
ficients indicate that each of the two makes the adoption of the other directly more likely. However, once we 
control for this significant direct effect, some firms that need E-Learning do not need KMS (negative ρ ).  
ρ
In column 2 we find one technology pair (Sell and Design) with negative direct effects but positive ρ  for 
both equations. This suggests that firms that use either one of these technologies are directly less likely to adopt 
the other. However, once we control for this direct effect, both technologies are perfectly correlated ( 1ρ = ), 
which suggests that they have a strong tendency to occur together due to some unobserved factors (e.g. the pres-
ence of other e-business technologies).  
Column 3 exhibits two additional technology pairs with undetermined effect which is due to different inher-
ent needs. The pair in row 4 (Sell and HRM) exhibits a positive direct effect of selling online on the probability 
to adopt HRM. However, once this direct effect is accounted for, some firms that use HRM have no need for 
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selling online (negative ρ ). A similar case appears in row 5 (Purc and Sell): Purchasing online has a direct 
positive influence on the probability to adopt online sales as well. However, after taking account of this effect, 
firms have different inherent needs which is reflected in a negative ρ : Some firms that do online purchasing 
have no need to sell online as well.  
Column 4 has four technologies which have a negative one-way direct relationship, but still a strong tendency 
to occur together due to unobserved exogenous effects. The technology pairs are ERP and CMS, ERP and CRM, 
ERP and KMS, and HRM and Design. In each case, the former has a negative direct effect on the occurrence of 
the latter. ERP systems can partially substitute the functionalities of specialized CMS, CRM or KMS systems. 
However, this depends on the configuration of the particular ERP system. Smaller ERP systems might rather be 
complements than substitutes to specialized solutions. This rationalizes the highly positive remaining correlation 
after controlling for the negative direct effect. 
In column 6 we find 17 technologies with a positive direct influence one way, and a negative or no direct in-
fluence (but a positive ) the other way. For these technology pairs, the order of adoption is important for 
whether an acceleration mechanism occurs or not. For example, firms that share documents online are more 
likely to adopt HRM as well, but HRM has no direct effect on sharing documents online. However, both tech-
nologies are likely to occur together because of the positive direct effect of sharing documents online on HRM.  
ρ
All together, out of the 55 technology pairs analyzed, all of them showed significant correlation – either due 
to a direct effect between the technologies, or due to joint exogenous factors. This shows that technological in-
terdependencies are crucial determinants of adoption decisions. The technological legacy of a firm has a system-
atic influence on its future technological development path. Hence, history matters and ignoring technological 
interdependencies in technology diffusion studies will likely lead to biased estimates.  
Furthermore, 31 of the analyzed pairs provide direct and unambiguous evidence for an endogenous accelera-
tion mechanism (the adoption of technology A makes adoption of technology B more likely and vice versa). 
This suggests that an endogenous acceleration mechanism of technological development can occur which is not 
purely the result of unobserved heterogeneity, as suggested by Theorem 2. 19 technology pairs provide mixed 
evidence: An acceleration mechanism can occur depending on which technology is installed first, and only 4 
technology pairs suggest that technology A makes adoption of technology B less likely. For three of these 4 
technologies we can suspect a partial substitution effect, in which case Theorem 2 does not apply and we would 
not expect an acceleration effect anyway. However, these 4 technology pairs are still strongly positively corre-
lated due to exogenous factors (such as other technologies). Thus, the predominant share of analyzed technology 
pairs suggests that an endogenous acceleration mechanism can occur, which is in accordance to our theory.  
5.4. CART – identification of clusters with different adoption probabilities 
 
Up to this point, two parametric approaches were used to test technological interdependencies and their influ-
ence on adoption decisions. In this section, a novel non-parametric technique is introduced to identify clusters of 
firms that exhibit significant differences in their adoption probability. The analysis complements the parametric 
results in three ways: First, CART simultaneously identifies clusters and significant predictor variables that char-
acterize the clusters. An identification of clusters is not possible with parametric regression models. The cluster 
results from the CART analysis are of high practical value for marketing purposes because they allow qualified 
predictions about the adoption probability of a firm for various technologies, based on very few (only the most 
relevant) parameters. Marketers of e-business technologies and consultants can use the results to evaluate for a 
given customer which investment into e-business technologies the customer is most likely to undertake next. 
Also, the identification of clusters allows to focus marketing activities on those market segments that are most 
likely to purchase. Second, CART identifies complex, non-linear relationships between technological and struc-
tural variables (such as firm size and market of operation) that were not captured by the parametric models pre-
sented above. As such, they provide unique and additional insights into the relationships that are present in the 
data. Third, CART relaxes important restrictions of parametric models: It does not make any assumptions about 
the distribution of error terms and the functional form of the explanatory variables. Also, CART is robust to out-
liers and invariant to monotone transformations of predictors (Gatnar 2002). Thus, the identification of relevant 
predictor variables and clusters is independent from any prior assumption that might not actually be justified by 
the data. Finally, in contrast to the parametric regression models, CART uses an out-of-sample validation proce-
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dure to eliminate an over-fitting of the model. For all of the above reasons, CART can be used to “double 
check” the results of the earlier sections: If CART detects relationships in the data that are inconsistent with the 
parametric regression results, this suggests that the parametric results might be erroneously influenced by their 
restrictive assumptions. 
CART was first introduced by Breiman et. al. (1984). It can loosely be codified as a combination of non-
parametric regression and cluster analysis. The result, a “tree” presented in graphic form, is both parsimonious 
and easy to interpret. CART has recently been used in numerous studies in the medical sciences (Zhang and 
Bracken, 1995; Zhang and Singer, 1999) with a focus on classifying patients into risk groups. For example, this 
is important for physicians in emergency rooms who need to decide on appropriate levels of medical care for ar-
riving patients when only few clinical factors are available. To my knowledge, however, the application of 
CART in a managerial or economic context is still novel. Therefore, a short description of the method is in-
cluded at this point and a short technical introduction to CART is given in Appendix 1.  
The basic idea of CART is to systematically split the dataset into homogeneous groups with respect to the de-
pendent variable based on the best set of predictors. The final tree is computed in four steps.  
In the first step, called recursive partitioning, the sample of subjects is systematically sorted into completely 
homogeneous subsets until a saturated tree is found. In this study, complete homogeneity means that a node con-
tains either only adopters or non-adopters. The root node of a tree contains the sample of subjects from which 
the tree is grown. Then, based on the parameter value that is most predictive for the outcome, the root node is 
split into two daughter nodes that now form a second layer of the tree. All nodes in the same layer constitute a 
partition of the root node. The process of splitting nodes is continued and the partition becomes finer and finer 
as the layer gets deeper and deeper. For each split, CART considers the entire set of available predictor variables 
to determine which one maximizes the homogeneity of the following two daughter nodes. This is a hierarchical 
process that reveals interdependencies between covariates. Also, a predictor might show up numerous times in 
different parts of the tree. Each case of the sample is sorted into one of the daughter nodes at each layer of the 
tree, according to the splitting rule that was used. Those subsets that are not split are called terminal nodes. 
When a case finally moves into a terminal subset, its predicted class is given by the class label attached to that 
terminal subset (e.g. “adopter {Y=1}” or “non-adopter {Y=0}” for node t). The process is continued until the 
nodes are completely homogeneous and cannot be split any further. This is the saturated tree. The saturated tree 
is usually too large to be useful. In the worst case, it is trivial because each terminal node could consist of just 
one case. The resulting model is subject to over-fitting problems. Therefore, one must find a nested sub-tree of 
the saturated tree that exhibits the best “true” classification performance and satisfies statistical inference meas-
ures. 
To proceed, a series of nested optimal sub-trees of the saturated tree is generated. This second step in the 
process is called pruning. The cost-complexity pruning algorithm suggested by Breiman et. al. (1984) is used 
here, which ensures that a uniquely best sub-tree can be found  for any given tree complexity.  
In a third step, one of the trees must be selected from the pruning sequence. The solutions lies in finding an 
honest estimate for the true classification performance and selecting the sub-tree that minimizes the estimated 
true misclassification costs. This is usually done with an independent test sample, boot-strapping, or cross-
validation. In this study, a 20-fold cross validation procedure is employed because it makes better use of the in-
formation contained in the original dataset than the independent test sample method and outperforms bootstrap-
ping in terms of reduced bias (Breiman et. al., 1984, pp. 72-78, 311-313).21  
Following these steps, the best classifying tree can be identified. However, because we are mainly interested 
in interpreting the revealed structures, it must also be ensured that the model satisfies the usual significance tests. 
The final tree is computed by calculating significance tests for all splits in the tree and dropping those splits (and 
their successors) that are not significant at the 95% confidence level or above. 
The same dataset as before is used for the CART analysis, originating from the June 2002 enterprise survey 
of the e-Business Market W@tch. CARTs are computed for all 11 technologies listed in Table 12. For each of 
the technologies, the remaining 10 technologies are included as predictors and all additional predictor variables 
are listed in Table 21. No abbreviation is specified for variables that did not show up as a relevant predictor in 
any of the 11 trees.7 
___________ 
21 Estimation was carried out with CART 5.0 by Salford Systems. 
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Table 21 – Predictor variables in CART models 
Predictor variable Abbreviation 
Country COUNTRY 
Sector SECTOR 
Sizeclass SIZE 
Company has a website (yes/no) WEBSITE 
More than one establishment (yes/no) N/A 
Company offers in-house computer or IT training (yes/no) N/A 
Company offers employees to participate in computer or IT train-
ing offered by third parties (yes/no) 
N/A 
Company provides tools for self-learning, for instance books or 
software (yes/no) 
N/A 
Company offers employees to use some of their working time for 
learning activities (yes/no) 
N/A 
Company judgement on importance of informal “learning on the 
job” (very, fairly, less, not important) 
N/A 
Company judgement on importance of formal training schemes 
(very, fairly, less, not important) 
N/A 
Company judgement on importance of self-learning activities 
(very, fairly, less, not important) 
N/A 
Company has recruited or tried to recruit staff with special IT 
skills during the last 12 months (yes/no) 
IT_STAFF 
Company has experienced difficulties in finding staff with spe-
cial IT skills (yes/no) 
N/A 
To what extent has e-business changed the way in which com-
pany conducts business (significantly, somewhat, not changed) 
EBIZ_CHANGE 
 
All firms included in the sample fulfill the necessary technological requirements to engage in e-business (use 
of computers, Internet, Email, and WWW). The terminal nodes can be ordered according to the ratio of adopters 
they contain. The numbers below the terminal nodes indicate this order, with 1 being the cluster with the highest 
adoption probability. The CART results for E-learning, CRM, and online sales are presented in the text. All re-
maining CART models are included in Appendix 2. They can easily be interpreted in a likewise manner. 
Figure 5 shows the final tree model for the usage of e-learning technologies. In the dataset, e-learning is de-
fined as the usage of online, Internet-based technologies to support employee training. The final tree consists of 
four terminal nodes. CART uses three different predictor variables to construct the tree. Each of the terminal 
nodes exhibits different fractions of e-learning users. The root node contains 4,852 firms, 17.2% of them use e-
learning. The most e-learning affine segment (number 1) contains 63.4% of adopters, whereas in the least e-
learning affine segment (number 4) a fraction of only 7.6% uses e-learning. The terminal nodes each contain a 
different number of firms. Some of the nodes are rather small and describe rare, but statistically relevant sub-
groups (like number 1, which contains only 153 firms or 3.2% of the sample), whereas others are very large 
(like number 4, which contains 2,594 firms or 53.5% of the sample). Note that the impact of each predictor vari-
able on the ratio of adopters can be followed along the tree branches. For example, the fraction of e-learning us-
ers increases from 17.2% in the root node to 28.2% for firms that share documents online. It again increases 
sharply if these firms also use an Internet-based Human Resource Management system. It is interesting to ob-
serve that all co-variables in the tree are good predictors only for a specific sub-set of the sample, in interaction 
with other predictors, and do not turn out to be relevant in other parts of the tree. This is one of the unique in-
sights into the data structures revealed by CART.  
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Figure 5 – CART for E-learning 
 
The results of the tree illustrate the importance of technological interdependencies. In fact, all three relevant 
predictor variables in the tree directly relate to the usage of other e-business technologies.  
Segment 1, which exhibits almost 63.4% per cent of e-learning users, consists of firms that are already very 
advanced in the usage of Internet-based technologies. The average number of other Internet technologies in-
stalled (  ) in this segment is 6.14, the highest among all terminal nodes in the tree. Segment 1 is sufficiently 
characterized by just three predictor variables: It includes firms that share documents online, use Internet tech-
nologies to support human resource management functions (HRM), and use Knowledge Management Systems 
(KMS) that run on the Internet. At least HRM and KMS can be seen as rather advanced e-business applications 
that are not yet used by many companies.  
i, jk −
The probability to adopt e-learning decreases sharply if any of technologies (Share_do, HRM, KMS) is not 
used by a company. The lowest adoption probability is observable in cluster 4 that only contains 7.6% of e-
learning users. This clusters is sufficiently characterized by just one predictor variable: it  contains firms that do 
not use the Internet to share documents online. No additional predictor variable can improve the classification 
performance of this node. Cluster 4 contains a large share of the dataset (53.5%). Also, cluster 4 has the lowest 
average number of other Internet technologies installed ( i, jk 1.0− 2=  ). Thus, the cluster that contains the firms 
that are “least advanced” in the usage of e-business technologies also has the lowest probability to adopt e-
learning. 
Other indicators in the dataset that reflected firm heterogeneity, such as size class or sector membership, do 
not turn up as relevant predictors in the tree. This should not be mistaken to indicate an irrelevance of other fac-
tors leading to rank effects, such as firm size, sector, or country of origin. Indeed, several of these variables ex-
hibited a significant impact on e-learning adoption in the logit regression (see table Table 13). The reason why 
they do not show up in the tree lies in the CART method,  which only uses the predictor that minimizes node 
impurity. The second best predictor that might even be closely related does not show up in the tree. Firm size, 
sectors, or country of origin are candidates for such factors, based on previous analysis.  
It has to be kept in mind that the usage of other e-business technologies as explanatory variables in the tree 
does not imply a causal relationship. It only implies that these variables are the best predictors for whether a firm 
uses e-learning or not, it does not say anything about the direction of the relationship or the presence of some 
other factor which could cause the correlation. However, the results are consistent with our findings from above, 
suggesting that more advanced firms exhibit higher adoption probabilities.  
Figure 6 shows the results for online sales. The final tree consists of 5 terminal nodes. CART uses only 3 pre-
dictor variables to construct the tree, one of the variables (sector membership) appears twice in the tree. The root 
node contains all 4,852 subjects again, the overall ratio of companies using the Internet to sell goods or services 
is 15.6%. The first layer splitting variable (which is the variable with the highest classification performance with 
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respect to the dependent variable) is whether a firm has a website or not. The probability that a company is 
selling online drops sharply from 15.6% to 3.3%, if the company does not have a website (cluster 5). Cluster 5 
has the lowest overall probability for online sales. The result is intuitive – having a website is not only a basic 
indicator for the “e-readiness” of company, but also an important channel for online sales. Consequently, firms 
that do not exhibit this basic characteristic do not have a high probability to adopt online sales. Cluster 5 is also 
the cluster with the lowest average number of other adopted technologies ( i, jk 1.2− 8= ).  
The second lowest probability for online sales occurs in cluster 4. Firms in this group do have a website, but 
they belong to an industry sector were anonymous remote orders and delivery are generally rare (food, chemi-
cals, metal products, machinery, electronics and electrical machinery, transport equipment, real estate, business 
services, health services). The ratio of firms selling online in cluster 4 is 12%, compared to 30.1% in the other 
daughter node which contains all firms with a website from the remaining sectors (publishing, retail, tourism, 
monetary services, insurances, ICT services). The best splitting variable for this cluster is whether firms use the 
Internet to purchase online. Provided that purchasing online is already quite frequently used by all firms in the 
sample (46.9%), this can again be interpreted as a proxy for the “e-readiness” of a company. Cluster 3, which 
contains those firms that do not purchase online also exhibits a low number of other adopted technologies 
(  ) and the chance of selling online in this cluster drops from 30.1% to 22.9%, whereas otherwise it 
increases to 35.7%. The cluster with the highest probability to sell online are those enterprises that have a web-
site, purchase online, and belong to either the retail or the tourism sector. This tree structure is interesting be-
cause it points out two insights: First, the general technological development level again turns out to be a good 
predictor for adoption decisions (website, purchasing online). Second, some technologies – such as online sales 
– are clearly more valuable and relevant in some industries than in others. Thus, depending on the type of activ-
ity a firm is pursuing, some firms will probably never adopt online sales even though they might be very ad-
vanced in using e-business applications otherwise. However, the probability to adopt still increases the more ad-
vanced a firm already is, ceteris paribus.   
i, jk 1− = .5
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Figure 6 - CART for Selling online 
 
Figure 7 shows the CART for Customer Relationship Management (CRM). This is the most parsimonious 
model. The root node contains 12% of CRM users, and the only relevant splitting variable is whether a firm uses 
a Knowledge Management System (KMS). If a firm does use KMS, the probability to adopt CRM increases to 
47.8%, otherwise it drops to 8.8%. Again, this relationship does not imply any direct causality. Instead, KMS is 
again a proxy for the general development level of a firm: Whereas cluster 1 exhibits , cluster 2 ex-
hibits only k .  
i, jk 4.7− = 6
3i, j 1.8− =
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Figure 7 – CART for CRM 
 
All CART models together emphasize technological interdependencies. Whenever a company uses any of the 
technologies identified in the tree models, the probability to adopt the technology under scrutiny increases and 
vice versa. This is in accordance to the findings in 5.2 and 5.3. Also, the CART models show interesting and di-
verse adoption patterns for various technologies: The adoption probability for some technologies can be best 
predicted solely by the technological profile of a firm, while for other technologies information about the size of 
the firm or its sector of operation are also important.  
Besides from the analytical value of this explorative analysis of data structures, the CART results have a very 
appealing practical value for technology providers, consultants, and marketers of e-business technologies. Pro-
vided that the collected data are fairly recent, the identified clusters can help to optimize marketing and sales 
strategies. For example, a technology provider might decide to focus his marketing activities on those clusters 
that have been identified as showing high probability to adopt. Also, a technology provider who is already con-
ducting business with a client might use the CART results to make an “educated guess” about what will be a 
likely future investment of the client. This knowledge could be used to increase the chances of getting a follow-
up job. In a similar way, CART can generally be used as a market research instrument for any kind of product, 
service or technology where useful and preferably large datasets are available.  
 
5.5. Discussion 
 
This chapter introduced a theory and an empirical analysis of the adoption of related technologies. If firms 
have the possibility to invest into a number of related technologies that are based on joint technological princi-
ples, technological interdependencies can have a crucial impact on investment and adoption decisions. In par-
ticular, firms might experience an acceleration mechanism in adopting related technologies, if the technologies 
do not substitute each other in their functionalities. An acceleration effect can occur for various reasons: 
- availability of joint complementary inputs, such as specialized labor, suitable organizational struc-
tures, or technological infrastructures  
- learning-by-doing effects 
- discounts for the purchase of more than one technology 
- technological complementarity, if technologies are directly compatible and do not substitute each 
other in their functionalities 
- better possibilities to finance investments due to successful earlier investments into related technolo-
gies 
If any of the above applies, the probability to adopt a technology will increase with the number of related 
technologies that a firm also uses because all of the above effects are strictly increasing in their argument, with-
out a natural point of inflection. In other words, the net present value of a technology can be higher for a firm 
that is already more advanced in using related technologies than for an otherwise identical firm. This suggests 
that early movers will make continuously faster progress on a given technological trajectory, building up a tech-
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nological leadership position until they have adopted all related technologies with a positive net present value. 
However, this does not imply that all firms will adopt all technologies because the net present value of a tech-
nology also depends on other firm-specific characteristics that are independent from its current level of techno-
logical development (e.g. market of operation or the size of a firm).  
Empirical evidence for this acceleration mechanism was provided by analyzing the adoption of 11 e-business 
technologies in a large cross-sectional dataset covering 15 industrial sectors from the four largest European 
economies. Three different methods were used to analyze the data: A logistic adoption model with fairly strict 
assumptions, a bivariate simultaneous equation model with less restrictive assumptions, and a non-parametric 
classification and regression procedure without any prior assumptions. The main result in all cases is that tech-
nological interdependencies have a crucial impact on adoption decisions. This suggests that the technological 
legacy of a firm – and thus its history – has a systematic influence on its investment decisions and hence on its 
future development. Strong evidence is found that an acceleration mechanism of technological development can 
occur. Firms that are already more advanced in using e-business technologies are found to be more likely to in-
vest into additional e-business technologies than otherwise comparable firms. The results suggest a “growing 
digital divide” among firms that could continue until the most advanced firms of a particular type have fully ex-
hausted the potential of e-business technologies and stop making progress on that trajectory. This could ceteris 
paribus lead to initially growing advantages of technological pioneers vis-à-vis late adopters, if they directly 
compete against each other. 
In addition to this main result, the influence of structural variables, such as sector membership, size class, and 
country of origin were also analyzed. The results support previous evidence that e-business usage patterns vary 
significantly among industries and countries (European E-Business Market W@tch 2004, OECD 2004, Preissl 
2003). However, which sectors and countries exhibit high usage rates varies substantially with the technology 
being analyzed. For example, firms in the retail sector are more likely to adopt online sales than the food, bever-
ages and tobacco sector; but the opposite is true for ERP systems. No clear evidence was found for the hypothe-
sis that industries with ex ante better knowledge of ICT will have higher probabilities to adopt e-business tech-
nologies. Industries with good ex ante knowledge of ICT are those that are either involved in the production of 
ICT goods or services (electronics, ICT services, business services) and those that traditionally exhibit high lev-
els of ICT usage (monetary services, insurances, transport equipment manufacturers). The results vary greatly 
among different e-business technologies. For example, firms from the ICT services sector exhibit very high 
adoption probabilities for purchasing online, CRM, CMS, Design, Share doc, selling online, KMS and HRM. 
However, they also show significantly lower adoption probabilities than the “IT-distant” food sector for ERP 
and SCM solutions, primarily because ERP and SCM solutions help to optimize material and information flows 
in manufacturing businesses, they are generally less relevant  in the services industries.  
The empirical results also provide evidence for size class effects. In particular, it was found that large firms 
exhibit higher probability to adopt technologies that are primarily used in-house, exhibiting positive returns to 
scale. Such technologies are CMS, sharing documents online internally, CRM, HRM, ERP and KMS. For all of 
the above, large firms have a significantly higher adoption probability. Otherwise, positive size effects are not as 
pronounced and in some cases even reversed for those e-business technologies that primarily deal with processes 
and information flows that are connected to the environment of the firm, and not primarily internal. E.g., E-
learning, online collaboration with business partners to design new products (Design) and selling online do not 
exhibit significantly higher adoption probabilities of larger enterprises.  
In addition to the analytical findings, the usefulness of CART was demonstrated to analyze innovation adop-
tion data. CART enables to identify clusters of firms that exhibit significant differences in their probability to 
adopt a particular technology. The results are parsimonious, easy to interpret and can be presented in an intui-
tive, graphical form. They have an appealing practical value for marketing purposes. For example, a technology 
provider might decide to focus his marketing budget on those firms that have been identified as high probability 
clusters in the CART analysis. Or, a technology provider who is already conducting business with a client might 
use CART results to make an “educated guess” about what will be a likely future investment of the client. This 
knowledge could help to increase the chances of getting follow-up contracts.  
The research presented in this chapter is subject to some limitations. First, a cross-sectional dataset was used 
that does not contain information about when technologies have been adopted. Since innovation diffusion is a 
dynamic process, lacking information about the timing of events means that we are missing an important part of 
the story. Hence, one can only speculate about the consequences of the observed technological interdependen-
cies, the “growing digital divide”, it cannot be actually observed in the data. Second, having only cross-sectional 
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data puts clear limits on the possibility to rule out alternative explanations for the observed relationships, i.e. 
there is no general test to rule out a significant effect of unobserved heterogeneity. Thus, it cannot be finally 
concluded whether the observed acceleration effect is truly endogenous and independent from unobservable firm 
characteristics. Third, while the data are quite rich in terms of the technologies they cover, they have no indica-
tion about the actual level of use of the technologies within firms or how “sophisticated” their solutions are. For 
example, purchasing online can be conducted in many way: A firm might infrequently buy a small number of 
items on an internet marketplace, or it might install a complex e-procurement software system that systemati-
cally aggregates and automates a substantial amount of ordering processes. In the data used for this chapter, both 
cases are simply treated as a positive adoption of online purchasing. Having more detailed information would 
possibly enable additional insights. However, there are clear budgetary and time restrictions for collecting addi-
tional levels of details in this type of enterprise survey. 
The most severe limitation of this chapter – the lack of a time dimension – is resolved in the next chapter 
which uses a different dataset to analyze the same fundamental questions that were examined in this chapter: 
How do technological interdependencies influence diffusion processes? And what role do structural variables 
and firm heterogeneity play? 
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6. Dynamic analysis of e-business diffusion 
 
The previous chapter presented a static analysis of the adoption of various related e-business technologies. 
The results indicated strong and persistent relationships between the observed technologies. In particular, their 
was support for the hypothesis that the probability to adopt is increasing in the number of other related tech-
nologies a firm has also installed. The results indicated that technological progress can be subject to an 
endogenous acceleration mechanism if firms have the choice to invest in numerous related technologies that are 
not substitutes.  
___________ 
22 Alternative terms for hazard rate models frequently found in the literature are „survival analysis“, „failure time mod-
els“, „life-time models“, or „response-time models“. 
In this chapter, the analysis of this phenomenon is extended to a dynamic diffusion model. Are the results of 
chapter 5 replicable in a dynamic setting using a different dataset? To answer this question, a flexible discrete 
time hazard rate model is introduced. It has various advantageous compared to the static analysis. First of all, the 
complications arising from simultaneous adoption decisions can be avoided because in the dynamic framework 
one can test for the effect of technological investments that have been undertaken in the past: Such investments 
are sunk and do not depend on today’s investment decisions anymore. Therefore, they can be treated as an ex-
ogenous variable. Thus, instead of running simultaneous equations with multiple endogenous technology terms, 
one can simply analyze each technology separately and only control for technologies that have been installed in 
the past. Second, the time dimension in the data provides multiple observations for each firm. This enables to 
control for unobserved heterogeneity explicitly. Thus, it is possible to measure whether an acceleration effect in 
technological development occurs endogenously, after controlling for unobserved alternative explanations such 
as an “inherent need” of firms to invest. Third, the time dimension of the data also allows to observe the possible 
consequences of an acceleration effect. If such an effect is present and not all firms start adopting the same tech-
nologies at the same time (i.e. if there are rank effects due to differences among firms), we would expect that the 
technological equipment of early adopters is continuously upgraded faster than that of late adopters, leading to 
growing differences among firms. 
The chapter is organized as follows: First, a short introduction to hazard rate models is given to set up the re-
quired notations. Then, I relate to the theory of chapter 5.1 and introduce the diffusion model. Next, the regres-
sion results are presented and discussed. After that, I examine whether there is evidence for a growing “digital 
divide” among firms. Finally, the results are summarized and some implications are discussed. 
 
6.1. Discrete time hazard rate model with unobserved heterogeneity 
Formel-Kapitel (nächstes) Abschnitt 1 
To study the diffusion of technologies over time, a hazard rate estimation framework can be used.22 In gen-
eral, hazard rate models are concerned with explaining the time interval until the occurrence of a state transition 
of an observed subject. In this study, the time interval from the introduction of a new technology until a firm de-
cides to adopt the technology is the variable of interest. Each adoption decision is a single, non-repeatable and 
non-reversible event. Obviously, not all firms will adopt within the observation period or thereafter. Let  indi-
cate at which point in time a firm is observed. The time from the beginning of the observation until the adoption 
decision is noted as T . At each point in time , we are interested in the adoption probability of each firm, given 
that the firm has not adopted before . This is the hazard rate, which is formally defined as 
t
t
t
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(6.1) 
dt 0
Pr ob(t T t dt | T t)(t) lim
dt→
≤ < + ≥λ =  
 
By standard arguments, there are two functions associated with the hazard function: The failure function 
, which indicates the fraction of the population that has left the initial state at time , and the survivor func-
tion , which states the share of the population that has not yet adopted at time . Consequently, 
 and  is the cumulative distribution function (cdf) of all adoption events over time. The asso-
ciated probability density function (pdf) is noted as f ( , with f (
F(t)
S(t)
t
S(t)
1 F≡ −
t
(t) F(t)
t) t) F (t)′= . A natural interpretation of  is 
the unconditional probability of adopting exactly in the infinitesimally small interval of time . By defi-
nition: 
f (t)
[t, t t]+ ∆
 
(6.2) f (t) f (t)(t)
1 F(t) S(t)
λ = ≡−  
 
In this application, the actual exact time of adoption T  is unobservable in the available dataset. We only 
know from the data that  falls into a specific year. Hence, a discrete time formulation is needed. For this pur-
pose, it can be defined that a duration of interest  is in the vth interval so that it satisfies, t , for 
. In the last observable interval, firm i’s spell ( i
T
t 1v vt− ≤ < t
v 1,...,V= 1,..., N= ) for technology  is either com-
plete, or right censored. Right censoring implies that at the time of the survey, the adoption of the technology 
had not yet occurred ( T  is unknown). Given entry at 
j 1,...,= K
1v =  and observation at time , we only know that  
for right censored observations. 
t T t>
The analysis is carried out with a dataset that contains a large number N  of heterogeneous enterprises that 
are assumed to have no strategic interaction. As before, each firm i 1...N=  is characterized by a vector of firm 
specific characteristics ix  and a -component vector  of binary variables  with 
 and , which indicates the current endowment of a firm with related technologies. Theorem 1 
implies that under the assumption that none of the elements of  is substituting any other element of , the net 
present value  associated with each technology is increasing in the number  of re-
lated technologies which have been adopted in the past. The integer variable 
K Y
Y
1 2 KY (y , y ,..., y )=
Y
1 [0,1, 2,...,K 1]∈ −
{ }jy 0,1∈ j 1...K=
ijvG i, j,vk − −
j,v 1i,k − −  is a simple proxy for “how 
advanced” a firm is in using any of the  available technologies. Firms adopt technology  in period  if 
.  
K j v
ijvG 0>
The net present value  is not directly observable. However, in each period , the endowment of firms 
with technologies Y  can be observed where each element takes a value of 
ijvG v
iv ijvy 1=  when the enterprise has 
adopted and  otherwise, . Firms adopt if the non-observable latent variable  exceeds a criti-
cal value 
ijvy = 0 j 1...K= *ijvy
*y , which depends on : ijvG
 
(6.3) * *ijv ijv ijvG 0 y y y> → > → = 1 
 
Theorem 3 – Assume (A1) and (A2) – The hazard rate to adopt a technology belonging to  is an increasing 
function of the number of elements of  which have been adopted in the past. 
Y
Y
Proof: Apply theorem 1 to (6.3).  
 
To test Theorem 3, the following discrete time hazard rate model of technology adoption is introduced: 
We know that  depends on the observable firm-specific characteristics ijvG ix  and their level of technological 
development, . In addition,  might systematically depend on unobservable firm-specific characteristics. 
To allow for unobserved heterogeneity, a firm-specific error term  with the following properties is intro-
duced: 
i,k − j,v ijvG
iju
 
(6.4)   2ij u ij i ij ij i, j,vu ~ N(0, ); E[u | x ] 0; E[u | v] 0; E[u | k ] 0−σ = = =  
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The unobserved additional error term is assumed to be strictly independent from the observable covariates 
ix ,  and observation period . The introduction of this unobservable error term allows to relax some of 
the assumption that were necessary in the static adoption model. Explicitly, we do not need to assume anymore 
that only observable firm characteristics influence the adoption decision in a systematic way. It is only necessary 
to assume that unobservable characteristics that might have a systematic influence on adoption probability, like 
quality of management, organizational structure, specific characteristics of the market of operation, or an “inher-
ent need” of firms to upgrade their technology etc., are normally distributed, independent of the observable char-
acteristics, and that the sample is randomly drawn from the population. Compared to the static adoption model in 
the previous chapter, this yields a more flexible modeling approach that is only possible because time-series ob-
servations of individuals have a three-dimensional structure (varying in time periods , firm , and all observ-
able variables) and hence contain more information than cross-sectional data. The additional information can be 
used to account for unobserved heterogeneity by grouping observations on . The close relationship between 
survival models including unobserved individual effects and panel econometric methods has recently been em-
phasized in the literature (Jenkins, 2004; Kiefer, 1990; Wooldrigde, 2002, 20.4).  
i, j,vk − v
v i
i
Theorem 1 and Theorem 3 implied that the decision to adopt depends on the observable characteristics ix , 
and explicitly also on the number of previously adopted, related technologies i, j,v 1k − − . In addition, diffusion 
processes are time-dependent. Epidemic effects, reduced uncertainty, stock effects, qualitative improvements in 
technology or falling prices all lead to higher adoption probabilities in later periods. Hence, the probability to 
adopt is generally time-dependent following some function . Furthermore, the random unobserved firm-
specific effect specified in (6.4) can influence the timing of adoption. Hence, a time-varying index function with 
the following form can be specified: 
vh (t)
 
(6.5) ijv j i i, j,v 1 jv ijZ (t) x k h (t) u− −′= β + γ + +  
 
For simplicity, the index function is assumed to have a linear additive structure.23 Given these preliminary 
definitions and following the general framework of Sueyoshi (1995), the hazard function can be specified as 
 
(6.6) v ijvijv i j i, j,v 1 j ij jv
v ijv
f (Z (t))
(t, x , , k , , u ) h (t)
1 F (Z (t))− −
  ′λ β γ =  −  
 
 
 
where  indexes the interval of interest, i  the firm, and where  and  are the density and cumulative dis-
tribution function for the continuous random variable . Note that  is allowed to vary with time, since 
(the number of previously adopted related technologies) is dynamic. The full specification of the hazard 
depends upon the pair { . The survival probabilities for the vth interval may be viewed as the probability 
that a random variable exceeds the aggregator, 
v vf vF
t)T
Z
ijvZ (
i, j,v 1k − − }F,h
ijv ijvPr( (t))ε > , where the cumulative distribution of  is de-
scribed by F (Sueyoshi, 1995). This is a straightforward extension of the static adoption model presented in 
chapter 5.2 to a dynamic scenario. Note, however, that in addition to the classic disturbance term ε  another er-
ror term  is introduced in (6.4) and (6.5). While the influence of 
ijvε
ijv
iju ijvε  on ijvλ  is a function of time and ran-
domly “redrawn” for each firm in each observation period,  captures additional firm-specific effects that do 
not vary with time but could have a systematic influence on the individual hazard. The interpretation is straight 
forward:  contains the influence of all relevant firm-specific characteristics that cannot be observed in the 
data but that stay with firm i over time, while 
iju
ijv
iju ε  are all remaining, time-specific random shocks that influence 
the probability of adoption. The value of both error terms for each firm can obviously vary with the technology j 
under scrutiny. 
To complete the specification of (6.6), one needs to chose { }F,h . Given that diffusion processes can be well-
described by a logistic function (Griliches, 1957; Mansfield, 1961), an obvious candidate to specify  is F to be 
the logistic cdf, 
λ
___________ 
23 Alternatively, one could also specify a semi- or non-parametric functional form. However, this makes the evaluation of 
hypotheses more difficult. Also, to my best knowledge, unobserved heterogeneity cannot be tested yet in non-parametric 
models.  
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(6.7) exp(z)F(z)
1 exp(z)
= +  
 
 
which corresponds to a pdf   
 
(6.8) 2
exp(z)f (z)
(1 exp(z))
= +  
 
for . The baseline hazard rate of each period can be specified as a flexible semi-parametric piece-
wise constant function:  
z−∞ < < ∞
 
(6.9)  jv jv jvh (t) = α θ
 
for all , choosing  as the reference category for estimationv 2,..., V= v 1= 24, jvθ  being a vector of dummy 
variables such that θ =  if  and jv 1 v 1t t− ≤ < vt jv 0θ =  otherwise. The variable jvα  is the period-specific hazard 
coefficient for technology . This piecewise constant specification yields a flexible model with some desirable 
properties. It allows duration dependence to vary between observation periods, without assuming a specific 
functional form of . It only implies the assumption that observations within a given time-interval  have 
the same baseline hazard rate. Hence, the model does not assume that adoption probability strictly increases in 
, and thus allow for period-specific demand shocks, e.g. due to cyclical variation. Furthermore, the model also 
does not assume that all firms will adopt each technology because  must not necessarily go to infinity as  
becomes very large. This is an important advantage vis-à-vis most fully parametric specifications of the hazard 
function that assume  as . The semi-parametric specification in (6.9) is more appropriate to 
study the diffusion of innovations, because it is only rarely the case that the entire population eventually adopts 
an innovation. Hence, a possible source of biased estimates is eliminated because an implausible assumption is 
avoided.  
j
λ →
jvh (t)
(t)
v
t
jvh (t) t
∞ t → ∞
Equation (6.6) can be explicitly written as 
 
(6.10) ijv
jv jv j i j i, j,v 1 ij
1
1 exp( x k u )− −
λ = ′+ −α θ − β − γ − . 
  
Note that (6.10) is equivalent to a random effects logit model applied to survival data organized in firm-
period form. Survival data in firm-period form contain observations for firm i for each period  until either cen-
soring or exit occur. This yields an unbalanced panel dataset, where each firm can have at most one observation 
period for which . Hence, the number of observed periods varies between firms. This specific form of 
data organization is necessary if one wants to apply standard panel estimation commands in statistical packages 
for survival analysis. To clarify the point: The binary response logit model estimates the unconditional likeli-
hood function  for observing  in exactly period , where f is the logistic pdf. The hazard function 
, however, is the conditional probability of making a transition in period , provided that firm i  has “sur-
vived” up to . Data organized in firm-period form fulfill the requirement that during the periods prior to the 
transition, all observations on the dependent variable have values of zero. Hence, the conditioning of f (  is 
provided by the specific form of data organization, and estimating (6.10) becomes equivalent to estimating . 
v
ijvy =
z)
1
1
1
___________ 
24 hence maintaining an intercept term in 
f (
v −
ijvy = vλ v
z)
f (z)
Furthermore, it is interesting to observe that (6.10) is a proportional hazard model, i.e. one can separate the 
effects of a “baseline hazard” function which only depends on time period  and is equal for all firms, and firm-
specific effects captured by the co-variables that scale the baseline hazard for each observation. The model is 
v
Z  
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also referred to as “proportional odds” because it assumes that the relative odds of making a transition in pe-
riod , given survival up to the previous period, can be summarized by  v
0
___________ 
procedure. 
 
(6.11) ijv jv jv j iv j i, j,v 1 ij
ijv jv jv
F( )
exp( x k u )
1 1 F( ) − −
 λ α θ ′= β + γ − λ − α θ  
+ , 
 
where F is the logistic cdf (Jenkins, 2004). The term in the left parentheses on the right-hand side of the equa-
tion is the baseline hazard which arises if all other co-variables are zero. This expression is scaled by the expres-
sion outside of the parenthesis, which do not depend on time period . Hence, the estimated parameter coeffi-
cients of this model have an intuitive interpretation. The 
v
jvθ  coefficients give the period-specific baseline hazard 
of technology j for a firm with all other covariables equal to zero. The j′β  and jγ  coefficients can be interpreted 
as the extent to which itx  and  scale the baseline hazard.  i, j,v 1k − −
Because (6.10) depends on the unobserved heterogeneity , it cannot be used directly to construct the like-
lihood function to consistently estimate , 
iju
jα j′β , and jγ . However, recalling the assumptions of (6.4) that  is 
independent of all other variables and has a normal distribution, a conditional maximum likelihood approach is 
available for estimating α , ,  and  (Wooldrige, 2002, 15.8.2). To find a likelihood function that does 
not depend on  anymore, one needs to integrate out , conditional on all observable covariables. Given 
(6.4) the likelihood contribution of each uncensored observation can be expressed as 
iju
j j′β jγ 2uσ
iju iju
 
(6.12) 
V
ijv u j u
v 1
L g(y ) (1 ) (u
=−∞
 = σ φ  ∏∫ )du
∞
σ
1 y
 
 
where , F is the logistic cdf and ijv ijvyijvg(y ) F(z) [1 F(z)]
−= − φ  is the pdf of the normal distribution. Censored 
observations in the sample are included with values of ijvy 0=  for all , whereas uncensored observations are 
included up to the period when exit occurs and observations with  
v
ijvy 1=  for  can be dropped because 
they do not contain any additional information that would contribute towards 
vt t>
(t)λ . Plugging in  for all  
and taking the log of (6.12) gives the conditional likelihood function for each i.
ijvy v
25 Summing up over all i gives 
the complete sample likelihood. To estimate this function, one simply has to maximize the complete sample like-
lihood with respect to α , , and .j j′β γ
2 2
u u/( 1)ρ = σ σ +
j
26 The integral can be approximated with an M-point Gauss-Hermite 
quadrature (StataCorp, 2001, p. 384). As mentioned above, this is equivalent to applying a random effects logit 
model to survival data organized in person-period form. The relative importance of the unobserved effect can be 
measured as , which is the proportion of the total variance contributed by the panel-level vari-
ance component since the idiosyncratic error in latent variable models is unity (Wooldrige, 2002, p. 486). When 
, the panel-level variance component is unimportant and the panel estimator is not different from the 
pooled estimator. The pooled estimator would results from applying the standard logit model to the survival data 
organized in person-period form, without grouping observations on i . This approach yields consistent and effi-
cient estimates if and only if no unobserved individual-specific effects exist. A likelihood ratio test that formally 
compares the pooled and the panel estimator can be used to evaluate the presence of significant unobserved in-
dividual effects.
ρ =
27  
The estimation approach outlined above has four explicit advantages.  
(1) By accounting for unobserved heterogeneity, it is possible to get consistent and efficient estimates of the 
observable covariates28 even if some of the unobservable characteristics have a significant influence on adoption 
behavior. If unobservable heterogeneity is important but ignored, one will get biased estimates of the included 
25 The integration of (6.12) does not yield a simple estimator because of the mixed distributions.  
26 In most econometric software packages, this is implemented either as Fisher-scoring or the Newton-Raphson-
27 This implies that the results of the pooled and the panel estimator are equivalent if no unobserved individual effects ex-
ist. Hence, controlling for unobserved heterogeneity in the model does not lead to biased estimates if individual effects are 
not significant. 
28 Provided that the assumption of  are satisfied by the data. The independence of from the observable variables can 
be tested by comparing the random odel with a fixed effects model via the Hausman test. However, this test is only 
required if significant observed effects are reported in the random effects model. An unresolved issue is how possible inter-
action effects between observable and unobservable variables on the dependent variable could be identified. 
u
 effects m
u  
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covariates. Also, one typically over-estimates the degree of negative duration dependence in the hazard and an 
under-estimates of the true proportionate response of the hazard to a change in a regressor. In addition, the pro-
portionate response of the hazard rate to changes in a regressor will no longer be constant, but declines with 
time. Lancaster (1979, 1990) gives an extensive treatment of these issues. Also, controlling for unobserved het-
erogeneity does not lead to biased estimates even if unobserved effects are not important because the estimator 
of the pooled logit and the panel logit are asymptotically identical if u 0σ → . Hence, controlling for unobserved 
heterogeneity yields a much more robust test of the hypothesis regarding the observable characteristics, in par-
ticular the effect of k . i, j,t−
(2) A dynamic model is estimated that utilizes all individual- and time-specific information that is available in 
the data. No information is lost due to any kind of data aggregation. In particular, by specifying  as a 
time-dynamic covariable that counts the number of other adopted technologies at time t for each firm, the maxi-
mum amount of information contained in the data is used. 
i, j,v 1k − −
(3) The flexible, semi-parametric specification of duration dependence in (6.9) does not assume that all firms 
will eventually adopt the innovation as , in contrast to many fully parametric specifications. Hence, an 
important source of biased estimates is excluded. See Kamakura, Kossar and Wedel (2004), Litfin (2001), or 
Sinha and Chandrashekaran (1992) for a discussion of the assumption that the entire population will eventually 
adopt. The simple piece-wise constant specification employed here is an attractive alternative to the computa-
tionally demanding split-hazard models that are otherwise proposed in the literature. 
t → ∞
(4) The estimation framework applied here is easily extendable to other empirical studies of innovation diffu-
sion, where time and individual specific information are available and the primary focus is not on forecasting. 
One simply needs to adapt the index function  in an appropriate way. ijtZ
 
6.2. Empirical results 
 
Equation (6.12) was estimated using a large sample of enterprise data from the Nov/Dec 2003 e-Business 
Market W@tch survey. The dataset consists of 7,302 successfully completed computer-aided telephone inter-
views with enterprises from 25 European countries and 10 sectors29. Available are basic background information 
about each company, including size class, number of establishments, % of employees with a college degree, 
market share and primary customers of the enterprise. Also, the dataset contains information on the adoption of 
7 e-business technologies, including retrospective information on the time of adoption. Firms that confirmed in 
the interview that they currently use a particular e-business application were asked when they first started to use 
that technology. The ratio of missing values on these questions was always below 20% of the respective subjects 
indicating that most respondents were at least able to make a fairly educated guess30. Also, one might reasonably 
assume that the error distribution will not be significantly skewed towards one side or the other side of the true 
values. Thus, without additional information or conflicting evidence, it is most reasonable to treat the reported 
adoption date as the true adoption date.  
Table 22 shows some descriptive results for the occurrence of the technologies for November 2003. Similar 
to the evidence in chapter 5.2, there are pronounced differences in the observed frequencies among the 7 e-
business technologies. Online purchasing is most widely diffused (46%), whereas other solutions such Knowl-
edge Management (KMS) or Supply Chain Management (SCM) exhibit rare occurrence. Each of the considered 
7 technologies serves a different purpose for supporting processes and information flows within a company, or 
___________ 
29 The composition of the sample does not allow comparability across sectors or countries on the aggregate level. Thus, 
the model does not control for sector- or country-specific effects explicitly, but treats them as part of the unobserved hetero-
geneity term   
 
30 The estimation results could be non-representative for the entire population if the missing values were not independent 
from the time of adoption, e.g. if those who could not recall the date of adoption had adopted particularly early. However, 
such an effect cannot be tested in the data and is hence not explicitly considered here.  
 iju .
 98
between a company and its environment. Thus, it can be assumed that these technologies do not substitute 
each other in their functionalities, which is the basic assumption underlying our theory. In parallel to the static 
analysis of e-business adoption, only those enterprises are included in the sample that fulfill the basic require-
ments to conduct e-business (usage of computers, Internet access, email and WWW). 
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Table 22 - Relative frequencies of 7 related e-business technologies, Nov 2003 
Technology Occurrence 
in sample 
E-learning 9.5% 
Customer Relationship Management System (CRM) 11.1% 
Online purchasing 46% 
Online sales 17% 
Enterprise Resource Planning System (ERP) 11.5% 
Knowledge Management System (KMS) 6.6% 
Supply Chain Management System (SCM) 3.9% 
N=5,615. Unweighted results. All firms included have computers, Internet access, use 
the WWW, and email. 
Abbreviations in ( ) indicate variable names for the regression analyses.  
 
Information about when a technology was adopted by a company is coded in yearly intervals. 1994 was cho-
sen as the first period of observations31. This is approximately the time when the Internet became available for 
commercial use in Europe. All adoption decisions occurring after 2002 are censored observations. Thus, there 
are 9 valid observations periods for each technology.  
Figure 8 and Figure 9 show two examples of survivor functions. The year of observation is recorded on the x-
axis (2 corresponds to 1994, 10 corresponds to 2002). The proportion of remaining non-adopters in the sample is 
depicted on the y-axis. Both survivor functions show that diffusion of online purchasing and online sales started 
slowly in the first few years, and then rapidly gained momentum. The highest annual rate of new adoptions oc-
curred from 2001 to 2002, shortly after the peak of the “Internet-hype”. Both figures show that the diffusion of 
e-business had not yet surpassed its peak in 2002. Thus the adoption of these new technologies is analyzed in a 
relatively early stage of the diffusion process. The survivor functions for the other e-business technologies in the 
sample exhibit comparable shapes. 
___________ 
31 A few companies stated implausible adoption dates, saying that they adopted a particular e-business solution before 
1994. These responses were coded as missing values. For all technologies, less than 5% of the adopters had to be excluded 
due to stating implausible adoption dates. The respective companies could be referring to ICT solutions that fulfill similar 
objectives as the e-business technologies, but are based on proprietary networks, such as EDI. However, because of the defi-
nition and the reasoning provided in chapter 1.4.4, proprietary ICT solutions are not part of this analysis.  
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Figure 8 – Discrete time survivor function for online purchasing 
 
 
 
Figure 9  - Discrete time survivor function for online sales 
 
 
Two different versions of the model in (6.12) were estimated. The first version included the proxy variable 
for current technological development, , as an ordinal variable. The results are reported in Table 23 and 
Table 24. In the second version, k  was decomposed into dummy variables ( k 0  to k 5
i, j,v 1k − −
1−i, j,v− i, j,v 1− − = i, j,v 1− − = ).32 
The decomposition into dummy variables was conducted to test for possible non-linear effects of .  i, j,v 1k − −
 
___________ 
32 Only 3 companies had adopted all 7 e-business technologies in 2002. Thus, the regression results on  were 
never significant and in most cases not identified. Hence, they are not included in the table. 
i, j,v 1k 6− − =
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Table 23 – Hazard rate regression results for 3 e-business technologies (k as integer) 
Co-variables Online sales Online  
purchasing 
CRM 
v = 2 1.253** 1.954** 0.603 
v = 3 1.447** 2.396** 0.496 
v = 4 2.228** 3.358** 1.172** 
v = 5 2.843** 4.781** 1.819** 
v = 6 3.313** 5.498** 1.603** 
v = 7 3.650** 6.721** 2.430** 
v = 8 3.890** 7.514** 2.465** 
v = 9 4.315** 9.093** 3.552** 
, , 1i j vk − −  0.257** 0.731** 0.525** 
10-49 empl. 0.042 0.033 0.734** 
50-249 empl. 0.067 0.167 0.967** 
>250 empl. 0.155 0.188 1.137** 
> 1 establishment 0.297** 0.568** 0.377** 
Primary customers:    
other businesses -0.465** 0.443** 0.426** 
public sector -0.596** 0.068 -0.190 
no primary customers 0.065 0.121 0.171 
% empl. w. university degree 0.001 0.010** 0.013** 
Market share:    
<1% 0.164 0.647** -0.472** 
1%-5% 0.415** 0.778** -0.179 
6%-10%  0.456** 0.645** 0.170 
11%-25% 0.546** 0.586** 0.203 
> 25%  0.340** 0.564** 0.081 
Constant -7.356** -11.283** -8.284** 
Model diagnostics    
N obs 44,545 42,310 45,257 
N groups 5,116 5,116 5,116 
Log-likelihood -3,773 -7,439 -2,411 
Rho <0.01 0.668 <0.01 
LL-ratio test for rho=0 1.00 0.00 1.00 
** denotes significance at the 95% confidence level, * denotes significance at 90% confidence.  
Reference categories: v = 1, 1-9 empl., primary customers: consumers, market share: unknown. 
All firms included have computers, Internet access, use the WWW, and email. 
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Table 24  - Hazard rate regression results for 4 e-business technologies (k as integer) 
Co-variables E-Learning ERP KM SCM 
v = 2 0.401 0.153 0.131 -0.697 
v = 3 0.900 0.204 0.752 0.680 
v = 4 1.843** 0.765** 0.521 1.365* 
v = 5 2.149** 0.719** 1.056** 1.754** 
v = 6 2.309** 1.048** 0.909** 1.800** 
v = 7 3.351** 1.356** 1.742** 2.459** 
v = 8 3.513** 1.079** 1.621** 2.023** 
v = 9 4.719** 2.513** 2.854** 3.648** 
, , 1i j vk − −  0.435** 0.265** 0.465** 0.328** 
10-49 empl. 0.051 1.116** 0.384** 1.001** 
50-249 empl. 0.234* 1.776** 0.689** 1.693** 
>250 empl. 0.770** 2.353** 1.099** 2.514** 
> 1 establishment 0.519** 0.187** 0.322** 0.385** 
Primary customers:     
other businesses -0.092 0.601** 0.144 0.045 
public sector 0.151 -0.004 -0.020 -0.817** 
no primary customers -0.008 0.126 -0.010 -0.287 
% empl. w. university degree 0.012** 0.004** 0.012** 0.006** 
Market share:     
<1% -0.106 -0.480** -0.173 0.211 
1%-5% 0.104 -0.052 0.201 -0.355 
6%-10%  -0.042 0.253 -0.182 0.519** 
11%-25% 0.193 0.304** 0.290 0.130 
> 25%  0.066 0.187* 0.289* 0.152 
Constant -8.688** -7.550** -7.799** -9.571** 
Model diagnostics     
N obs 45,562 44,889 45,504 45,800 
N groups 5,116 5,116 5,116 5,116 
Log-likelihood -2,121 -2,550 -1,689 -957 
Rho <0.01 <0.01 <0.01 <0.01 
LL-ratio test for rho=0 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
** denotes significance at the 95% confidence level, * denotes significance at 90% confidence.  
Reference categories: v = 1, 1-9 empl., primary customers: consumers, market share: unknown. 
All firms included have computers, Internet access, use the WWW, and email. 
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Table 25 - Hazard rate regression results for 3 e-business technologies (k in 5 categories) 
Co-variables Online sales Online  
purchasing 
CRM 
v = 2 1.252** 1.879** 0.601 
v = 3 1.384** 2.317** 0.491 
v = 4 2.223** 3.253** 1.164** 
v = 5 2.834** 4.633** 1.810** 
v = 6 3.299** 5.317** 1.586** 
v = 7 3.631** 6.499** 2.406** 
v = 8 3.865** 7.253** 2.431** 
v = 9 4.284** 8.786** 3.511** 
, , 1 1i j vk − − =  0.398** 0.863** 0.613** 
, , 1 2i j vk − − =  0.502** 1.395** 1.143** 
, , 1 3i j vk − − =  0.825** 1.922** 1.628** 
, , 1 4i j vk − − =  -0.341 0.356 1.998** 
, , 1 5i j vk − − =  0.867 44.260 1.409* 
10-49 empl. 0.044 0.032 0.738** 
50-249 empl. 0.060 0.149 0.963** 
>250 empl. 0.162 0.188 1.135** 
> 1 establishment 0.300** 0.548** 0.384** 
Primary customers:    
other businesses -0.473** 0.423** 0.431** 
public sector -0.600** 0.069 -0.190 
no primary customers 0.058 0.114 0.170 
% empl. w. university degree 0.001 0.010** 0.013** 
Market share:    
<1% 0.161 0.632** -0.484** 
1%-5% 0.414** 0.753** -0.186 
6%-10%  0.458** 0.625** 0.161 
11%-25% 0.547** 0.572** 0.196 
> 25%  0.340** 0.553** 0.078 
Constant -7.352** -10.954** -8.288** 
Model diagnostics    
N obs 44,545 42,310 45,257 
N groups 5,116 5,116 5,116 
Log-likelihood 3,764 -7,433 -2,409 
Rho <0.01 .645 <0.01 
LL-ratio test for rho=0 1.00 0.00 1.00 
** denotes significance at the 95% confidence level, * denotes significance at 90% confidence.  
Reference categories: v = 1, ,1-9 empl., primary customers: consumers, market share: unknown. , , 1 0i j vk − − =
All firms included have computers, Internet access, use the WWW, and email. 
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Table 26 - Hazard rate regression results for 4 e-business technologies (k in 5 categories) 
Co-variables E-Learning ERP KM SCM 
v = 2 0.398 0.153 0.132 -0.702 
v = 3 0.889 0.203 0.753 0.667 
v = 4 1.824** 0.763** 0.523 1.343* 
v = 5 2.118** 0.716** 1.061** 1.724** 
v = 6 2.261** 1.042** 0.917** 1.751** 
v = 7 3.273** 1.348** 1.750** 2.394** 
v = 8 3.433** 1.068** 1.629** 1.933** 
v = 9 4.630** 2.498** 2.862** 3.558** 
, , 1 1i j vk − − =  0.654** 0.292** 0.425** 0.593** 
, , 1 2i j vk − − =  1.136** 0.687** 0.860** 0.683** 
, , 1 3i j vk − − =  1.357** 0.399 1.703** 1.254** 
, , 1 4i j vk − − =  0.291 0.764 1.807** 0.699 
, , 1 5i j vk − − =  1.465* - 1.126 1.132 
10-49 empl. 0.052 1.116** 0.380** 1.001** 
50-249 empl. 0.234* 1.775** 0.690** 1.688** 
>250 empl. 0.780** 2.359** 1.095** 2.516** 
> 1 establishment 0.521** 0.189** 0.313** 0.377** 
Primary customers:     
other businesses -0.115 0.599** 0.137 0.033 
public sector 0.126 -0.006 -0.030 -0.832** 
no primary customers -0.050 0.126 -0.017 -0.306 
% empl. w.university degree 0.012** 0.004** 0.012** 0.006** 
Market share:     
<1% -0.132 -0.482** -0.171 0.199 
1%-5% 0.083 -0.055 0.201 -0.358 
6%-10%  -0.044 0.250 -0.165 0.500* 
11%-25% 0.187 0.300** 0.299 0.118 
> 25%  0.049 0.184 0.297** 0.152 
Constant -8.659** -7.549** -7.795** -9.556** 
Model diagnostics     
N obs 45,562 44,889 45,504 45,800 
N groups 5,116 5,116 5,116 5,116 
Log-likelihood -2,111 -2,549 -1,687 -955 
Rho <0.01 <0.01 <0.01 <0.01 
LL-ratio test for rho=0 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
** denotes significance at the 95% confidence level, * denotes significance at 90% confidence.  
Reference categories: v = 1, ,1-9 empl., primary customers: consumers, market share: unknown. , , 1 0i j vk − − =
All firms included have computers, Internet access, use the WWW, and email. 
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The most important result from the regression analysis is that i, j,v 1k − −  has a positive and significant influ-
ence on adoption rates in all models. Furthermore, the hazard rate for adoption increases the higher the value of 
: All significant coefficients on  decomposed into dummies exhibit an almost linear increase of 
adoption probability. The results are very similar to the static adoption analysis from chapter 5.2. They provide 
strong support to Theorem 3 and Hypothesis 10, which stated that more advanced firms are more likely to fur-
ther improve their technologies, suggesting an endogenous acceleration mechanism of technological develop-
ment. Thus, the technological history and legacy of a firm have a crucial, systematic impact on future invest-
ments and technological developments. This suggests that the diffusion of technological innovations among 
firms should be studied as a path dependent, evolutionary phenomenon, where firm-specific resources are both a 
cause and a consequence of technology adoption.   
i, j,v 1k − − i, j,v 1k − −
Furthermore, significant size-class effects are found in the regressions. Companies with more than one estab-
lishment are more likely to adopt any of the 7 analyzed technologies. Also, large firms with many employees are 
systematically more likely to adopt e-business solutions that are primarily used in-house, such as CRM, E-
learning, ERP and KMS. This supports Hypothesis 3. Large firms with many employees are also more likely to 
adopt SCM, while the size of the firm does not have a significant impact on the adoption of online sales and 
online purchasing.  
Hypothesis 9 is also supported by the regression results: The probability to adopt is low in the early periods 
of the diffusion process and always the highest for the last observed period ( v 9= ). In between, the probability 
to adopt increases in an almost linear fashion, with some random fluctuations in between.  
Also, the results show that the primary customers a firm is serving does have a systematic influence on its 
choice of technologies. For example, the adoption of online sales is clearly prevailing among firms that primar-
ily serve consumers, while it is much less common among firms primarily serving other businesses or the public 
sector. The adoption of purchasing online, CRM and ERP solutions is significantly more frequent among firms 
that have other businesses as their primary customers, and SCM adoption is less frequent for firms primarily 
dealing with the public sector. These findings imply that the particular business environment of a firm greatly af-
fects the expected value of installing a particular technology – not all technologies are suitable to all kinds of 
firms.  
In addition, the regression results show that the percent of employees with a university degree within a com-
pany always has a positive and significant influence on the hazard rate to adopt, with the only exception of 
online sales where the effect is not significant. Thus, a higher proportion of highly qualified staff increases the 
chances of e-business technology adoption. This is consistent with the view that complementary investments 
into human capital are an important part of technology adoption decisions (Brynjolfsson and Hitt 2002, Dewar 
and Dutton 1986). Firms with better human capital resources should face lower total costs of adoption and thus 
higher adoption rates, ceteris paribus. Also, it supports the view that technological progress is biased towards 
more skilled labor (Acemoglu 2002, Pianta 2004). 
The results also show that market share (a proxy for market power) is a significant indicator for the adoption 
of all analyzed technologies, except for e-learning. On the one hand, firms with less than one percent market 
share show lower adoption rates than firms with higher market shares. On the other hand, firms with more than 
25 percent of market share do usually not show the highest hazard rates for adoption, except for KMS. The peak 
usually occurs somewhere in between the two extremes. This lends some support to Hypothesis 4, which states 
that firms with a medium degree of market power are more likely to adopt.  
Finally, the estimated Rho and their significance levels indicate that unobserved heterogeneity is never sig-
nificant in the models, except for online purchasing. Thus, neither sector nor country of origin nor any other fac-
tor that is not explicitly included in our analysis does have a systematic influence on adoption rates. This pro-
vides additional evidence for an endogenous acceleration mechanism because it rules out any unobserved firm-
specific factor as an alternative cause for the observed effects of ki, j,v 1− − . According to the regression results, 
controlling for relevant technological history, time, size class, primary customers, human capital and market 
share is sufficient to explain the differences in adoption rates for most e-business technologies. This seems to be 
in contrast to descriptive evidence on e-business usage patterns, which usually shows pronounced differences 
among sectors and countries (European E-Business Market W@tch 2004, OECD 2004). Also, it provides a new 
perspective on the results from the static analysis in chapter 5.2 that found varying but significant sector and 
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country influences. Interestingly, different dynamic test regressions revealed that controlling for the techno-
logical history ( k ) of a firm makes the panel level variance component Rho insignificanti, j,v 1− −
33, and therefore 
indirectly accounts for part of the variance that is otherwise captured in the country and sector dummy variables. 
Rather than suggesting that country and sector effects are not important, this result could imply that real eco-
nomic differences among countries and sectors (institutions, regulation, competition, cyclical effects etc.) are 
captured to a great extent in the investment history of firms into new technologies. 
i, j,v 1k − −
Like most research, these results are also subject to some potential limitations. The dataset that was used does 
have certain advantages for the purposes of this study (e.g. the large number of observations, the detailed infor-
mation about technology usage), but it also has some potential disadvantages. Certainly, the sample has been 
collected long after the diffusion process started. Thus, it is likely that the sample has a selection bias towards 
the “survivors” of technological competition. This could possibly have an influence on our estimation results, al-
though related diffusion studies using survey data with information about the time of adoption suggested that 
such biases were not severe (Stoneman 2002). Also, the nature of the data forces us to assume that structural 
variables (such as market share, size of the firm) are exogenous and constant over the entire observed period 
from 1994-2002. This is arguably a tough assumption to make, but the only feasible one in lack of a true panel. 
However, treating structural variables as exogenous rather than endogenous actually seems warranted: Treating 
structural variables as endogenous would only be required if they would have an unambiguous influence on 
adoption rates and if the analyzed technologies would have a direct significant and unambiguous positive influ-
ence on firm-level productivity. Productivity effects, however, may not occur immediately. In fact, Brynjolfsson 
and Hitt (2003) suggest that the contribution of computerization to productivity only occurs with a large time lag 
(5 to 7 years). In the meantime, no major direct effects of technology deployment on market shares and firm size 
should be expected. Also, the results suggest that large firms with high market shares are not necessarily the 
most likely to adopt all e-business technologies. Therefore, treating structural variables as exogenous in the 
model does not appear to be a critical assumption, i.e. making them endogenous would probably not change the 
main message of this study. 
Finally, there is one restriction in the estimation model which puts some limits on the conclusion that the 
identified acceleration mechanism is truly and beyond any doubt endogenous to the process. Although the esti-
mation model already controls for unobserved firm-specific factors explicitly, there is the theoretical possibility 
that some unobserved factor does not have a direct impact on the adoption decision, but an indirect one via an 
interactions effect with any of the observable variables. The presence of such an interactions effect cannot be 
ruled out by the finding that there is no direct effect of the unobserved error term. In particular, if such an inter-
actions effect would occur with one of the explanatory variables that varies with time (such as ), it would 
be impossible to differentiate between the true effect of the explanatory variable itself and the time-varying error 
term ( ε ). However, to my best knowledge, there is currently no econometric solution available yet to solve 
this potential identification problem. In addition, the finding that controlling for the technological history 
( ) of a firm makes the unobserved firm-specific error component insignificant makes it hard to argue that 
the observed acceleration effect is driven entirely by some exogenous unobserved interactions effect: Whatever 
firm-specific effects have contributed to the observed level of 
i, j,v 1k − −
ijv
v 1−i, j,k −
i, j,v 1k − −
v
 in the past, they are now included in the 
information that  contains because they are part of the technological history of the firm. And, consistent 
with the theoretical prediction, the technological history of the firm shows the expected systematic effect on fu-
ture investment decisions and it makes the remaining unobserved firm-specific characteristics irrelevant for the 
adoption decision of most e-business technologies in period . This is quite strong evidence for the argument 
that the observed acceleration mechanism is indeed endogenous. 
6.3. Growing digital divide 
The finding that the technological development along a given trajectory of related technologies can be subject 
to an endogenous acceleration mechanism has some important implications. If not all firms start at the same time 
to adopt the new technologies, i.e. if there are some pioneer users and some followers, the endogenous accelera-
tion mechanism will lead to growing differences in technological endowment between them. The differences 
will continue to grow until the most advanced firms do not find any additional technologies belonging to the as-
___________ 
33  Without  Rho is significant, whereas Rho remains significant for . i, j,v 1k − − i, j,vk −
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sociated paradigm that promise positive returns on investment. Only when the most advanced firms stop 
making progress on the trajectory will otherwise comparable follower firms be able to “catch up”. Thus, when a 
new technological trajectory emerges, we can expect an initially growing gap in progress upon the trajectory be-
tween early and late movers. Provided that technological investments do on average yield positive returns, this 
growing gap could have important consequences if early and later adopters are directly competing against each 
other. According to standard arguments, this acceleration mechanism could benefit  early adopters, allowing 
them to capture additional market share, achieving higher profits, and increasing their probability of survival in 
the market, ceteris paribus. 
A growing digital divide among firms can be demonstrated in the data: Let  be the variable counting the 
number of adopted technologies belonging to the trajectory. A higher position on the trajectory is indicated by a 
higher number of adopted technologies. The ongoing diffusion processes should lead to higher average values of 
 over time, while a growing gap will show up as a growing variance of  over time. The results are re-
ported in Table 27.  
ivk
ivivk k
In the first observed period (1994), the mean value of  in the sample is 0.0089. Thus, the vast majority of 
firms has not yet adopted any of the 7 included e-business technologies at this early time. The standard deviation 
of  is quite small with 0.11904. Over time, we observe an increase in the mean value of . In 2002, it 
reaches 0.7854, which is still pretty low considering that some very advanced firms have already adopted all 7 
technologies, while the majority still has adopted none. The increase in the mean value of  is clearly the re-
sult of the ongoing diffusion processes of all 7 technologies. The most interesting finding, however, is the in-
crease in the standard deviation of . Over the entire observation period, the “inequality” in technological en-
dowment with e-business technologies is increasing in the sample. Thus, we exhibit a “growing digital divide” 
as suggested by the finding of an endogenous acceleration mechanism.  
ivk
ivk ivk
ivk
ivk
Table 27 - Mean value and standard deviation of k over time 
 Minimum Maximum Mean Standard De-
viation 
Time period     
1 (1994) 0 5 .0089 .11904 
2 0 6 .0258 .19398 
3 0 7 .0486 .26550 
4 0 7 .0885 .36915 
5 0 7 .1619 .48780 
6 0 7 .2581 .61031 
7 0 7 .4287 .78360 
8 0 7 .6167 .91899 
9 (2002) 0 7 .7854 1.029 
Source: E-Business Market W@tch survey Nov/Dec 2003. N = 5,615. 
All firms included have computers, Internet access, use the WWW, and email. 
 
Figure 10 provides an illustrative representation of the phenomena. In the first period, 99% of all firms have 
adopted none of the 7 technologies, and 1% has adopted 1 technology. As time proceeds, the fraction of firms 
that have adopted none technology continuously decreases and the distribution of k  spreads out, leading to 
higher mean values and a greater disparity in technological endowment in the early periods of the diffusion 
processes. In 2002, the fraction of firms having adopted none of the technologies is 51%, 30% have adopted one 
technology, 13% have adopted two technologies, and 6% have adopted more than two technologies. Clearly, the 
differences in technological endowment between pioneer adopters and followers have continuously increased 
from 1994 to 2002. 
iv
Following the logic of the endogenous acceleration story, the “growing divide” will continue to increase, un-
til the more advanced firms stop making progress on the trajectory and adoption decisions of followers will 
eventually lead to a convergence in technological equipment again. This is another interesting insight from this 
analysis: In the presence of an endogenous acceleration mechanism, a growing divergence in technological 
equipment is a logical consequence in the early phases of the diffusion process, a convergence will only occur in 
the later phases. Maybe a surprising result from this study is that the early phase of e-business diffusion has con-
tinued for such a long period of time (1994-2002), with an ever increasing divergence over the entire observed 
time frame. 
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Figure 10 - Distribution of k over time 
Source: E-Business Market W@tch survey Nov/Dec 2003. N=5,615. All firms included have computers, 
Internet access, use the WWW, and email. 
6.4. Discussion 
 
These results show that current investment decisions are not independent from past investment decisions. 
This implies that history matters for the technological development of a firm. A decision to adopt a technology 
today affects the expected value of any other related technology in the future. Hence, technological development 
can be viewed as a path dependent process where current choices of technologies become the link through 
which prevailing economic conditions may influence the future dimensions of technology, knowledge, and eco-
nomic opportunities (Ruttan 1997).  
The observation of an endogenous acceleration mechanism of technological development along a given tra-
jectory suggests that early mover advantages can exist that are sustainable until the early mover has exhausted 
the possibilities of the trajectory, and followers begin to catch up. The theoretical literature on technology diffu-
sion suggests that if early and late adopters compete on the same output market, early adopters will be able to 
achieve excess profits and capture additional market share until their technological advantage has been perfectly 
copied by all rivals (Reinganum 1981a,b, Götz 1999, Quirmbach 1986). In addition, early mover advantages can 
be sustainable even in the long run if there is free entry and exit in the market, and if firms are not ex ante iden-
tical, for example if there are positive returns to scale, learning-by-doing effects, scarce complementary re-
sources to the new technology, market reputation effects, or discount rates that are lower for previously more 
profitable companies. If first mover rents may not be completely extinguished by other firms following, it might 
be less profitable for later movers to adopt at all. Also, some firms might “pre-emptively” adopt to capture stra-
tegic advantages (Fudenberg and Tirole 1985, Ireland and Stoneman 1985). In the terminology of the resource-
based view (Barney 1991), the existence of an endogenous acceleration mechanism of technological develop-
ment implies that adoption decision can lead to competitive advantages (see section 3.5): The technological en-
dowment of a firm belongs to its set of strategic resources. Furthermore, the current configuration of these re-
sources systematically influences both the possibility and the return of future adoption decisions, as well as cor-
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porate performance34. The presence of the acceleration mechanism implies that imitating rivals will not be 
able to perfectly copy these resources until the early mover has exhausted the development potential of the new 
technological trajectory. Furthermore, it is very likely that some of these competitive advantages will be sustain-
able, because in reality such development processes occur over a long time span where entry and exit to a mar-
ket take place. In addition, there are numerous reasons why positive returns to scale, learning-by-doing effects 
and imperfectly mobile complementary assets can exist in the real world.  
From the adopters’ perspective, this implies that companies must be aware of the path-dependency and the 
strategic role of technology investment decisions. There are two crucial questions that firms need to answer 
when a new technological paradigm emerges: 
1. Is there an alternative technological trajectory available to solve the same problems or to build up the 
same strategic resources? If alternatives do exist, then the adoption decision becomes not only a 
problem of optimal timing, but also a choice between alternative technological development paths. 
In this case, firms also need to evaluate early on whether the entire industry will eventually choose 
one of these alternative development paths. This could be the case if there are some kind of network 
externalities involved that imply that only one dominant industry standard will finally emerge and 
firms that are on the “wrong trajectory” might lose out in the competition (see section 2.3.3). This 
scenario has beyond doubt the most severe strategic implications for a firm because it implies that 
“betting on the wrong horse” could put the very existence of the firm at stake. It also implies that the 
decision to invest into a new trajectory depends on the firm’s expectations about the behavior of 
other firms. Furthermore, the timing of the decision becomes subject to a difficult trade-off. On the 
one hand, being an early mover on the “right” trajectory promises competitive advantages, not least 
because of a possible acceleration mechanism. On the other hand, it has some benefits to wait and 
see which of the trajectories reaches critical mass and emerges as the new industry standard. How-
ever, once this is clear, it might be too late for the firm to capture early mover advantages. 
2. If no technological alternatives exist to the new paradigm, how substantial is the technological un-
certainty35 and how probable are rapid technological improvements in the future? Both of these ef-
fects make it more attractive to delay the investment, according to diffusion theory (see section 3.2). 
However, if technological uncertainty is limited and no dramatic technological improvements can be 
expected for the near future, an early mover strategy will probably be most beneficial, especially if 
an acceleration effect can be expected. 
Arguably, these are tough questions to answer and choosing the correct development path and the optimal 
time to invest are clearly decisions with far reaching consequences that require a very profound knowledge of 
the technological developments and of the behavior of other market players, such as competitors, suppliers, cus-
tomers, and potential new entrants. Given the complexity of the issue, firms might benefit from the knowledge 
of industry experts and consultants to choose their path of action.  
The presence of an endogenous acceleration mechanism also has some important implications for the suppli-
ers and marketers of new technologies: Firms that have previously invested into related technologies can expect 
lower implementation costs and / or higher benefits of adopting additional technologies that belong to the same 
technological paradigm. Thus, they are more likely to make additional investments into such technologies. In 
other words, it should be much easier for technology suppliers to conduct further business with their existing cli-
ents or firms that are already advanced in using compatible technologies than to acquire orders from firms that 
are less advanced or on a different technological trajectory. This will hold until the most advanced firms have 
exhausted the potentials of the new technological trajectory and reach a saturation level. Technology providers 
could actively benefit from this mechanism by systematically studying and understanding the purchasing behav-
ior of their customers and technological interdependencies. It will be easier for them to conduct additional busi-
ness with existing clients if they can offer them technological solutions that are complementary to each other, 
rather than constituting partial or total substitutes (see section 3.5). A quantitative analysis of their data on cus-
___________ 
34 Provided that firms can on average appropriate some private returns from their technology investments, see Chapter 
2.2. 
35 Technological uncertainty in the sense of the risk of an investment project to fail due to technological or implementa-
tion reasons, such as unexpected incompatibility, unexpected implementation costs, or plain technological malfunction. 
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tomer behavior (for example based on the methods of section 5.3 and 5.4) could help them to optimize their 
product portfolio and their cross-product marketing and sales activities.  
 
7. E-business, innovation, and firm performance 
Formel-Kapitel (nächstes) Abschnitt 1 
7.1. Does IT matter? 
 
In a much debated article, Nicholas Carr (2003) argued that IT doesn’t matter anymore as a strategic device 
for companies to gain competitive advantage. His reasoning was both simple and convincing: As IT becomes 
ubiquitous, it turns into an infrastructure technology (just like electricity or telephones) possessed by everyone, 
instead of a resource that is only available to few. Therefore, IT loses its potential for creating sustainable com-
petitive advantage because it is scarcity, not ubiquity, that enables a company to gain an edge over rivals. Carr 
concludes that IT should be viewed and managed as a commodity and not as a strategic asset.  
In this chapter, it is argued that Carr’s argument is not entirely correct because it overlooks an essential prop-
erty of information technology: IT creates numerous, company-specific opportunities to improve processes and 
to generate new products and services for customers that did not previously exist. Hence, IT is inherently strate-
gic because it enables innovation and is therefore a medium to competitive advantage. However, it is not IT per 
se that matters, but what firms do with it. Hard- and software tools offer sets of technologically feasible oppor-
tunities. But they can often be customized and they leave plenty degrees of freedom to the user to decide how, 
when, or for what purpose the technology will be used. One and the same IT tool can have varying impacts in 
two different firm (Chan 2000)– the impact depends on how the two firms decide to utilize the technology, and 
to what extent they take advantage of a new technology to introduce innovations to their business.  
Innovation is a strategic tool because it fulfills two purposes: Firms conduct innovation because they seek 
profitable investment opportunities (profit incentive) and they seek to give themselves a strategic advantage over 
their rivals (competitive threat). A strategic advantage may occur because a better process or a better product can 
enhance a firm’s market share. If a firm knows that its rivals are engaging in innovative activities, it will see its 
own competitive position as being under threat. This creates an incentive to also invest in innovation in order not 
to lose out to rivals (Beath et. al. 1995, Götz 1999).  
From this reasoning, four main questions arise that can be addressed in this empirical study. First, how much 
innovation is actually enabled by IT, in particular by Internet-based technologies? Second, do innovative firms 
generally perform better? Third, is there a difference between IT-related innovation and other kinds of innova-
tion in terms of correlation with firm performance? And fourth, does a high endowment with Internet-based 
technologies translate into better performance? 
In this study, organizational performance is measured in terms of profitability, turnover development and em-
ployment development. The objective is to analyze the relationship between these performance variables and 
different kinds of innovation, including IT-related and non-IT-related innovations.  
Scholars of firm performance have made numerous contributions to identify the determinants of organiza-
tional performance. However, a fundamental problem is the identification of causality in such studies. As March 
and Sutton (1997) noted: “Most studies of organizational performance are incapable of identifying the true 
causal relations among performance variables and other variables correlated with them through the data and 
methods they normally use. Although there are studies that mitigate these shortcomings, the emperor of organ-
izational performance studies is for the most part rather naked.” It has to be admitted upfront that in this regard 
this study can only offer additional invisible clothing to the poor emperor. With respect to the relationship of in-
novation and organizational performance, the principal question that is so hard to answer is whether firms’ per-
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form well because they are innovative, or if they are able to innovate because they perform well. It is not the 
purpose of this study to resolve this question, and the results of the study can be interpreted in both ways.  
Yet, the empirical evidence presented in this chapter is sufficient to demonstrate that IT can matter for gain-
ing competitive advantage because it enables innovation. It is found that more important than the absolute en-
dowment with information technologies is whether and how firms use them to conduct innovation. Also, the 
study is unique because it provides new insights into the relationship between IT- and non-IT-based innovative 
activities and performance measures. The results suggest that IT-based innovation are not inferior to other kinds 
of innovation and that appropriability problems can occur with both IT- and non-IT-based innovations. The 
econometric model introduced in this article is particularly suitable to study organizational performance because 
it allows to control both for unobserved firm- and market-specific effects that can influence corporate perform-
ance. The data set used here is also unique because it is timely, containing a very large sample of enterprises 
from various sectors and countries in the European Union, and because it allows to differentiate between IT-
based and non-IT-based innovation. Together, the data and the methods used here enable a more differentiated 
discussion about the strategic relevance of IT.  
7.2. Theoretical background 
Various scholars have stressed the importance of innovation for corporate performance. Audretsch (1995) 
finds that new firms that are able to innovate experience higher growth rates and greater chances of survival. Ce-
fis and Marsili (2003) also find a positive effect of innovation on firms’ survival. In addition, their findings sug-
gest that small and young firms can benefit most from innovation in order to survive in the market. Geroski et al. 
(1993) show that successfully innovating firms are more profitable due to the direct effect of the new product or 
process, and because of the indirect effect associated with the transformation of a firm’s internal capabilities that 
enable the firm to better profit from knowledge spillovers and relative insensitivity to macroeconomic shocks. 
Mansfield (1968) reports that innovators are more likely to grow than other firms during the years after an inno-
vation. Czarnitzki and Kraft (2004) report better credit ratings among innovative firms up to a certain threshold, 
whilst too many innovative activities reduce the rating. Griliches (1981) and Blundell et al. (1999) report greater 
stock market values for innovating firms.  
Despite these generally positive impacts of innovation on performance, many innovating firms fail to obtain 
significant economic returns from an innovation, while customers, imitators and other industry participants 
benefit. Thus, there are often appropriability problems for the innovator because of the difficulties to protect the 
innovation from imitation by rivals (Levin et al. 1987, Teece 1987). To accommodate, firms typically try to ap-
propriate private returns from innovation with a range of mechanism, including patents, secrecy, lead time ad-
vantages and the use of complementary capabilities (Cohen et al. 2000). Methods of appropriability vary mark-
edly across and within industries and not all methods work well in all cases. 
Patents rarely yield perfect appropriability because they can be “invented around” at modest costs and are 
only effective in a few industries (Harabi 1994, Teece 1987). Arundel (2001) presents survey results showing 
that a higher percentage of firms in all size classes rate secrecy as more valuable than patents. Levin et al. (1987) 
and Harabi (1995) find evidence that for process innovations lead time is the most effective means of appropri-
ability. For product innovations, superior sales and service efforts are most effective, followed by lead time. 
Baumol (2002) stresses that the advantages of being first to innovate have successfully sped up the pace of tech-
nological progress in free market societies, because “time is money”.  
A different stream of literature analyzes the firm-level impacts of IT investments on performance variables, 
without linking them explicitly to innovation. The effect of IT investments is still subject to debate, because not 
all studies have demonstrated clear payoffs from IT investment (Chan 2000, Kohli and Devaraj 2003). Also, the 
results vary depending on how performance and IT payoffs are measured and analyzed. For example, Hitt and 
Brynjolfsson (1996) find positive impacts of IT investments on productivity, but not on profits. Prasad and 
Harker (1997) did not find positive effects of IT capital on productivity, while IT labor positively contributed to 
output and profitability.  
Positive effects of IT spending on firm-level productivity are reported, for example, by Brynjolfsson and Hitt 
(1996, 2000, 2003), Greenwood and Jovanovic (1998), and Bertschek and Kaiser (2004). Many of these studies 
stress that the effect of IT on productivity is rather indirect, arising if IT investments are combined with com-
plementary investments into work practices, human capital, and organizational restructuring. 
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Analyzing the profitability of IT, Stoneman and Kwon (1996) show that the profits of non-adopters of IT 
are reduced as other firms adopt new IT and that the gross profit gains of IT adoption are related to firm and in-
dustry characteristics and the number of other users of the technology. Similarly, Weill (1992) suggests that 
early adopters of IT are likely to benefit, but once the technology becomes common the competitive advantage is 
lost.  
Analyzing the effects of IT investments on firm level growth, Devaraj and Kohli (2000, 2003) find positive 
effects of IT investments and IT usage on revenue development in the health care sector. Using data from the in-
surance industry, Harris and Katz (1991) found that top performing firms with high premium income growth had 
higher IT expense ratios and lower non-IT costs. Weill (1992) found positive effects of IT investment on sales 
growth among valve manufacturing firms. 
In a meta analysis of studies on IT payoff, Kohli and Devaraj (2003) find that positive impacts of IT on per-
formance are more likely to be found in studies using large data sets from primary sources. Also, studies using 
longitudinal firm-level data that allow to control for time-lag effects are more likely to find positive impacts of 
IT. Results tend to vary greatly among different industry sectors. In addition, different results tend to be reported 
for different kinds of dependent variables being analyzed. Generally, more studies suggest positive impacts of IT 
investments on productivity and growth than on profitability. 
Variations in performance outcomes of firms investing into IT can be related to firm-specific resources that 
are unequally distributed among firms (Melville et al. 2004, Bharadwaj 2000). This reasoning is related to the 
resource-based view of the firm (Barney 1991) that proposes that firms could obtain competitive advantage 
based on firm-specific resources that are specific, valuable, rare, imperfectly imitable, and not strategically sub-
stitutable by other resources. Following the resource-based view, Santhanam and Hartono (2003) find that IT 
capability is related to superior firm performance. Richardson et al. (2003) show that performance differences 
can be attributed to the IT conversion capability of firms, which is conceptualized as reflecting the ability of 
firms to leverage the potential of information technologies. 
The resource-based view, which focuses on firm-internal factors influencing performance differences, can be 
complemented by the conceptual link between IT adoption and innovation that is proposed in section 1.4.4. In 
particular, a possible reason why various studies did not find positive relationships between IT investments and 
performance is because it is not the investment into new technology per se that determines performance, but how 
these investments are transformed into process and service innovations. Firm-specific resources such as manage-
rial skills, know-how, experience, the presence of technical experts and prior technological investments may be 
responsible for the ability of firms to transfer IT investments into innovation. After the IT investment has suc-
cessfully triggered an innovation within the firm, the performance outcome of the investment will depend on the 
type of the innovation that was carried out and the market response of competitors and customers. In this con-
text, the timing of the innovation is important and the appropriability strategy of the firm, i.e. the ability of the 
firm to protect its innovation from imitation by competitors. 
 
7.3.  An error component model of firm performance 
 
It is obvious that, besides innovative activities, numerous other factors also influence the performance of an 
enterprise. For example, this includes the market in which a firm operates, the presence of economies of scale 
and the size of the firm, the prevailing market structure and the market share of the enterprise, as well as firm-
internal structures and resources, including the technology the firm uses, its organizational structure, human re-
sources, and managerial competence. Lenz (1981) provides an interdisciplinary summary of numerous “deter-
minants” of organizational performance.  
Hence, in order to identify the relationship between innovation and firm performance, one needs to control 
for alternative factors that influence performance. The challenge in this study (as well as in most other studies 
with a similar objective) is that not all factors that could play a role are actually observable in the data.  
Because not all relevant factors can be observed, it is necessary to make some preferably non-critical assump-
tions about them. For this purpose, an error component model of firm performance is introduced here that en-
ables to control separately for firm-specific and market-specific unobserved effects when estimating the influ-
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ence of the observable characteristics on performance variables. This enables to disentangle the effects of 
unobservable market characteristics and the effects of the observable firm level characteristics, for which we ob-
tain coefficient estimates. 
We observe a cross-section of a large number N of heterogeneous firms with index i . Each firm op-
erates primarily on one market, and there are J different markets with index 
1,..., N=
Jj 1,...,= . We are interested in the 
performance of firm  in market , which is recorded in the dependent variable . Performance depends on a 
vector of observable firm-specific characteristics 
i j ijy
ijx . In addition, performance also depends on unobservable 
market-specific effects u  and unobservable firm-specific effects j ijε . Thus, performance is a function of various 
firm-specific characteristics and two unobservable error terms: 
 
(7.1) ij ij j ijy f (x ,u ,= ε )  
 
In this study, ijx  consists of the following variables: 
1x  = dummies indicating four different kinds of innovative activity 
2x  = firm size (measured by number of employees in four categories) 
3x  = market share (measured in % in six categories) 
4x  = % of employees with a university degree 
5x  = number of e-business technologies installed by the firm 
 
The technologies which are included in  and their relative frequency of occurrence are listed in Table 22. 
A more detailed description of the data follows in 7.4. 
5x
The economic conditions within one market are comparable for all firms operating in that market, but they 
can vary greatly among markets. Hence, u  is equal for all firms operating in market , but  can vary. All 
relevant firm-specific effects are captured in 
j j ju
ijε . Identification requires to assume that  is independent of all 
observable factors 
ijε
ijx . 
Yet, the advantage of the model is that we do not need to assume that the market-specific effect  is inde-
pendent from the firm specific effect  , 
ju
ijε j ijE[u | ] 0ε ≠ . Also, we do not assume independence of  from the 
observable firm-specific characteristics 
ju
j ijE[u | x ] 0≠ . Clearly, such an assumption would violate basic eco-
nomic reasoning. Consider the relationship of market structure and the observed market share of an individual 
enterprise: If a market is characterized by perfect competition, we will not expect to find a firm with a high share 
in that market. Vice versa, a highly concentrated market may only exhibit a low number of firms with high mar-
ket shares. Hence, market structure and market share of each firm are correlated. In our case, it is possible to ob-
serve the market share of each firm in the data, but we do not know the exact market structure in which each 
firm operates. However, this unobservable market structure, which is captured in , is very likely to effect firm 
performance. Similar arguments can be made with respect to the other observable characteristics.  
ju
We consider a qualitative indicator variable  of firm performance that takes a value of  if a specific 
criteria is observed, and 
y y 1=
y 0=  otherwise. For example,  could be profitability taking a value of  if the 
firm has been profitable last year and  otherwise. Hence,  is a Bernoulli distributed random variable and 
the occurrence of  is conditional on various observable and unobservable characteristics, as defined in (7.1). 
Assuming that the influence of the conditional characteristics is linear, the probability that a firm observes 
y y 1=
y 0= y
y
y 1=  
can be written as 
 
(7.2) ij ij ij j ij ij j i jp Pr[y 1| x ,u ] E(y | x ,u ) F( x u )′= = = = β +  
 
where  is the cdf of the individual specific error term F ijε  that maps i j( x u )′β +  into the (0;1) range. In order 
to get consistent estimates for  in (7.2), it is necessary to eliminate the unobserved market-specific effects  
from the equation. Following Chamberlain (1980), the solution to this problem lies in specifying F as the logistic 
cdf and writing the likelihood function based on the conditional distribution of the data, conditioned on a set of 
β ju
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sufficient statistics for . By definition of a sufficient statistic, the distribution of the data given this suffi-
cient statistic will not depend on  anymore.  
ju
ju
ix
ij
j i
x
j in
) | d
Chamberlain (1980) showed that a sufficient statistic for u  is j iji y∑  and that the conditional log-likelihood 
function will only depend on β , , and : ijy
 
(7.3) 
j
ij ij i
d B i
L ln[exp( y ) / exp( x d )]
∈
′ ′= β β∑ ∑ ∑ ∑  
 
where 
  j 1 i
i i
B d (d ,...,d 0 or 1 and d y = = = =  ∑ ∑ ij
n
 
and  is the number of firms in market .  is in conditional logit form (McFadden 1974) with the alterna-
tive set ( ) varying across the markets. The estimator only considers markets where 
i
, because 
the individual likelihood contribution of a market with no single positive observation or all positive observations 
is zero according to (7.3). Since  is in the form of a conditional logit log-likelihood function, it can be maxi-
mized by standard programs and all inference follows directly from conditional MLE theory (Wooldridge, 2002, 
p. 492). Thus, by conditioning the log-likelihood function on 
i∑ , the u  are swept away and a consistent es-
timator is obtained that does not place any restrictions on the distribution or co-variance of the unobservable 
group-specific effect. Solution (7.3) critically depends on choosing F to be the logistic cdf, a similar simplifica-
tion for probit models has not yet been found (Baltagi, 2001, p. 209).  
  
7.4. Empirical results 
The dataset used for this study originates from the Nov/Dec 2003 enterprise survey of the e-Business Market 
W@tch. Survey participants were randomly selected from 10 sectors and 25 European countries, but not all sec-
tors were covered in each country. However, the number of enterprises sampled in each country-sector cell was 
large enough to be representative of the underlying population. The economic conditions within each sector can 
be very different depending on the country. In addition, market structures and the economic conditions can vary 
greatly between the sectors of each country. However, the economic conditions for firms operating in the same 
country and the same sector can be assumed to be reasonably comparable. In the dataset, each firm belongs un-
ambiguously to a specific country-sector group of enterprises, which we define as the relevant market in our 
study. Overall, the sample contains 101 markets (the market index in the regression model is defined as 
). On average, we observe approximately 60 firms per market and a total of 7,302 firms.  
The dataset contains qualitative information about firm performance. In particular, firms were asked the fol-
lowing questions relating to their performance: 
- Has your company been profitable over the past 12 months? (yes / no / don’t know, not applicable) 
- Has the turnover of your company increased, decreased or roughly stayed the same when comparing 
the last financial year with the year before? (increased / decreased / roughly stayed the same / don’t 
know, not applicable) 
Based on these questions, seven binary performance variables were computed that serve as dependent vari-
ables in the analysis . In this study, all seven binary variables are analyzed in separate regression models. This 36
___________ 
36 Observations with missing values or subjects answering „don’t know, not applicable“ were dropped from the analysis. 
This included 14.4% of the sample for turnover development, 11.8% for profitability, and 1.2% for employment develop-
ment. 
jn
B
j L
j ij j0 y< <∑
L
ijy j
 
j 1,...,101=
- Has the number of employees in your company increased, decreased, or roughly stayed the same 
during the past 12 months? (increased / decreased / roughly stayed the same / don’t know) 
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allows to get detailed insights into the effects of different kinds of innovation and technological development 
status on financial performance, employment effects, and firm growth. All models follow the same basic struc-
ture, they are only different in the dependent variable.  
The advantage of this type of qualitative data is that it provides information about dynamic developments 
which are independent of the size of each firm, although only one cross-section is observed. Information about 
absolute turnovers and the number of employees in the survey are only useful to identify the size of a firm, but 
they do not provide any information about dynamic developments and performance if no true panel data are 
available. Alternatively, one could survey firms about the absolute size of changes ( ∆ ), but such detailed in-
formation are usually not obtainable in telephone interviews.  
In addition to the above questions that related to the performance of enterprises, the survey also contained 
questions that related to different kinds of innovative activities of firms. In particular, the following two ques-
tions were asked: 
- Has your company introduced new company internal processes during the past 12 months? (yes / no 
/ don’t know, not applicable) 
A particular goal of the survey was to find out the share of innovative activity that is directly related to or en-
abled by Internet-based technology. Therefore, companies that indicated in the introductory questions that they 
had conducted innovations in the past 12 months were asked two follow up questions: 
- Has any of your product / service innovations over the past 12 months been directly related to or en-
abled by Internet-based technology? (yes / no / don’t know, not applicable) 
- Has any of your company internal process innovations been directly related to or enabled by Inter-
net-based technology? (yes / no / don’t know, not applicable) 
 
Internet-enabled  
Figure 11 – Innovative activities of companies 2002-2003 
Note: Unweighted survey results, e-Business Market W@tch Nov/Dec 2003 
52.3% of enterprises in the sample introduced substantially improved products or services to their customers 
in 2003. 41.1% of these product or service innovations has been directly related to or enabled by Internet-based 
technology. This corresponds to 21.5% of enterprises in the sample that have introduced Internet-based product 
or service innovations in 2003. The importance of the Internet is even more pronounced for process innovations: 
t
- Has your company introduced new or substantially improved products or services to your customers 
during the past 12 months? (yes / no / don’t know, not applicable) 
96% of the survey respondents (N = 7,302) provided valid responses on the product / service innovation 
questions, and 96.5% on the process innovation questions. The relative frequencies of these questions are dis-
played in Figure 11.  
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42.8% of enterprises say that they introduced new internal processes in 2003. About one half of these process 
innovations were directly related to or enabled by Internet-based technology.  
Thus, it can be concluded that a substantial amount of innovative activity in the European Union was related 
to or enabled by IT and Internet-based technologies in 2003. 
Another interesting finding is reported in Table 28: There is a strong significant positive correlation between 
product innovations and process innovations that are Internet-related. Similarly, non-Internet-enabled product 
and process innovations are also positively correlated at a high level of significance. On the other hand, Internet-
enabled innovations are negatively associated with non-Internet-related innovations. Hence, it appears that there 
are three clusters of firms: Those that use IT and the Internet extensively to conduct both product/service and in-
ternal innovations, and those that also innovate in both domains, but without using the Internet. The third cluster 
of firms comprises of firms that do not innovate or only innovate in one domain. The correlations suggest that 
many companies make a conscious decision about whether they want to rely on IT to conduct innovation, or not.  
Table 28 – Pearson correlations of innovative activity indicators 
 Product innovation –  
general 
Product innovation – 
Internet enabled 
Process innovation -  
general 
0.2897** -0.1190** 
Process innovation -  
Internet enabled 
-0.1730** 0.4858** 
N = 6,879. e-Business Market W@tch Nov/Dec 2003. 
** denotes significance at the 99% confidence level. 
 
Table 29 shows the descriptive summary statistics for the dependent variables. 44.3% of enterprises in the 
sample experienced increasing turnover from 2002-2003, 82% report profitability for this period, and 23.3% re-
port increasing employment. Less than one fifth of the sample recorded decreasing turnover, decreasing em-
ployment or no profits.  
 
Table 29 – Performance indicators of companies 2002-2003 
 Relative fre-
quency 
N 
Turnover: comparison last financial year with year 
before 
  
increased 44.3% 
decreased 20.4% 
roughly stayed the same 35.3% 
6,253 
Has your company been profitable over the last 12 
month? 
  
yes 82% 6,443 
No. of employees: comparison last financial year 
with year before 
  
increased 23.2% 
decreased 17.5% 
roughly stayed the same 59.3% 
7,218 
Note: Unweighted survey results from Nov/Dec 2003. 
 
 
Table 3  shows the correlation coefficients of the performance indicators. Not surprisingly, we find that firms 
that experience turnover growth are significantly more likely to be profitable and to increase employment and 
vice versa. Noticeably, the development of turnover and employment are measures indicating whether a com
pany is growing, declining, or stagnating. According to Table 3 , growth is positively related to profitability, 
however it is not a pre-requisite of profitability. A significant proportion of firms in the sample are profitable al
0
-
0
-
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though they did not increase employment. Also, some firms (not a significant part) are profitable although 
they experience decline. 
 
Table 30 - Pearson correlations of performance indicators 
 Profit Employment 
(increase) 
Employment 
(unchanged) 
Employment 
(decrease) 
Turnover  
(increase) 
0.2215* 
(N=5,887) 
0.3439* 
(N=6,226) 
-0.1239* 
(N=6,226) 
-0.2144* 
(N=6,226) 
Turnover 
(unchanged) 
0.007 
(N=5,887) 
-0.1886* 
(N=6,226) 
0.1940* 
(N=6,226) 
-0.0425* 
(N=6,226) 
Turnover 
(decreased) 
-0.2825* 
(N=5,887) 
-0.2001* 
(N=6,226) 
-0.0776 
(N=6,226) 
0.3147* 
(N=6,226) 
Profit 
 
    
Employment 
(increase) 
0.1126* 
(N=6,408) 
   
Employment 
(unchanged) 
0.0894* 
(N=6,408) 
   
Employment 
(decrease) 
-0.2391* 
(N=6,408) 
   
e-Business Market W@tch Nov/Dec 2003. 
* denotes significance at the 99% confidence level. 
 
The error component model of (7.3) was estimated using these data. Table 31 reports the regression results 
for turnover development. Table 32 shows the results for profit and employment development.  
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Table 31 – Fixed effect logistic regression results on turnover development 
Co-variables Turnover  
increase 
Turnover  
unchanged 
Turnover  
decreased 
Product or service innova-
tions last year: 
   
Internet-related 0.402** -0.205* -0.293** 
general 0.439** -0.280** -0.219** 
Internal process innovations 
last year: 
   
Internet-related 0.395** -0.342** -0.136 
general 0.331** -0.219** -0.181 
10-49 empl. 0.257** -0.024 -0.307** 
50-249 empl. 0.274** 0.127 -0.592** 
>250 empl. 0.409** -0.196 -0.347* 
Market share:    
< 1% -0.294** -0.128 0.502** 
1%-5% -0.059 -0.153 0.285* 
6%-10%  0.233* -0.061 -0.283 
11%-25% 0.122 -0.077 -0.071 
> 25%  0.144 -0.092 -0.087 
% empl. w. university degree 0.001 0.001 -0.002 
# e-business technologies 0.152** -0.125** -0.064 
Model diagnostics    
N obs 5,697 5,697 5,697 
N groups 101 101 101 
Log-likelihood -3,355 -3,328 -2,453 
Sign. (Prob>chi2) 0.000 0.000 0.000 
** denotes significance at the 95% confidence level, * denotes significance at 90% confidence.  
Reference categories: no innovations last year, 1-9 empl.,  market share unknown 
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Table 32 - Fixed effect logistic regression results on profit and employment development 
Co-variables Profit Employment 
increase 
Employment 
unchanged 
Employment  
decreased 
Product or service innova-
tions last year: 
  
  
Internet-related 0.351** 0.409** -0.196* -0.165 
general 0.238** 0.379** -0.155* -0.171* 
Internal process innova-
tions last year: 
  
  
Internet-related 0.026 0.579** -0.400** -0.093 
general 0.048 0.495** -0.402** 0.063 
10-49 empl. 0.046 0.885** -0.726** 0.228** 
50-249 empl. -0.079 0.876** -0.881** 0.495** 
>250 empl. -0.097 0.860** -1.241** 0.988** 
Market share:     
< 1% -0.536** -0.098 -0.198* 0.388** 
1%-5% -0.039 -0.026 -0.157 0.274* 
6%-10%  -0.007 0.172 -0.201 0.126 
11%-25% 0.347* 0.319** -0.350** 0.172 
> 25%  0.229* 0.075 -0.100 0.083 
% empl. w. university de-
gree 
0.000 0.001 0.000 -0.001 
# e-business technologies 0.033 0.034 -0.085** 0.081* 
Model diagnostics     
N obs 5,796 6,415 6,415 6,415 
N groups 100 101 101 101 
Log-likelihood -2,320 -2,905 -3,783 -2,586 
Sign. (Prob>chi2) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
** denotes significance at the 95% confidence level, * denotes significance at 90% confidence.  
Reference categories: no innovations last year, 1-9 empl.,  market share unknown 
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The regression results indicate that all four kinds of innovation are positively associated with turnover and 
employment growth and negatively associated with stagnating turnover and employment development. This sup-
ports Hypothesis 6 and Hypothesis 8, which stated that innovators are more likely to grow and to expand their 
employment than non-innovators, independent from their ability to achieve excess profits. This is in line with re-
lated empirical evidence by Mansfield (1968), who reported that innovators in the steel and petroleum industries 
grew more rapidly than other firms in those industries during the years after an innovation. Also, this supports 
the finding that firms innovating in products, but also in processes, are more likely to expand their employment 
than non-innovative firms, because they grow faster in their respective markets (Pianta 2004, Pasinetti 1981). 
However, there are also some differences between product and process innovations: While product innova-
tions are positively associated with profitability, internal process innovations do not show a significant interrela-
tion with profits. Also, product innovations are negatively associated with decreasing turnover and non-Internet-
enabled product innovations are negatively associated with decreasing employment. Thus, firms that conduct 
product or service innovations are less likely to be in the group of firms experiencing decline. However, this 
does not hold for internal process innovations. Enterprises engaged in improving internal processes are not less 
likely to exhibit decreasing employment or turnover levels. This corresponds with the view that process innova
tions are a defensive strategy, whereas product innovations are an offensive, growth-oriented strategy. Also, it 
implies that process innovations are more likely to have a labor-substituting effect at the firm level than product 
innovations, i.e., firms facing a decline might invest into a labor-saving process innovation to reduce costs.  
-
-
___________ 
37 This obviously must not hold for enterprise start-ups, i.e. it is a „ceteris paribus“ prediction.  
An interesting finding is that differentiating between Internet- and non-Internet related innovations reveals 
only small differences in estimated coefficients, i.e. whether firms use the Internet or not to conduct innovations 
is less important than whether they innovate at all. Also, the differences between process- and product-
innovations are greater than the differences between Internet- and non-Internet related innovations.  
In addition, it is interesting to observe that firms being more advanced in the use of IT (i.e. firms having 
adopted a higher number of Internet-based technologies) have a greater chance to exhibit increasing turnover. 
However, no significant effect can be reported for profitability. Thus, the empirical evidence on Hypothesis 5 is 
ambiguous. Hypothesis 5 claimed that early movers enjoy excess returns. A possible reason why there is no 
clear support for this hypothesis is that the theories suggesting this claim are based on the assumption that there 
is only moderate or no improvement in the technology over time and that the technological risk is limited or 
null. These are arguably tough assumptions for analyzing e-business technologies because there continues to be 
both a rapid decline in the price for computer hard- and software and ongoing improvements in the technologies 
(Moore’s law). Thus, the early mover advantages could be limited to assist firm’s growth strategies due to ongo
ing innovative activities rather than reflecting actual superior profitability.  
In addition, the regression results show that firms who are more advanced in using e-business technologies 
show a higher chance of being in the group of firms that decrease employment, suggesting that e-business tech-
nologies might – after all – have a labor substituting effect. This supports Hypothesis 7.  
The results also support standard economic predictions: Small firms with little market share are less likely to 
be profitable, and they are also less likely to exhibit increasing turnovers37. On the other hand, firms with high 
market shares are significantly more likely to be profitable, suggesting that they can exploit a certain degree of 
market and price setting power. Firms with low market shares have a higher chance to exhibit shrinkage in turn-
over and employment development, suggesting a decline of enterprises that were not able to capture larger 
shares of their respective markets.  
In all regressions, the proxy variable for human resources (% of employees with a university degree) did not 
turn out to be significant, possibly suggesting that it was an improper proxy to measure the relevant types of 
human resources required in different kinds of firms.  
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7.5. Discussion 
 
There are five key messages arising from the empirical analysis: 
1. Internet-based technologies are currently important enablers of innovation. 
2. All four types of innovation are positively associated with turnover and employment growth at the 
firm level. 
3. Only product/service innovations are positively associated with profitability. Process innovations do 
not show a significant interrelation with profits. 
4. Internet-enabled innovations are at the very least not “inferior” to other kinds of innovations in terms 
of positive correlation with performance indicators. 
5. More important than the technologies themselves (the number of e-business technologies they have 
installed) is what firms do with them (whether they are used to conduct innovations or not). 
 
Although the direction of the causality between innovative activities and performance is ambiguous, it may 
appear surprising to find that only product/service innovations are positively associated with profitability, while 
process innovations are not. However, the results can be rationalized, assuming that performance follows inno
vation: A simple explanation could be that process innovations take longer to generate positive returns than 
product innovations. Process innovations are organizationally embedded and have to be routinized. Such lagged 
effects are obviously not observable in this cross-sectional dataset. Also, process innovation might be interde
pendent with other technologies and firm-specific resources and may there-fore not yield optimal returns if those 
complementary assets are not available or not advanced enough. 
-
-
-
In addition, from a theoretical point of view it can be argued that strategic advantages of conducting process 
innovations are only sustainable (thus leading to excess profits) if direct rivals have not imitated the innovation 
yet (Reinganum 1981b, Götz 1999). According to this view, the adoption of generic “best practice” solutions or 
technology, often suggested by process re-engineering consultants and standard business software packages, 
generate only temporary excess returns at best, as long as competitors did not successfully copy the same prac
tice. To a certain extent, the invention and implementation of a “best practice” solutions bears the public good 
problem of information (Geroski 1995): A “best practice” or standardized technological solution may be non-
rivalrous in the sense that its invention and use by one firm does not automatically preclude the use by another. 
It may also be non-excludable if the producer of the new knowledge is unable to effectively prevent non-payers 
from using it. Thus, a successful process innovator may involuntarily create a positive externality for the market 
without being able to get a private benefit from the investment. Such externalities might be desirable from a so-
cial welfare point of view, but their existence limits the incentives of firms to invest in such activities. This theo-
retical appropriability problem is alleviated if the costs of conducting the process innovation or implementing 
the new technology is not zero, if the process and the associated technology is complex, and if it relates to other 
complementary or specialized assets of the firm that cannot be easily copied by rivals. Thus, sustainable advan-
tages arising from process innovations and new production technologies can only be achieved if the innovation 
cannot be perfectly copied by rivals. Note that this argument does not only apply to IT-based process technolo-
gies, but to process innovations in general.  
The public good problem of innovation, and hence the associated appropriability problems are not as severe 
for product/service innovations than for process innovations. Naturally, it is much easier to claim property rights 
and charge for an innovation if it can be embodied in an output sold as a new product or service. Often, products 
or services can be differentiated vis-à-vis competitors offers, making perfect imitation less likely and hence in-
creasing the chance of appropriating private returns from the investment. The empirical result that product inno-
vations are positively associated with profitability, but process innovations are not could suggest that firms in a 
given industry are more successful in differentiating their products and services than their production processes. 
Yet, the successful diffusion of a new “best practice” in an industry may still lead to higher productivity in the 
firms adopting the “best practice”. This leads to lower production costs of the more productive firms, which 
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makes it optimal for them to increase their output levels at a given market price. Thus, this process leads to 
growth of the process innovating firms and the entire industry. However, as more industry players imitate the 
new process and output grows, the equilibrium price in the market will fall, to the benefit of consumers and so
cial welfare (Reinganum 1981b, Götz 1999). Via this mechanism, consumers might be the actual winners of 
wide-spread process innovations within an industry. The empirical evidence presented in this study is consistent 
with this theory.  
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
From this perspective, the results suggest that adopting generic “best practice” solutions, often associated 
with standard business software and process re-engineering, do at best generate temporary excess returns, as 
long as competitors did not successfully copy the same practice. This suggests that sustainable advantages that 
are due to IT can only be achieved in two ways: (1) if the technology triggering a process innovation can be cus
tomized, complementing some other scarce resource of the firm, thus limiting imitation; or (2) if the technology 
can be used to innovate a new product or service offer that is valuable to customers and cannot be perfectly cop
ied by competitors.  
Assuming a reverse causality, i.e. if innovation follows performance and not the other way around, the em
pirical results also have an interesting implication: It would suggest that profitable firms are more likely to invest 
in product than in process innovation, which would imply that profitable firms are generally more customer ori-
ented, focusing on new products and services to satisfy customer needs rather than on cost leadership.  
In any case, the results emphasize the strategic importance of information technology. IT matters because it is 
an important enabler of innovation. Information technology and e-business tools in particular enable process in-
novations, if the implementation of the new technology succeeds, the routines are changed, and the new system 
is actually utilized. Also, IT and e-business tools can enable product or service innovations, if the new technol
ogy is successfully used to offer a new service or deliver products to customers in a way that is new to the enter-
prise. Depending on how the new technologies are used, the strategic objectives and consequences of IT can be 
quite different: The primary objective of process innovations is to reduce costs for a given output, i.e. to improve 
productivity, involving appropriability problems if the same process and the same technology can be perfectly 
copied by rivals. Yet, even in the case that firms cannot gain excess profits from their IT-enabled process inno
vation, increased efficiency often leads to growth and higher chances of survival in a given market, which can 
also be a strategic objective. On the other side, if IT is used to create new product and service offers, the strate
gic objective can be to explore new markets and to differentiate services and delivery modes from competitors, 
which can result in sustainable advantages. Especially this last point is often overlooked in the discussion about 
the relevance of IT, though this study demonstrates the empirical relevance of IT as an enabler of product and 
service innovations. 
However, once the innovative potentials of IT in general and Internet-based technologies in particular will be 
exhausted, further investments will lose their strategic relevance and IT will become an infrastructure like streets 
or railways, just like Nicolas Carr (2003) suggested. However, according to the evidence presented here, which 
is based on 2003 data, we are still far away from such a point. Also, the development of new IT applications for 
business purposes is still thriving. This suggests that IT will maintain its strategic importance, simply because 
new IT applications will facilitate further process and product/service innovations among the adopters of these 
new technologies. Yet, the ability of firms to successfully transfer IT into innovation is still not a sufficient con
dition for superior performance and sustainable competitive advantage because performance also depends on the 
behavior of customers and competitors. However, the results of this study suggest that firms using IT to innovate 
are – at the very least – not less successful than firms using other ways to innovate. Also, innovative firms in our 
sample are clearly more likely to be successful than non-innovative firms. 
Limitations 
It should be recalled that appropriability methods vary greatly in their kind and effectiveness among indus
tries (Levin et al. 1987, Cohen et al. 2000). Thus, the empirical results of this study with respect to profitability 
could be sensitive to the industries included in the sample. Consequently, the result of this study that process in
novation (whether IT-enabled or not) does not correspond to higher profitability  should not be generalized.  
Furthermore, although the data used for this analysis are unique and interesting in various ways, they also 
have shortcomings. Obviously, it would be desirable to have panel data to observe the causality of innovation on 
firm performance, as well as the effects of past performance and other lagged variables. In addition, panel data 
would enable to control for unobserved heterogeneity at the firm level. Also, quantitative instead of qualitative 
performance variables would be desirable because they contain a greater amount of information. In addition, 
given that the data were collected via computer-aided telephone interviews with firm executives and IT manag
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ers, one might question the precision of their answers, especially with regard to financial performance meas
ures. Yet, as long as the potential imprecision of their answers is not systematically related with the explanatory 
variables, the direction of the regression results will remain unaffected. For most variables, this seems to be a 
plausible assumption. However, there is one exception: It could be argued that the profitability variable in this 
dataset is not an objective variable (indicating whether a firm has made a positive profit in the last financial 
year), but a subjective variable, measuring the profit of a firm vis-à-vis some aspiration level that depends on 
past performance. For example, firms that experience growth could have higher aspiration levels regarding their 
profits than firms that experience a decline. Thus, it could be that some firms that were actually objectively pro
itable did not report it as such and vice versa, because they were making reference to their aspiration levels, 
which are unobservable in the data. If past growth is positively associated with current growth and innovative 
activities, and also with higher aspiration levels for profitability, the results could be biased, underestimating the 
positive relation between innovative activity and profitability. Thus, if such a bias exists indeed, the main mes-
sages of this study would be unaffected, with the possible exceptions that a significant positive relation between 
process innovation and profitability might exist after all. 
-
f-
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PART III 
8. Summary 
 
This thesis argued that the diffusion of e-business technologies among firms is part of the ongoing process of 
technological change and economic development. The adoption of a new e-business technologies by firms cre-
ates opportunities to conduct innovations, either to reduce the costs for a given output, to create a new service, 
or to deliver products to customers in a way that is new to the enterprise. Depending on how firms utilize the 
technologies, the consequences can vary substantially, both at the level of the individual firm, at the market 
level, and at the aggregate level. Thus, it was argued that at least as important as the technologies themselves is 
how firms utilize them to change their business. 
Part I of the thesis provided a comprehensive overview of what we currently know about the diffusion of new 
technologies among firms and the consequences of the diffusion process. It was emphasized that the diffusion of 
new technologies among firms is an essential part of the dynamics of technological development and change. An 
attempt was made to bridge the gap between the management and the economics literature on these topics on 
various occasions, with the purpose to identify complementarities between the fields and to draw conclusions for 
both audiences. E-business technologies were placed in perspective to the existing literature and a set of hy-
potheses were derived that could be empirically tested in Part II of the thesis. While Part I was taking stock of 
the existing theories and empirical findings, Part II presented original research results providing new theoretical 
arguments and empirical tests of theoretical predictions that contribute to the existing literature in a number of 
ways.  
The new empirical results suggest that Internet-based technologies are currently important enablers of both 
process and product/service innovations. Chapter 7 shows that innovative firms are more likely to experience 
turnover and employment growth than firms that do not innovate. Also, Chapter 7 provides evidence that e-
business related innovations are not inferior to other kinds of innovations in terms of positive interrelation with 
performance indicators. However, in contrast to process innovations, only product/service innovations exhibit a 
positive relationship with profitability. This indicates difficulties of firms to appropriate private returns from in-
vestments into productivity-enhancing technologies and process innovations.  
The presented evidence also suggests that e-business technologies are currently an important part of techno-
logical competition among firms: They present both opportunities for profitable investments and for strategic 
advantages, which can be generated either by increasing market shares due to improved productivity, or through 
the exploration of new markets by means of product innovation and differentiation. Chapter 7 suggests that the 
resource-based view of the firm, which focuses on firm-internal factors influencing performance differences, can 
be complemented by the conceptual link between IT adoption and innovation that is proposed in this study: 
Firm-specific resources such as managerial skills, know-how, experience, the presence of technical experts and 
prior technological investments may influence the ability of firms to transfer IT investments into innovation. If 
no innovation is triggered, the investment will be written off. If the investment is successfully transferred into an 
innovation, the performance outcome will be determined in a market process. The payoff explicitly depends on 
the type of the innovation that was carried out and the reaction of other agents, such as customers, competitors 
and suppliers. Thus, there is a strong strategic dimension to the decision to adopt a new technology. In particu-
lar, the timing of the decision is important and has an influence of the ability of competitors to copy the innova-
tion and hence on the ability of the innovator to appropriate private rents. 
-
The empirical results also indicate that investments into IT and e-business technologies are a two-edged 
sword with respect to employment dynamics. On the one hand, there is evidence for a compensation effect: 
Firms that invest into IT-enabled innovation are more likely to grow, and therefore more likely to increase em
ployment. However, there is also evidence for a substitution effect both on the market and within firms: The 
most advanced firms in terms of e-business usage are more likely to decrease employment, which suggests that 
labor is partially substituted by e-business technology. Also, firms that do not innovate are more likely to reduce 
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employment, which suggests that innovative firms grow at the expense of their non-innovative rivals. The 
aggregate employment effect is yet unknown, but crucially depends on the dynamics of aggregate demand. 
The two chapters studying the adoption and diffusion of multiple related e-business technologies revealed 
important insights about technological change in general: With the emergence of a new technological paradigm, 
firms are often confronted with the opportunity to invest into numerous, related technologies that belong to that 
paradigm. The theory and the empirical evidence presented here suggests that a particular pattern will emerge: 
Provided that the related technologies do not substitute another in their functionalities, there can be increasing 
returns to adoption. In this case, the probability to adopt is an increasing function of the number of previously 
adopted, related technologies. Thus, history matters for the technological development of a firm. An adoption 
decision today affects the expected value of any other related technology in the future. Hence, technological de
velopment can be viewed as a path dependent process that exhibits an endogenous acceleration mechanism. Pro-
vided that not all firms start to adopt the new technologies at the same time, a growing divergence in technologi-
cal endowment among firms is a logical consequence of this mechanism. This technological divergence in the 
early periods after the emergence of a new paradigm will continue to grow until the most advanced firms have 
exhausted the potentials of the new paradigm and stop making progress. Only then will the follower firms be 
able to “catch up”, and technological endowments will begin to converge again.  
-
0
Table 33 summarizes the empirical results of Part II. There was empirical support for 8 of the 11 developed 
hypotheses regarding the diffusion and implications of e-business technologies. One hypothesis was rejected, 
and two hypotheses yielded ambiguous results. The strongest empirical support was found for Hypothesis 1 , 
which suggested that the development upon the e-business trajectory can be subject to an endogenous accelera-
tion mechanism. Support for this was found using two different datasets and four different econometric ap-
proaches.  
 
Table 33 – Overview of empirical results 
 Chapter 
Hypothesis  5.2 5.3 5.4 6.2 7.3 
1 – Diffusion varies across sectors 
 +  +   
2 – Sectors with high concentration ratios and 
high technological competition are more likely to 
adopt 
-     
3 – Large firms are more likely to adopt 
 +   +  
4 – Firms with medium degree of market power 
are more likely to adopt    +  
5 – Early movers enjoy excess returns 
     ? 
6 – Innovators are more likely to grow 
     + 
7 – Firms that are advanced in using e-business 
are more likely to reduce employment     + 
8 - Firms that recently used technology to inno-
vate are more likely to increase employment     + 
9 – The probability to adopt e-business technolo-
gies strictly increases with time    +  
10 – The probability to adopt any e-business 
technology increases with the number of previ-
ously adopted e-business technologies 
+ + + +  
11 – Industries with high ICT competence are 
more likely to adopt e-business technology ?     
Legend 
+ : empirically supported 
- : empirically rejected 
? : ambiguous empirical results 
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On the methodical side, a few new empirical methods have been applied in this study. In Chapter 7, an er-
ror component model of firm performance is introduced that controls for unobserved market specific effects. 
Chapter 6 featured a discrete time hazard rate model that controls for unobserved firm-specific heterogeneity to 
study the diffusion of multiple related technologies. The model avoided the implausible assumption that all firms 
will eventually adopt by specifying a flexible piece-wise constant baseline hazard rate. In Chapter 5, a simulta-
neous equation model of technology adoption was introduced to distinguish between the direct influence of 
technologies on another and exogenous factors that drive adoption decisions. Finally, Classification and Regres-
sion Trees (CART) have been introduced to study innovation adoption. The CART results have a very appealing 
practical value for technology providers, consultants, and marketers of new products and technologies because 
they enable to identify clusters that differ significantly in their probability to adopt. Provided that the collected 
data are fairly recent, the identified clusters can help to optimize marketing and sales strategies. For example, a 
technology provider might decide to focus his marketing activities on those clusters that have been identified as 
showing high probability to adopt. Also, a technology provider who is already conducting business with a client 
might use the CART results to make an “educated guess” about what will be a likely future investment of the 
client. This knowledge could be used to increase the chances of getting a follow-up job. In a similar way, CART 
can generally be used as a market research instrument for any kind of product, service or technology where re-
cent and preferably large datasets are available. 
9. Implications and further research 
 
The theoretical considerations and empirical results of this thesis emphasize the strategic importance of new 
technologies in general, and IT in particular. 
The observation of an endogenous acceleration mechanism of technological development along a given para-
digm suggests that early mover advantages can exist that are sustainable until the early mover has exhausted the 
possibilities of the paradigm, and competing followers begin to catch up (if they still exist then). In addition, 
early mover advantages can be sustainable even in the long run if there is free entry and exit in the market, if 
firms are not ex ante identical, for example if there are positive returns to scale, learning-by-doing effects, scarce 
complementary resources to the new technology, market reputation effects, or discount rates that are lower for 
previously more profitable companies. If first mover rents may not be completely extinguished by competing 
followers, it might be less profitable for late movers to adopt at all. Also, some firms might “pre-emptively” 
adopt to capture strategic advantages, even if this would not be justified on ROI considerations alone.  
From the adopters’ perspective, this implies that companies must be aware of the path-dependency and the 
strategic role of technology investment decisions. There are two crucial questions that firms need to answer 
when a new technological paradigm emerges:  
1. Is there an alternative technological trajectory available to solve the same problems or to build up the same 
strategic resources? If alternatives do exist, then the adoption decision becomes not only a problem of opti-
mal timing, but also a choice between alternative technological development paths. “Betting on the wrong 
horse” could put the very existence of the firm at stake. In this case, the timing of the decision becomes sub-
ject to a difficult trade-off. On the one hand, being an early mover on the “right” trajectory promises com-
petitive advantages, not least because of a possible acceleration mechanism. On the other hand, it has some 
benefits to wait and see which of the trajectories reaches critical mass and emerges as the new industry stan-
dard. However, once this is clear, it might be too late for the firm to capture early mover advantages.  
2. If no technological alternatives exist to the new paradigm, firms still need to assess how substantial the tech-
nological uncertainty is and how probable rapid technological improvements are in the future. Both of these 
effects make it more attractive to delay the investment. However, if technological uncertainty is limited and 
no dramatic technological improvements can be expected for the near future, an early mover strategy will 
probably be most beneficial, especially if an acceleration effect can be expected. 
Arguably, these are tough questions to answer and choosing the correct development path and the optimal 
time to invest are clearly decisions with far reaching consequences that require a very profound knowledge of 
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the technological developments and of the behavior of other market players, such as competitors, suppliers, 
customers, and potential new entrants. Confronted with such a situation of Knightian uncertainty, firms might 
benefit from the knowledge of industry experts and consultants to choose their path of action.  
The particular importance of e-business as a technological paradigm arises from its very general scope of ap-
plication and from the fact that its underlying technology (the Internet) is subject to network effects and has al-
ready reached critical mass. The technological problem that all e-business solutions try to solve is to optimize 
the exchange of commercially relevant information, which is essential for running and controlling any business. 
They do so by providing specific software solutions that run on non-proprietary computer communication net
works with a universally standardized protocol (TCP/IP). The “normal problem solving tools” of e-business 
technologies are applicable in various regions, sectors, firms, and functional areas. In many sectors, certain e-
business applications are already the new standard for exchanging commercially relevant information and firms 
that are not able to keep up with this technological development face the risk of losing out to the competition (e-
Business Market W@tch 2004).  
-
-
-
-
Yet, the results of this study also imply that the strategic implications of technology investments arise less 
from the technologies themselves than from the way the technologies are utilized to conduct innovation on the 
side of the user. Theory suggests that technology-induced innovations can lead to sustainable advantages, but 
only if not all rivals are able to perfectly copy the improved production process or product. In any case, even if 
firms are not able to appropriate private excess returns from the technology-induced innovation, conducting the 
innovation may still have a strategic value because it may help to defend market shares against competitors who 
also engage in innovations. Thus, technology-induced innovation may help to increase the chances of survival in 
a given market.  
The presence of an endogenous acceleration mechanism also has some important implications for the suppli
ers and marketers of e-business technologies and ICT in general: Firms that have previously invested into related 
technologies are more likely to make additional investments into such technologies. Thus, it should be much 
easier for technology suppliers to conduct further business with their existing clients or firms that are already 
advanced in using compatible technologies than to acquire orders from firms that are less advanced or on a dif-
ferent technological trajectory. This will hold until the most advanced firms have exhausted the potentials of the 
new technological trajectory and reach a saturation level. Technology providers could actively benefit from this 
mechanism by systematically studying and understanding the purchasing behavior of their customers and the ex-
istence of technological interdependencies. 
From an economic point of view, it was pointed out that innovation and technological change may effect vari-
ous important areas, such as the development of market structure, productivity, growth, and employment dynam-
ics. The provided empirical evidence implies that IT and e-business technologies are currently important en
ablers of innovative activity in Europe. Related research has demonstrated that IT investments in conjunction 
with complementary investments into human resources and organizational change does have positive effects on 
firm-level productivity and growth. 
The results of this study also suggest that firms that successfully conduct innovations using e-business tech-
nologies will grow faster than non-innovating firms. However, they will probably do so at the expense of non-
innovating firms, especially considering the currently stagnating demand dynamics in many markets in Europe. 
This might have consequences for the development of market structures. Also, there is evidence that technologi-
cal advanced firms have a tendency to reduce employment, which suggests that e-business technologies can be 
used to substitute labor. Hence, a possible implication of this finding is that e-business technologies can be an 
instrument for firms to rationalize and restructure, leading to productivity growth at the expense of total em
ployment in a low GDP growth scenario. Also, we may expect that the diffusion of e-business technologies will 
have a skill-biased effect on labor demand, favoring well-educated workers with ICT skills. 
The finding that technological development at the firm level can be subject to increasing returns could be 
transferred to the aggregate level. If firms in a specific country get a head start in adopting technologies from a 
new paradigm, this might generate a technology gap vis-à-vis firms in other countries. This would provide an in-
teresting alternative explanation why some countries become technological leaders and some followers, with 
possible consequences for productivity and per-capita income differences among countries (Barro and Sala-I-
Martin 1997). 
From a policy perspective, it is interesting to note that investments into innovation and new technologies 
might be subject to market failure, which can result in either too much or too little investment in technology 
compared to the social optimum. However, it is also not clear a-priori which scenario is likely to occur, if market 
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failure will occur at all, or what the social optimum would actually be in reality. Metcalfe (1995) and 
Mowery (1995) provide good surveys on these issues. Some empirical studies have also analyzed the effect of 
government intervention in the diffusion process. Evidence suggests that governmental intervention rarely 
speeds up the diffusion process and government-controlled firms do not move faster than privately owned com
panies (Hannan and McDowell 1984, Oster and Quigley 1977, Rose and Joskow 1990). 
-
-
Numerous important questions regarding the dynamics of technology diffusion still remain open and present 
potential for future research. For example, a panel data analysis incorporating technology investment decisions 
and performance parameters (such as profits or market share) over time would provide valuable new insights 
into the dynamics of market structure development and technological change. From a policy perspective, many 
important questions still remain open that require further theoretical and empirical research: Does intense tech-
nological competition lead to higher concentration ratios or monopoly market outcomes, and is such a scenario 
desirable from a social welfare perspective? What is the socially optimal level of investment into new technol-
ogy and what role can policy makers play in reaching that optimum? 
Also, the strategic dynamics of new technology diffusion, as proposed by stock and order effect models, need 
a more rigorous empirical analysis. How do real decision makers behave in such situations of strategic uncer-
tainty? Furthermore, the role of risk with regards to the properties of technologies need to be disentangled from 
the role of ambiguity and the process of information acquisition about the new technology. As theory suggests, 
these are different concepts with different impacts on the diffusion process. Also, the rapidly emerging field of 
behavioral economics provides manifold evidence that actual human behavior in risky and ambiguous situations 
is very complex and only badly described by the standard assumptions of risk aversion or expected utility theory 
(see for example Kahneman and Tversky, 1979; Thaler et. al., 1997; Fox and Tversky, 1995; Schade et al., 
2002). It has not yet been analyzed how these psychological phenomena influence the behavior of real decision 
makers in the specific context of technology investments in firms. Thus, we do not yet know how different in
formation conditions and levels of uncertainty actually influence the spread of new technologies among firms in 
the real world where perceptions and risk attitudes of decision makers do matter. Empirical studies with real 
world data clearly have limitations to answer these questions. Instead, laboratory experiments might provide 
useful new insights because they allow to control and to manipulate risk, ambiguity, and information conditions 
in explicit ways. This could be subject to interesting future research. 
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Appendix 1 – CART 
 
Splitting nodes 
A number of methods have been proposed to define the best split (Breiman, 1984, chapter 4). Entropy impu-
rity is used for the study in Chapter 5.4. The entropy criterion is related to the likelihood function. It tends to 
look for splits where as many levels as possible are divided perfectly or near perfectly. As a result, entropy puts 
more emphasis on getting rare characteristics right than e.g. Gini or Twoing.  
Consider the following split, where a, b, c, and d are the number of subjects in the two daughter nodes: 
 
Table 34  – Cross table for two daughter nodes 
 Predictor Adopter Non-Adopter  
Left node   
is 1=  a b a+b 
Right node   
is 0=  c d c+d 
  a+c b+d n = a+b+c+d  
 
Following Breiman et. al. (1984, pp. 94-102), the entropy impurity in the left daughter node is 
 
 ( ) log logL
a a b bi t
a b a b a b a b
   = − −   + + + +   
(1)   . 
 
Likewise, the entropy impurity in the right daughter node is 
 
(2)   ( ) log logR
c c d d
c d c d c d c d
   = − −   + + + +   i t
. 
 
The impurity of the parent node consequently is 
 
(3)  ( ) log loga c a c b d b d
n n n n
+ + + +  = − −    i t
. 
The goodness of a split, s, is then measured by 
}
 
 
(4)  ∆ = . ( , ) ( ) { } ( ) { } {L L R RI s t i t P t i t P t i t− −
 
The goodness of a split is calculated for all available predictor variables, and the best predictor, which is the 
one with the highest , is selected. ( , )I s t∆
This recursive partitioning process continues until the tree is saturated in the sense that the offspring nodes 
subject to further division cannot be split any further (e.g. when there is perfect homogeneity in the node). The 
resulting saturated tree is called . 0T
 
Pruning 
The purpose of pruning is to find the right-sized tree, which should be a nested sub-tree of . The right-
sized tree should not be subject to over-fitting and insignificant splits, but detailed enough to exhibit a good 
classification performance. To begin, we need to define a concept to measure classification performance. Recall 
0T
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that CART predicts the outcome (e.g. adoption or non-adoption) based on the group membership of a sub
ject. In the tree, each subject falls into exactly one terminal node. We choose a class assignment rule that assigns 
a class to every terminal node  . In our application, node t is assigned “adopter {Y=1}” if 
-
t T∈ % { }1 0.t= ≥ 5P Y  
and vice versa. In this simple case, the expected cost resulting from any subject within a node is given by 
R(
V , vΛ =
V
Rˆ(T
 
 (5)  , ( ) 1 ( | )r t P i t= −
 
where ( | )P i t  is the percentage of correctly classified subjects in a node.  
Note that r(t) becomes smaller for any additional split. The formal proof is given by Breiman et. al. (1984, p. 
95-96). Thus, r(t) is minimal for the saturated tree. 
The classification performance of the entire tree is given by the quality of its terminal nodes 
 
(6) ( ) ( ) ( )
t T
R P t r t
∈
Τ = ∑
%
 , 
 
where is the misclassification cost of all terminal nodes in the tree, T  the set of terminal nodes, and 
 the probability of a subject to fall into the terminal node t. 
( )R Τ %
P(t)
We are now ready to turn to the main idea of cost-complexity pruning (Breiman et. al., 1984, pp. 66-71): For 
any subtree 0 , define its complexity as Τ ≤ Τ Τ% , the number of terminal nodes in T. Let ( 0)α ≥  be a real num-
ber called the complexity parameter and define the cost complexity of the entire tree as 
 
(7) ( ) ( )R Rα αΤ = Τ + Τ% . 
 
For any value of ( 0)α ≥ , there is a unique smallest subtree of T  that minimizes . The formal proof is 
in Breiman et. al. (1985, chapter 10). Thus, by gradually increasing 
0 ( )Rα Τα , a sequence of nested essential subtrees 
of  can be constructed by pruning off the weakest branches at each threshold level of α . Note that T  mini
mizes  if . If 
0T 0 -
( )Rα Τ 0α = α  becomes large enough, the root node becomes the optimal solution. 
 
Selection of the best pruned tree using cross-validation 
The classification performance  as specified in (6) is obviously biased and results in severe over-fitting. 
To select the best pruned tree, we need a more honest estimate of the true misclassification cost of the tree. Us
ing cross-validation (Breiman et. al., 1984, pp. 75-78), we estimate  by growing a series of V auxiliary 
trees together with the main tree grown on the learning sample 
T)
-
Rˆ(T)
Λ . The V auxiliary trees are grown on randomly 
divided, same sized subsets, , with the v-th learning sample being 1,.., V (v) VΛ = Λ − Λ  so that (v)Λ  
contains the fraction (V  of the total data cases. For each v, the trees and their pruning sequence are con
structed without ever seeing the cases in . Thus, they can serve as an independent test sample for the tree 
. The idea now is that for V large, 
1) /− -
VΛ
(V)T ( )α (V)T ( )α  should have about the same classification accuracy as T( )α . 
If unit misclassification costs are used, and priors are data estimated as in Chapter 5.4, the estimated misclassifi
cation costs  equal the proportion of misclassified test set cases in the V auxiliary trees. The best pruned 
tree is the one with the smallest . 
-
Rˆ(T)
)
 
Significance of splits 
Finally, the significance of each individual split in the selected tree can be tested following Sheskin (2000; 
section 16.6): Recall the notation from table 8. The resubstitution risk is defined as 
 
(8)  
a
a b
c
c d
+=
+
r . 
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The calculation of the confidence interval of r requires to compute the standard error of the two daughter 
nodes, which is given by 
 
(9)  1 1 1 1r a b c d
= + + +SE . 
 
Since the sampling distribution of the resubstitution risk is positively skewed, a logarithmic scale transforma-
tion is employed in computing the confidence interval (Christensen, 1990; Pagano and Gauvreau, 1993). The  
-confidence level is obtained by α
 
(10) { ( ) ( ) }ln ln;r SE z r SE ze eα α− • + •       , 
 
where  is the tabled two-tailed z value for the zα (1 )− α  confidence level.  For the 95% confidence level, the 
relevant .05 value is . This test is computed for all splits in the tree that was selected from the pruning 
sequence after the cross-validation procedure. 
.05z 1.9= 6
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Appendix 2 – Additional CART results 
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Figure 12 – CART for SCM 
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Figure 13 – CART for sharing documents online (Share_doc) 
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Figure 14 – CART for CMS 
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Figure 15 – CART for ERP 
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Figure 16 – CART for KMS 
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Figure 17 – CART for HRM 
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Figure 18 – CART for online purchasing (Purch) 
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Figure 19 – CART for Design 
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